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Game of frames: the competition to establish the dominant framing of 
climate change among journalists, ministers and political advisors 
	
	
Author: David Robbins, Schools of Communications, DCU 
 
Abstract  
 
This research is concerned with the competition between various actors – journalists, 
government ministers and their advisors – to establish the dominant framing of climate 
change during a particularly eventful period of Irish political history, during which the 
Green Party was in government and Ireland underwent a dramatic financial crisis. Three 
levels of analysis are presented: a content analysis to determine levels and trends in media 
attention for climate change; a frame analysis to uncover journalistic framings, and 
analysis of interviews with environmental journalists, government ministers and media 
advisors. The findings of these analyses are then discussed in relation to the dynamics of 
framing and theories of agenda systems. The explanatory power of the mediated issue 
development model proposed by Nisbet and Huge (2006) is also assessed in relation to 
Ireland’s media coverage of climate change. 
 
Ireland’s media coverage of climate change is framed in predominantly political terms, 
while economic frames, frames emphasising the scientific consensus and frames 
foregrounding the moral and ethical aspects of the topic are also strongly represented. 
Sceptic arguments are not present in the coverage to any great degree, are largely 
confined to the opinion section and consist of dismissive and sarcastic references rather 
than substantive arguments. 
 
The frame competition emerges as a complex process in which government ministers 
attempt differing communications strategies: one minister emphasised a responsibility 
frame, while the other foregrounded economic and opportunity framings. Journalists, 
however, were constrained by news values and their journalistic culture and preferred 
political framings. These political framings stopped short of implicating the existing 
political and economic structures in creating climate change, but favoured ecomodern 
perspectives and solutions emphasising efficiency and techno-managerial solutions. 
	 xx	
More recent Irish media coverage of climate change has focused on constituent issues 
such as waste, water, energy efficiency and transport, thus further de-politicising the 
issue. 
 
The concluding remarks include recommendations for best practice in covering and 
communicating about climate change, including the necessity of employing specialized 
environment correspondents, the need to tailor news subsidies in a strategic manner, and 
the advisability of employing flexible framing strategies. The role of journalists as 
political media advisors is also assessed. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
“Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting 
changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, 
pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems.” – IPCC 5th Assessment 
Report, Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers, November 2014 
 
“We have the means to limit climate change. The solutions are many and allow for 
continued economic and human development. All we need is the will to change, which we 
trust will be motivated by knowledge and an understanding of the science of climate 
change.” – R. K. Pachauri, Chair of the IPCC. November 2, 2014. 
 
“Climate change is not a priority for Ireland.” – Taoiseach (prime minister) Enda Kenny, 
briefing to journalists, COP21, Paris, November 30, 2015. 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
This thesis is concerned with investigating the extent and nature of Ireland’s print media 
coverage of climate change between 2007 and early 2016, with examining the framing 
strategies of the journalists who authored much of this coverage, and the politicians and 
media advisors who sought to contribute to, increase or influence it. 
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In this chapter, I intend to set out briefly why such a project is worthwhile, and to set my 
research in context. I also state in which respects this project comprises an original 
contribution to knowledge of media coverage of climate change, and reflect on my role 
as a practitioner-scholar to carry out such research. Finally, an explanation of how the 
remaining chapters of the thesis are organised is given. 
 
This research takes as a starting point a disparity between the findings of climate science 
and institutional and political responses (Moser and Dilling, 2004; Nerlich, 2010; Schäfer 
et al., 2014). The varied social responses to the challenge of climate change, from those 
who contend it “changes everything” (Klein, 2014) to those who maintain it is “the 
greatest hoax ever perpetrated…” (Inhofe, 2012), is also of interest to scholars of media 
coverage of climate change. Such scholars, myself included, are motivated to examine 
the media’s role in amplifying and interrogating such perspectives. 
 
This scholarly interest is based on several aspects of the media’s role and influence in 
society. The first relates to a long-standing research area in media studies: the agenda-
setting power of the media to influence public perceptions of salience (McCombs and 
Shaw, 1972; McCombs, 2004; Weaver, 2007; Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2011). Agenda-
setting argues that the more media coverage is devoted to an issue, the more important 
the public perceives the issue to be. Thus, levels of media attention for climate change 
are important because they can move the issue to the top of the public’s agenda and lead 
to pressure on governments to act (Newell, 2000). 
 
The second relates to the normative role of the media in relation to informing the public. 
For many, climate change is an unobtrusive problem (Atwater, 1985 cited in Shanahan 
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and Good, 2000) which is experienced predominantly through the media (Anderson, 
2011; Nelkin, 1987). Many scholars believe it is the media’s job to act as society’s 
watchdog, and to warn of impending risks and harm (Gil de Zúñiga and Hinsley, 2013), 
and the academy has been interested to establish whether the media are fulfilling this role 
with regard to climate change (Hiles and Hinnant, 2014). Concern over the transmission 
of relevant information regarding the findings of climate science via the media also 
connects with other scholarship regarding the communication of science in general, and 
whether the media is fulfilling its normative role in its treatment of other complex socio-
scientific issues (Nisbet & Fahy, 2015). 
 
A third reason why media coverage of climate change is of interest relates to the media’s 
role in creating a “public sphere” (Habermas, 1989) in which societies can present and 
debate issues of common concern before arriving at agreed actions. Motivated actors 
engage in claims making in this sphere, and these may include citizens, lobbyists, non-
governmental organisations, politicians and policy advocates, as well as the media. Often, 
it is here that a competition takes place to establish dominant narratives about certain 
issues 
 
This thesis pays particular attention to a fourth reason: media coverage of climate change 
is of interest regarding how (and not just how often) it covers the issue. This “how” is 
revealed by the framing devices employed by journalists and other claims makers 
communicating about the issue. It is helpful here to give a brief definition of framing; the 
development of framing as a theory of media effects is considered in section 3.6, and the 
process by which a frame analysis of Irish print media texts about climate change was 
carried out for this thesis are explained and discussed in section 4.7. Framing is the 
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necessary process whereby information is presented so that the receiver understands and 
interprets it in certain ways. Framing is “the setting of an issue within an appropriate 
context to achieve a desired interpretation or perspective” (de Blasio and Sorice, 2013, p. 
63). The origins of framing as a means of understanding communication lie in sociology, 
and framing was initially conceived as a means of organising “the information of 
everyday life” (Goffman, cited in Bowe et al 2012, p. 158). It became attractive to 
scholars of media because media frames – the elements of a story foregrounded by the 
journalist – were found to influence how audiences perceived certain issues. These media 
frames contained elements of problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation 
and treatment recommendation (Entman 1993, p. 52).  
 
The competition to establish a dominant narrative or perception in the public and media 
discourse is a key element of framing, and of various approaches to the dynamics of 
agenda systems. The framing of climate change is important, because certain frames 
encourage public engagement with the issue, while others discourage it, and some may 
promote sceptic attitudes towards mitigation or adaptation policies (Gavin & Marshall, 
2011; Nisbet, 2009; Painter, 2011). Furthermore, framings may change over time as an 
issue progresses along a media trajectory, moving from one policy venue to another, 
becoming subject to claims making by diverse groups and these changes have 
implications for public and policy responses to the issue (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; 
Kingdon, 1995; Jones and Baumgartner, 2012). This examination of media framings is 
illuminated further through interviews with journalists, politicians and media advisors to 
give a multi-level analysis of climate change communication in Ireland during the 
timeframe under study. 
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1.2 The scientific context 
 
 
The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), published in November, 2014 makes it clear that “Continued 
emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all 
components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and 
irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems” (IPCC, 2014, p. 2) The series of reports 
that comprise AR5 make it clear that climate change is a serious threat requiring 
international action. At the time of writing, AR5 is the latest in a series of assessments of 
the effect of greenhouse gases (predominantly carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous 
oxide, although chloro-fluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride contribute to the 
greenhouse effect also) are having on the atmosphere. The first of these reports was 
published in 1990 and the others have followed every five, six, or (as in the case of AR5) 
seven years. The language concerning the anthropogenic contribution to climate change 
in the reports has become more definitive over time, with AR5 declaring that “warming 
of the climate system is unequivocal” (IPCC, 2014, SPM 1.1, p. 2) and that 
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era, 
driven largely by economic and population growth, and are now higher than ever. This 
has led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that 
are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with those of 
other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate system and are 
extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-
20th century. (Ibid., SPM 1.2, p. 4, emphasis in original). 
 
The Summary for Policymakers issued by the IPCC in tandem with the AR5 Synthesis 
Report in 2014 begins with a description of “observed changes” in the global climate: 
“The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished 
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and sea levels have risen.” These changes have led to “widespread impacts on human and 
natural systems.” The Summary outlines the IPCC’s projections for future warming under 
a number of different emissions scenarios. The IPCC undertook “multi-model mean 
projections” to arrive at several climate scenarios, called “representative concentration 
pathways” or RCPs. For example, under RCP 2.6 (which envisages dramatic emissions 
reductions and adaptation measures), warming is kept below the widely accepted tipping 
point of 2 degrees Celsius, sea level rise is stabilised and rainfall pattern is relatively 
unchanged. However, under RCP 8.5 (which envisages emissions continuing to rise at 
current rates), there is a dramatic reduction in rainfall in the middle latitudes (-10 to -20 
per cent), a dramatic increase in rainfall in the northern and southern latitudes (up to + 50 
per cent) and temperature increases of up to 9 degrees Celsius by 2100. (IPCC 2014: 12).  
 
The Assessment Reports of the IPCC are representative of a broad scientific consensus 
on the anthropogenic contribution to climate change. The National Academies in the 
United States have also confirmed the human influence in rising levels of CO2 and other 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) (Brand, 2010, p. 15). A study of 11,944 scientific papers on 
climate change published between 1991 and 2011 showed that between 97.1% and 97.2% 
of scientific literature which expressed a position on the origins of climate change 
endorsed the existence of anthropogenic global warming, and described the number of 
papers rejecting the consensus on anthropogenic global warming as a “vanishingly small 
proportion of published research”. (Cook et al 2013: 1). This has led some to describe the 
current geological period, previously known as the Holocene, as the “Anthropocene”, 
due to the increasing impact of humans on the planet (Crutzen, 2006; Steffen, Crutzen 
and McNeill, 2007). 
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Ireland has contributed to, and been affected by, global warming. During the period 1995-
2005, the country witnessed changes in settlement patterns, deteriorating environmental 
quality and considerable expansion of transport, waste and water usage. (Pape et al 2011: 
29). Indeed, Ireland recorded “the highest percentage increase of greenhouse gas 
emissions from the transport sector of any EU state during the period 1990-2003”. (Flynn 
2007: 58). Provisional measurements show that Ireland’s total greenhouse gas emissions 
for 2016 amounted to 61.19 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (Mt CO2eq) (EPA Ireland, 
2017) and Ireland is one of only 12 parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to show an increase in total aggregate anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases between 1990 and 2015 (UNFCCC, 2017). Ireland’s per 
capita emissions are relatively high; the country is the third highest per capita emitter in 
the EU (Ó Fáharta, 2016). This elevated per capita figure is largely due to the distorting 
effect of emissions from the agriculture sector, which is expected to account for over 45% 
of Ireland’s non-ETS emissions by 2020. Ireland is required by the EU to reduce its non-
ETS emissions by 20% (as measured against 2005 levels) by 2020. (Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2014). It is expected to miss the 2020 target by a wide margin 
(Climate Change Advisory Council, 2017b; Melia, 2017). In addition, Ireland is, at the 
time of writing, involved in EU-wide negotiations regarding an Effort Sharing Regulation 
which will set emissions targets for 2030. (Environmental Protection Agency, 2014). 
Ireland has been criticised for adopting a negotiating position aimed at reducing the 
ambition of the 2030 targets. (O’Sullivan, 2017b) 
 
Meanwhile, the impacts of climate change are beginning to be felt in Ireland, with 
increased rainfall, fewer frost nights and more frequent flood events (Environmental 
Protection Agency 2009; McElwain & Sweeney, 2007; Sweeney, 2000), with 
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implications for Ireland’s agriculture (Sweeney et al., 2003, 2007), fisheries (Pinnegar et 
al, 2017), and economy (Flood, 2012; Government of Ireland, 2017).  
 
Since the publication of AR5, the findings of climate science suggest that the models 
used by the IPCC have underestimated the rate of warming and the extent of impacts 
(Harrison et al., 2016; Stern, 2016). However, political responses to climate change have 
been largely inadequate (Giddens, 2009), and it is considered that even the international 
agreement to reduce global emissions arrived at in Paris in December 2015 may not 
include sufficient measure to keep global warming to below 2C (Anderson & Peters, 
2016a, 2016b).  
 
 
1.3 The policy context 
 
The policy response to climate change in Ireland has been slow, leading to the suggestion 
that Ireland is a “laggard” when it comes to climate policy (Torney & Little, 2017). On 
September 30 and October 1, 2017, Ireland’s Citizens’ Assembly1 (an exercise in 
deliberative democracy in which 100 citizens consider social issues) considered the topic 
of “How the State can make Ireland a leader in tackling climate change”. The Citizens’ 
Assembly meeting was the most recent in a range of climate-related publications and 
initiatives, including a National Mitigation Plan (Government of Ireland, 2017) and a 
public consultation process entitled the National Dialogue on Climate Action, mandated 
by the Programme for Government agreement between Fine Gael and several 
																																																						
1	Details of the Assembly can be found at www.citizensassembly.ie and archive video footage of the 
first of two sessions considering the topic “How the State can make Ireland a leader in tackling  
Climate Change” can be accessed at 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC2DgyetL9aUTMry_F9B9yUw 
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independent deputies. Some of these initiatives were mandated in Ireland’s primary 
climate change legislation, the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 
(Government of Ireland, 2015). In general, the policy responses to climate change in 
Ireland, including the Act, have been roundly criticised for (i) the absence of binding 
sectoral targets for emissions reduction, and (ii) the lack of specific policy proposals as 
to how a transition to a low-carbon economy and society is to be achieved (Torney, 2017). 
Indeed, the Climate Change Advisory Council, an expert body established by the 2015 
Act, has warned, firstly, that Ireland’s emissions are in fact rising in the agriculture and 
transport sectors, and that, “in the absence of further policies or measures, the overshoot 
on emissions could be even larger than currently projected” (Climate Change Advisory 
Council, 2017b, p. 10). At the meeting of the Citizens’ Assembly, it was remarked that 
making Ireland a leader in tackling climate change was “fanciful”, that Ireland was failing 
“spectacularly” to meet its obligations on emissions reduction, and that it might be a 
better first step to ensure Ireland simply did its fair share (O’Sullivan, 2017a). 
 
1.4 The social and political context 
 
 
Political progress in advancing climate legislation has been a slow and contested process, 
with sectoral interests, particularly the agriculture lobby, arguing against specified 
targets. At various points since Ireland was assigned emissions targets as a result of the 
burden-sharing agreement of the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, a range of political parties 
including the Green Party, Labour and Fine Gael have been involved in proposing climate 
legislation (Torney, 2017). A comprehensive bill was proposed by the Labour Party in 
2007, another by the Green Party in 2010; neither was enacted. A less stringent bill was 
proposed by a Fine Gael minister in 2013, and a version of this legislation was again 
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presented by his Labour Party successor in 2015, at which point it was passed by the 
Oireachtas (Ibid.).  
 
The Labour Party bill of 2007 was introduced as a private member’s bill in the Seanad 
(upper house) when the Labour Party was in opposition, and stood little chance of being 
accepted by the government. The 2010 bill, put forward by the Green-Fianna Fail 
government, had been accepted at cabinet, and was in a consultation period when that 
government fell. The 2015 Act was passed by a Fine Gael-Labour coalition. An 
interesting difference in the drafting of the 2010 Greens-led legislation and the 2015 Fine 
Gael-led Act relates to the composition of a “national expert advisory body on climate 
change” (now called the Climate Change Advisory Council, mentioned above). In the 
2010 bill, the chief executives of the Environmental Protection Agency and the 
Sustainable Energy Association of Ireland were proposed as ex officio members of this 
body; in the 2015 legislation, these were augmented by the director of Teagasc, the state 
agricultural research agency, and the director of the Economic and Social Research 
Institute, signalling a turn away from an environmental emphasis and towards an 
agricultural and economic one. 
 
Two further developments permit insights into the political and social contexts in which 
this research is set. Firstly, at the UN climate change conference in Paris in December, 
2015, Taoiseach Enda Kenny (in common with all other government leaders) addressed 
the COP, saying that climate change “requires action by everybody, big and small. Ireland 
is determined to play its part”. However, he also alluded to Irish agriculture, saying it was 
“already efficient” (Kenny, 2015). Meanwhile, in a briefing to the Irish media, he said 
that tackling climate change was not a priority for Ireland, defended the agriculture sector 
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and blamed a “lost decade” of economic growth for Ireland’s inability to prioritise 
climate action (McGee, 2015a; McGee and Marlowe, 2015; Melia, 2015). The disparity 
between the public speech and the private briefing were seen as symbolic of Ireland’s 
attitude to climate change: public alignment with EU and other policy objectives 
combined with domestic indifference and business as usual, especially in regard to 
agricultural growth (An Taisce, 2015; Gibbons, 2015). 
 
Secondly, the recent emergence of a climate contrarian organisation in Ireland entitled 
the Irish Climate Science Forum has challenged a broad social and political consensus on 
the anthropogenic origins of recent climate change (Gibbons, 2017). The group have, at 
the time of writing, hosted two closed meetings at which noted climate deniers (Richard 
Lindzen and William Happer) addressed the audience. Lindzen was the subject of an 
open letter from MIT scientists dissociating themselves from Lindzen’s appeal to 
President Trump urging the US to withdraw from the Paris climate change agreement 
(Hirji, 2017), while Happer, among those being considered for the post of science advisor 
to the White House, has espoused a range of denier positions (Readfearn, 2017). Both 
Happer and Lindzen questioned the contribution of methane to global warming. The 
meetings were covered by the media (even though journalists were prevented from 
attending) and the claim that methane was contributing less to the warming effect than 
previously thought was dismissed as “balderdash” by eminent climate scientist John 
Sweeney (Boucher-Hayes, 2017). 
 
Ireland, then, is a small country with a large per capital emissions profile, whose 
emissions from the transport and agriculture sectors are rising; Ireland will not meet its 
emissions reductions targets in 2020, and has not produced any policy initiatives that 
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might help it to meet its 2030 targets. Despite some recent climate-related initiatives, 
Ireland remains a laggard in terms of climate legislation, and the issue remains low on 
the political agenda. 
 
1.5 The media context 
 
 
Ireland’s media system exhibits characteristics that place it in the North Atlantic or 
Liberal model, such as medium newspaper circulation, neutral commercial press and 
strong professionalisation within the journalism sector (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). As 
this research is concerned with print media (a decision discussed in detail in Chapter 4), 
it is helpful to sketch the media landscape as it pertains to the newspaper market. Sales 
of print newspaper are dominated by Independent News and Media, which publishes 
several leading titles, including the Irish Independent, the Sunday Independent, the 
Sunday World, and the Evening Herald. The Irish Times Trust Ltd. publishes the Irish 
Times and, at the time of writing, is in talks to buy the Irish Examiner from Landmark 
Media. Several UK media organisations publish Irish editions, such as News 
International (the Times Ireland and the Sunday Times Ireland edition, the Irish Sun), 
Trinity Mirror (the Irish Mirror) and Associated Newspapers (the Irish Daily Mail). 
Some 76% of the Irish population read a newspaper between two and three times per 
week (Flynn, 2016), although newspaper circulation and readership is falling (ABC 
Ireland 2017). The circulation and readership figures for the newspapers studied in this 
thesis are given below. 
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Table 1.1: Circulation and readership of seven national Irish newspapers 
Title Number of copies sold Readership 
Irish Independent 95,502 508,000 
Irish Times 62,423 317,000 
Irish Examiner 28,338 194,000 
Irish Daily Mail 41,027 172,000 
Sunday Independent 185,080 852,000 
Sunday Business Post 30,202 109,000 
Sunday Tribune 54,400 171,000 
 
Circulation figures relate to the period January to June, 2017; readership figures relate to 2014-
2015. Source: Newsbrands Ireland. Note: the Sunday Tribune ceased publication in 2011. The 
Tribune’s circulation and readership figures relate to 2010. 
 
Although Ireland records a low score on the Media Pluralism Monitor, the score for 
concentration of media ownership is high, principally due to the influence of businessman 
Denis O’Brien, who has extensive cross-media holdings in radio, online and print media, 
and is the largest shareholder in INM (Flynn, 2016). The media market in Ireland is quite 
diffuse, with legacy titles such as those of the Independent group and the Irish Times 
continuing to be influential, while net native news outlets such as thejournal.ie grow their 
audiences. However, the state, in the form of RTÉ’s television, radio and online news 
offerings, dominates the media landscape (McNamara et al., 2017). This brief outline is 
intended to give a sense of the media environment in Ireland and to establish the reach, 
and the agenda-setting potential, of the titles examined. The six titles listed above have a 
combined circulation of 496,972 copies, and a combined readership of 2,323,000, 
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representing considerable market penetration. Critical perspectives on the Irish media 
landscape from journalism history (O’Brien, 2017), political economy (McCullagh, 
2008; Cawley, 2012; Preston and Silke, 2014), journalism practice (Heravi, Harrower 
and Boran, 2014), and more general perspectives on the role of the media in Irish society 
(Bell, 1986; Horgan, 2001; Truetzschler, 2007; Horgan and Flynn, 2017) are 
acknowledged; however, the critical focus of this work remains the framing strategies of 
those communication about climate change during the timeframe examined. 
 
 
 
1.6 Critical perspectives on media coverage of climate change  
 
 
Climate change became a media topic in the US in 1988, following the testimony of 
NASA scientist James Hansen to a US Congressional committee in the summer of that 
year (O’Donnell, 2000; Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004; Russill, 2008; Killingsworth and 
Palmer, 2012). How the media have covered the topic since then is an established and 
growing academic field. Early scholarship concentrated on whether media coverage was 
scientifically accurate, or whether the over 97% scientific consensus on anthropogenic 
global warming was reflected in media reports. Other strands in this field considered the 
representations of sceptics in the media, the influence of journalistic norms on climate 
change coverage, and the question of how coverage was framed. Even though journalistic 
work practices, routines and norms were examined, the perspective of journalists and 
editors themselves was largely absent from such studies. Furthermore, much of the 
scholarship of media coverage of climate change is naturally concerned with media texts, 
either with measuring their frequency or analysing the frames they contain. The question 
of how media frames perform in the competitive environment described in agenda 
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systems scholarship is a neglected area. The interaction of the frames advanced by claims 
makers and issue entrepreneurs with the frames favoured by journalists has therefore not 
been fully explored. 
 
Ireland’s media coverage of climate change has been a relatively neglected research area. 
Although some work has been done of the framing of climate change and related topics 
in Irish newspapers (McNally, 2015; Wagner and Payne, 2015), the area of frame 
competition, whereby various actors compete to establish the dominant frame, has not 
been explored. Much of the research carried out on Irish media examines media 
representations only; this wider perspective is missing. 
 
This thesis aims to uncover the framing strategies of a range of influential actors 
communicating about climate change during a particularly dramatic period in Irish 
political history. These actors include the environment correspondents of the major media 
organisations, national newspaper editors, government ministers and political media 
advisors. This work offers three levels of analysis:  
(i) firstly, trends in Irish coverage are revealed by a quantitative content analysis;  
(ii) secondly, the framing strategies of journalists are uncovered by means of a 
frame analysis of a representative sample of climate articles;  
(iii) thirdly, these journalistic frames are made more explicit by interviews with 
environmental journalists, while the framing strategies of other actors are also 
investigated by means of interviews. These interviews permit rare and 
privileged insights into the wider competitive communications environment 
around climate change during the timeframe under examination. 
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This research also aims to build on this earlier work, both in scope and breath of 
perspective. It expands on Wagner and Payne’s 2015 work by considering a greater 
number of newspaper titles over a longer timeframe. Wagner and Payne carried out a 
frame analysis on a one-year sample of articles; this thesis includes a more detailed (10 
frames versus four used by Wagner and Payne) frame analysis over 10 years. McNally’s 
work is concerned with print media representations of low carbon transition and 
decarbonisation and does not discuss climate change directly (McNally, 2015). 
Therefore, this thesis contributes to our understanding of Ireland’s media coverage of 
climate change by broadening and deepening the analysis of media attention and media 
framing, and contributes to the understanding of media coverage of climate change more 
generally in its examination of the frame competition engaged in by elite actors. 
 
1.7 The perspectives of practitioner scholars 
 
 
It is necessary to be explicit about the possibility of bias in qualitative research (Ortlipp, 
2008) and the importance of reflexivity in examining one’s own work (Kuo, 2008). I am 
one of a growing number of former journalists who have joined the academy; I worked 
as a reporter, sub-editor, columnist, section and magazine editor in national print 
journalism for 25 years before joining the academic staff at Dublin City University. This 
experience permits me some insights and critical tools unavailable to non-practitioner 
scholars (Niblock, 2007), but it also carries with it a risk of a narrow analytic focus and 
a propensity to foreground considerations of journalism practice, sociology of journalism, 
newsroom cultures and journalistic work routines. In addition, I am a member of the 
Green Party, stood as a Green Party candidate in the local elections of 2009, and worked 
as an advisor to the Green Party Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local 
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Government. Once again, this involvement in electoral politics and public policy allows 
for “insider knowledge” of how these worlds work, but also carries the risk of bias in 
privileging narratives and explanations of events which favour a Green Party perspective. 
 
Much scholarly analysis of journalism adopts approaches derived from sociology, and 
many researchers in the area of journalism practice have felt “limited by these 
sociological discourses in research and are seeking to bring practice to the forefront” 
(Ibid. p. 21). There has been a growth in reflective research, with former practitioners 
such as Roy Greenslade and Barbie Zelizer bringing insights from the professional world 
to their work. Indeed, Zelizer has argued that a range of perspectives is required to further 
understand journalism, including those offered by former or continuing practitioners 
(Zelizer, 2004, p. 4). There is also a body of scholarship relating to the role of scholar-
practitioners in the field of organisational psychology and business studies; the work of 
Edgar Schein (1988, 2010) is influential in setting out the role and beneficial influence 
of scholar-practitioners (Wasserman and Kram, 2009). Scholar-practitioners are “actors 
who have one foot each in the worlds of academia and practice and are pointedly 
interested in advancing the causes of both theory and practice” (Tenkasi and Hay, 2004, 
p. 49). My experience in journalism practice, politics and policy may therefore allow the 
communication of a deeper understanding of the processes at work in these arenas. 
Furthermore, my “insider” status is a considerable advantage in securing and carrying 
our research interviews, as “practitioner-scholars who have inroads with a particular 
group can use this route to increase understanding, gain access, and build confidence in 
participants” (Hiles and Hinnant, 2014, pp. 436–7). Likewise, the unspoken norms of a 
particular profession or endeavour can be made explicit, as “tacit knowledge” (Polanyi, 
1958) is shared among those with a common understanding (Lam, 2000). 
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The research methods themselves constitute a corrective to possible bias on the part of 
the researcher as far as is ever possible. The integrity of the quantitative element of the 
research is evident, as set out in Chapter 4. The possibility of researcher bias in the frame 
analysis and interview process is guarded against by (i) using an established frame 
typology, and (ii) carrying out in-depth research, asking open-ended questions and 
engaging in researcher reflexivity, measures recommended to ensure the trustworthiness 
of the research (Poggenpoel and Myburgh, 2003; Sampson, 2012). 
 
1.8 Organisation of thesis 
 
 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into three distinct parts. Firstly, the literature 
relating to media coverage of climate change is examined in the next chapter (Chapter 2) 
with a view to discerning trends, gaps and long-standing preoccupations. This literature 
is, in turn, divided into three broad phases:  
(i) an initial phase concerned with measuring media attention and evaluating 
media representations of science,  
(ii) a second phase concerned with uncovering and analysing frames and 
discourses in media texts and with analysing sceptic arguments present in 
media coverage,  
(iii) and a third phase in which the broad topic of climate change is disaggregated 
into sub-topics such as flooding, carbon, public health, environment and 
renewable energy, among others. In this third phase, the media analysed also 
become more diverse, with a growing focus on digital media and visual 
representations of climate change.  
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This part of the thesis also considers the literature relating to how issues appear on the 
media, public and policy agendas, and how they rise to the top of these agendas, or fail 
to do so (Chapter 3). Firstly, the media’s role in these processes is examined. Media 
effects including agenda-setting, second-level agenda-setting and priming are discussed, 
but there is a focus on framing as a powerful media effect. Subsequently, perspectives 
from outside the media on the question of how social problems appear and rise on public 
agendas are discussed. These include approaches from agenda systems theory, such as 
multiple streams (Kingdon, 1995), punctuated equilibrium (Jones and Baumgartner, 
2012) and the public arenas model (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). Approaches which allow 
for media effects alongside broader public, political and policy influences, such as issue 
attention cycles (Downs, 1972), are also discussed in this section, as is the theory of 
mediated issue development (Nisbet & Huge, 2006), which seeks to explain agenda 
dynamics in a way which does not downplay or neglect the role of the media. 
 
The second section of the thesis deals in more detail with the focus of the research, 
including the research question, and also with the collection and analysis of relevant data. 
The methodologies used to collect and examine data in order to address the research 
question are set out and discussed (in Chapter 4), while the results are presented and 
analysed subsequently (in Chapters 5 and 6). Briefly, a content analysis is carried to 
establish levels of coverage of climate change between January 2007 and February 2016 
in seven national newspapers. This large sample of articles is reduced, and a frame 
analysis is carried out on the reduced corpus. The coding system used for this research 
allows for both “dominant” and “secondary” frames to be identified, permitting detailed 
analysis of both of the most prominent frames in each article, but also of the frames most 
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often appearing alongside these dominant frames. The frequency of frames, the titles in 
which they appear, the article type containing the frames and the topics to which the 
frames refer are presented and analysed in depth in this section. Subsequently, the 
framing strategies of journalists, politicians and media advisors is investigated further by 
means of 12 semi-structured interviews. The data from these interviews is set forth and 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
This research is also concerned with the influence of the Green Party on media coverage 
of climate change during a period in which the party was in government and two of its 
members held ministerial portfolios. It is in this second part of the thesis that this 
influence is investigated, both quantitatively, by means of content analysis of climate 
press coverage mentioning the Green Party, and qualitatively, in interviews with 
journalists, the ministers themselves and their media advisors. It is found that increased 
coverage of the Green Party also increases coverage of climate change; however, when 
coverage of climate change increases, as it does around UN climate conferences, this 
increase does not affect levels of media interest in the Greens. 
 
The third part of the thesis (Chapter 7) aims to synthesise the discussion and analysis 
which has gone before, drawing conclusions as to the significance of this research and its 
contribution to our understanding of media coverage of climate change and the framing 
strategies of those communicating about it. The limitations of the research are considered 
in this section, and some areas for further research are discussed. The discussion focuses 
on the outcome of the complex frame competition in which journalists, government 
ministers and their advisors were engaged, and evaluates the framing strategies 
employed. These strategies are examined in the light of the analysis of media texts, where 
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such frames are made manifest. From this analysis, a complex picture emerges in which 
journalists frame climate change in predominantly political terms, while ministers and 
their advisors emphasise responsibility and economic framings. A disconnect between 
the empirical data on media framings and the ways in which individual journalists 
describe their frame strategies is also evident. The differing communications strategies, 
of the two government ministers interviewed, are also discussed in this concluding 
section. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The media and climate change 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter considers how the media functions in relation to climate change, and reviews 
the scholarly literature in this area. It begins with a brief outline of the scholarship of 
media theory and various sociological approaches to the study of journalism and 
journalists. This is not meant to be an exhaustive review; it is intended to give the reader 
a sense of how media scholars have found the media to operate generally before seeking 
to understand how they operate in relation to the single although complex issue of climate 
change in particular. In this section, there is a necessary emphasis on “legacy” media, and 
print media in particular, as many of the influential theories considered pre-date the 
arrival of digital media.  Subsequently, a literature review of the scholarship of media 
coverage of climate change is presented.  
 
The study of media representations of climate change is a growing area of research 
(Doulton and Brown, 2009). It is also a multi-disciplinary research field. However, 
despite the diversity of approaches and methodologies, studies are generally derived from 
long established research agenda in the fields of media and communication and are 
predicated on the notion that increased media attention for a particular issue creates, 
reflects, influences or shapes public perceptions of that issue. The ways in which these 
effects are manifest are considered in detail in the next chapter; here, it is sufficient to 
note that whether, how and to what extent the media cover a particular issue has an effect 
on how the public and the policy world perceives that issue. 
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Such scholarship takes as a starting point two separate but related aspects of the media: 
first that the public gets most of its information about science from the mass media 
(Nelkin, 1987; Wilson, 1995), and second, the public associates high levels of coverage 
with salience (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Ungar, 2000a; McCombs, 2004). Public 
amplification in the media “provides a certification of importance” (Schudson, 1995, p. 
20); elsewhere, the same author adds: “When the news media offer the public an item of 
news, they confer on it a public legitimacy.” (Schudson, 2011, p. 22). The media are 
“central agents for raising awareness and disseminating information (Schäfer et al. 2014, 
p.1233, emphasis in original), and their coverage of climate change may create 
circumstances “where it is conducive for governments to act, or hard for them not to act 
in the face of perceived pressure to initiate a policy response” (Newell, 2000, p. 94). 
Furthermore, mass media are an important forum in which various responses to climate 
change are discussed and legitimated (Nanz and Steffek, 2004, p. 321; Schneider, 
Nullmeier and Hurrelmann, 2007, p. 136).  They are also a forum in which various 
societal actors – ENGOs, business associations, political parties, policymakers – may put 
across their views and in turn have these views exposed to feedbacks from others (Steffek, 
2009, p. 315). Where there is disagreement about the effects of climate change, or even 
the extent to which is it anthropogenic, or about mitigation or adaptation measures which 
may or may not be undertaken, the media helps clarify the positions of the various societal 
actors on the issue (Peters, 2008, p. 131).  
 
Broadly, there are two main strands of media coverage of climate change research: 
studies which strive to understand why coverage rises and falls in particular contexts, and 
studies which examine the nature of the coverage itself. These two approaches could also 
be said to be focused externally (at the social, ideological and institutional forces 
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affecting general media attention for climate change) and internally (at the work of the 
journalist, the framing and lexical choices he or she makes, the sourcing practices he or 
she engages in and the professional norms to which he or she is subject). This extensive 
body of research can also be divided into three distinct thematic phases: an initial phase 
of research which concerned itself with measuring media attention, with assessing 
whether the media reported climate science accurately, with ascertaining whether the 
scientific consensus on the anthropogenic element of climate change was reflected in the 
coverage and with detecting the presence of sceptic, denialist or contrarian voices; a 
second phase involving a more diverse examination of media texts through the 
explanatory lenses of framing theory, critical discourse analysis and other theoretical 
approaches. The coverage of discreet events, rather than the broad topic of climate 
change, was examined in this phase (e.g. COPs, IPCC reports and weather events). 
Research into social media coverage of climate change was also undertaken in this phase. 
And a third phase which has diversified into coverage of various constituent parts of the 
climate change issue. In this phase, subjects such as visual representations of climate 
change, media treatment of carbon, perceptions of risk, the role of celebrities, flooding, 
weather, transition to carbon-free societies, sustainability, landscape, and energy are 
examined. These phases are broadly aligned with the chronology of media coverage of 
climate change research, with the first phase occurring in the years after the subject 
became a media topic following NASA scientist James Hansen’s testimony to a US 
Congressional hearing in 1988. The alignment of chronology with these three groups is 
not rigid however; research on framing and attention levels continues to be published 
(e.g. Wagner & Payne 2015), as do studies devoted to the analysis of sceptic discourses 
(e.g. Reed 2016). 
 
	 25	
This study aims to add to this body of research in certain important areas. Firstly, in 
relation to the first phase of media coverage of climate change research, it aims to perform 
the essential measurement work on media attention in Ireland, which may in turn form 
the basis of further research for other scholars; secondly, in relation to the second, more 
exploratory phase, it aims to provide a frame analysis of Ireland’s national press coverage 
of the topic, and thirdly, it aims to provide valuable perspectives from journalists, 
politicians and media advisors, relating both to the production of media coverage and 
also to the frame competition played out in the media arena in relation to climate change. 
 
2.2 Theoretical approaches to understanding and analysing the media 
 
To examine how the media have represented climate change, one must first understand 
how the media represents things in general. The perspectives offered by media studies, 
journalism studies, various ethnographic approaches, political economy and other 
academic disciplines are valuable in analysing how the media work on three levels: media 
systems, newsroom cultures and the sociology of the individual editor or reporter.  
 
The media system in operation in a given territory at a given time will necessarily have 
an influence on the content of the media outlets within that system (Siebert, 1956). There 
have been various attempts to provide a reliable taxonomy of media systems, starting 
with Fred Siebert’s influential work in 1956, Four Theories of the Press in which four 
basic media systems (authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility and Soviet 
totalitarian) were proposed. A fifth, based on media ownership, was suggested (Merrill 
and Lowenstein, 1979) and subsequently dismissed as superfluous (Ostini and Fung, 
2002) because the Four Theories models were based on media ownership as well as 
media function. Other taxonomies have been put forward: one with three categories 
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(market, communitarian and advancing) (Altschull, 1995); one with five categories 
(authoritarian, Western, Communist, revolutionary, and developmental) (Hachten, 1981). 
Calling for an update of Siebert’s model, Hallin and Mancini suggest three basic media 
models: Mediterranean/Polarised Pluralist; North/Central European or Democratic 
Corporatist; and North Atlantic or Liberal (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Ireland was one 
of the 18 countries they analysed; it belongs, in their analysis, to the North Atlantic or 
Liberal model. 
 
A basic question at the heart of these studies is how each particular kind of media system 
affects the performance of the media in relaying accurate information to the public. Does, 
for instance, the commercialisation of the media promote or inhibit this flow of 
information? The evidence is “fragmentary and not entirely consistent” (Hallin and 
Mancini, 2004, p. 279) on this point, but it is asserted that commercialisation “has 
encouraged the development of a globalised media culture that substantially diminishes 
national differences.” (2004, p. 282). For others, however, the danger of the 
commercialisation of the media is quite clear. The flow of political information reduces 
in line with the level of commercialisation (Aalberg, van Aelst and Curran, 2010). Indeed, 
there is a strong case to be made that market-based media are structurally incapable of 
serving the public at all. Because the media is part of the market economy, they inevitably 
serve the interests of the political and economic elite (Herman & Chomsky 1988). The 
concentration of media ownership in the hands of an elite few was a consequence of the 
collapse of the “public sphere” following the rise of capital in the mid-20th century, 
according to Jürgen Habermas (1989), who called for the re-creation of a space where 
rational citizens engage with each other and hold government to account. The argument 
that the media is structurally inclined to support the status quo, as Herman and Chomsky 
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state, and which forms part of Habermas’s theory of the public sphere, has implications 
for the coverage of climate change. 
 
Various scholars have defended the media against these charges, principally on the 
grounds that individual journalists have professional standards and adhere to professional 
norms which prevent them from slavishly following the agenda of the social elite. They 
are concerned with their own legitimation (Hallin, 1985) and are in fact insulated by 
commercialisation rather than compromised by it (Schudson, 2011, pp. 124–5).  
 
The influence of commerce and the market also forms part of Pierre Bourdieu’s critique 
of media systems. Bourdieu’s influential concept of “the field” (any specialised form of 
human activity) having its own rules and forms of capital both supports and counters 
more political economy arguments such as those made by Herman and Chomsky and 
Habermas. The support comes from Bourdieu’s contention that journalism is a “weak 
autonomous field” (Bourdieu, 2005) in that it is dependent for its survival on other fields 
(the economic field, for instance) by which it is inevitably influenced. However, within 
journalism itself, individual journalists compete for capital within the field. Thus, 
although the media generally may be susceptible to influence and control from economic 
elites, this influence may be subverted by the struggle for peer reputation and prestige of 
the reporters and journalists themselves. (See Willig 2012 for an overview). 
 
Following on from theories of how media systems operate, a body of scholarship has 
grown around how the media in general and journalism/journalists in particular ought to 
be – normative theories of the media. Many lists of journalism attributes have been 
compiled and propounded, based squarely on the idea that a fair and free press is essential 
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to the proper functioning of democracy (Deuze 2005b; Deuze 2008; Deuze 2005a; 
Schudson 2001; Schudson 2008; McQuail 2010; Altschull 1995). Precisely how the press 
should contribute to this functioning was the subject of  “one of the most instructive and 
heated intellectual debates of the American twentieth century” (Alterman, 2008) between 
journalist and political commentator Walter Lippmann and philosopher John Dewey. 
Lippmann (1922) believed the world was becoming too complex for lay audiences to 
comprehend, and the role of the media was to interpret these complexities on their behalf; 
Dewey (1922) believed the press should encourage the participation of the citizenry in 
democracy. Modern journalism has followed the Lippmann model (Schudson, 2008a), 
although the growth of online media has promoted a more Deweyan, participative model 
(Hermida et al., 2011) in which news is constructed through a conversation between 
journalist and citizen. 
 
Many scholars agree that journalists should be autonomous and independent, fair and 
balanced, but the extent to which journalists should pursue a goal of objectivity is a matter 
of debate. For instance, Marx believed that adherence to a code of objectivity on the part 
of journalists is a barrier to change (Altschull, 1995), yet journalists themselves value 
objectivity as a professional norm (Schudson, 2001); indeed, it is the “chief occupational 
value of American journalism” (Ibid., p. 149). The American emphasis is notable; 
objectivity does not play such a central role in the professional norms of European media 
culture (Chalaby, 1996; Schudson, 2001).  
 
From the 1920s onwards, objectivity became “a fully formulated occupational ideal” for 
journalists (Schudson, 2001, pp. 162–3); however, it was largely an unattainable ideal 
(Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 26) because news organisations and routines inevitably 
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produce bias (Schudson, 2011, p. 41). Various professional codes of conduct also set out 
norms such as fairness, balance, social responsibility for journalists (Laitila, 1995), yet 
whether journalism was a profession at all remained open to debate (Abbott, 1988; 
Broddason, 1994; Friedson, 2001; Gardner, H, 2001; Aldridge, M and Evetts, 2003). 
Political scientist and civic engagement scholar W. Lance Bennett identified three 
normative orders with which journalists had to content: economic norms (that journalism 
in a market system must be efficient and profitable), political norms (that journalists must 
provide the citizenry with accurate information so as to make informed electoral choices), 
and journalistic norms (that journalists must be fair, balanced, accurate and objective in 
their reporting) (Bennett, 1996). 
 
It is also an open question as to whether audiences value journalistic objectivity: some 
argue that a form of transparent partisanship is more honest (Gil de Zúñiga and Hinsley, 
2013), while others have found that an unbiased presentation of various viewpoints, 
allowing the reader to decide among them, is preferable (Newman, Levy and Nielsen, 
2015). The Bosnian war of 1992-1995 persuaded a veteran BBC correspondent that 
journalistic objectivity amounted to a dishonest approach. When faced with morally 
freighted events, standing above and apart from the events themselves was inappropriate 
and unworkable, and journalists should strive to produce a kind of reportage that “cares” 
as well as “knows” (Bell, 1998).  However, Bell’s definition of objectivity was criticised 
for being too narrow and reductive (Ward, 1998). 
 
How journalists interpret their duty to be objective, fair and balanced has implications 
for the media coverage of climate change. The concept of balance is a cornerstone of 
journalism education (Vos, 2012), but has been found to produce informationally biased 
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coverage of climate change due to the practice of “hearing both sides” irrespective of the 
relative merits of their viewpoints (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004, 2007). While journalists 
espouse the values of objectivity, fairness and balance when it comes to their reporting, 
they often advocate for increased media attention for their particular news area. For 
instance, environmental journalists press for more environmental coverage in their media 
organisations (Hiles and Hinnant, 2014). 
 
Perhaps the professional norms of individual journalists could indeed mitigate against the 
institutional bias of the media organisations they worked for, as Michael Schudson has 
argued. However, there is a good deal of evidence from ethnographic newsroom studies 
to suggest that reporters and editors reproduce the bias of their employers (White, 1950; 
Gieber, 1964), and that newsroom culture enforces such bias (Breed, 1955; Tuchman, 
1972; Glasgow University Media Group, 1976; Schlesinger, 1978; Gans, 1979). In much 
of this early research, there is a feeling that “if left alone, reporters will produce truth” 
(Reese and Ballinger, 2001, p. 651). This is a comforting notion, but one that fails to take 
into account the influence of news values (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Harcup and O’Neill, 
2001). It turns out that the media do not simply report the truth, but rather the truth is 
made to accommodate the news routines and values of the media. Furthermore, far from 
being mindful of professional norms and social responsibilities, journalists often rely on 
heuristics (Dunwoody and Griffin, 2011), a sixth sense for news, the journalistic gut 
feeling (Schultz, 2007). 
 
Barbie Zelizer (2004) and Michael Schudson (2011) have provided valuable analyses of 
the development of sociological approaches to the study of journalism. The many 
approaches they describe often turn out to be ways in which journalism is weighed in the 
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balance and found wanting. The media systems in which journalists operate, the 
requirements of news itself, the inherent biases of the individual journalists all, it is 
argued, make it difficult, if not impossible, for journalists to fulfil the roles assigned to 
them by normative theories of the press. However, the professional norms to which 
individual journalists aspire may be a defence against such institutional and structural 
constraints, especially in cases where coverage is provided by specialist correspondents, 
who are seen by their peers more as “independent experts, free to make judgments” 
(Michael Schudson, 2001, p. 163). Furthermore, the influence of news values – 
characteristics of events and topics which make them attractive to journalists – may prove 
more powerful than more institutional constraints.  
 
2.3 Studying media coverage of climate change: surveying the academic field  
 
The study of media coverage of climate change is a broad, inter-disciplinary field 
(Schäfer et al., 2016). Scholars from academic disciplines such as science, political and 
environmental communication are represented, as are, to a lesser extent, perspectives 
from journalism studes and journalism practice. They have analysed many different types 
of media data, including newspaper articles, TV reports, social media posts and various 
visual representations. Much of their research starts from a common concern that the 
response to climate change at national and international level has been lacking and a 
desire to explore whether the media coverage of the issue has played a role in influencing 
the nature of the response. 
 
A meta-analysis of research on media coverage of climate change carried out in late 2014 
for this research is helpful in scoping out the extent and nature of academic endeavour 
regarding media coverage of climate change. The search encompassed three academic 
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databases (JSTOR, Scopus and Web of Science). The search terms were “media”, 
“climate change”, “global warming” and “greenhouse effect”. The search was limited to 
article abstracts only, and the sample was further refined by selecting only those journal 
articles which examined hard media data. The results show that science communication 
journals are strongly represented, while journalism studies journals are relatively poorly 
represented. In terms of territories studied, the US and the UK attract most scholarly 
attention. Comparative studies are becoming more common. Print remains the most 
commonly analysed form of media content, while content analysis and frame analysis are 
the most frequently used analytical approaches. 
 
These findings are in broad agreement with a meta-analysis carried out of the research 
field from 1959 to 2012 in which it was found that (i) there is a clear growth in research 
concerning media coverage of climate change research; (ii) Europe (39.5% of 133 
relevant studies) and the US (19.3%) predominate; (iii) print media are by far the most 
analysed form of media (67.5%), and (iv) qualitative (44.8%) and quantitative (47.8%) 
are fairly evenly represented, while studies which employ both quantitative and 
qualitative methods (such as this one) are increasingly popular (Schäfer and Schlichting, 
2014). 
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Fig 2.1 Types of media analysed
 
Fig 2.2 Analytical methods
 
Fig 2.3 Territories analysed 
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Fig 2.4 Journals publishing most research on media coverage of climate change  
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five months of 1988 had been warmer than any other period in the previous 130 years.  
Dr. Hansen said it was “99 per cent certain” that this temperature increase was not due to 
natural variation, but to the build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. “It is time 
to stop waffling so much and say that the evidence is pretty strong that the greenhouse 
effect is here,” Dr. Hansen said. This testimony had an immediate effect: “the US 
opinion-leading newspapers leapt on the story” (Anderson, 2011, p. 536) . 
 
The coverage of climate change in the prestige US print media increased dramatically in 
1988, from 73 climate change stories in 1987 to 285 stories in 1988 and continued to rise 
in subsequent years. (Wilkins, 1993, pp. 75–76). However, several researchers have 
identified a change in the nature of the coverage in the period 1988-1989. It was at this 
time that climate change became transformed from what was perceived as a scientific 
issue to one that was perceived as an ideological or political one. In a study of US media 
coverage of climate change from 1987-1990, Wilkins shows that, in 1987 and 1988, 
scientists were the sources most often quoted in the US press, whereas in 1989 and 1990, 
government officials were the most often quoted, with industry sources second and 
scientists third (Wilkins, 1993). In her study of climate change coverage in the British 
press from 1985 to 2001, Anabela Carvalho discovered that scientists were the 
“uncontested central actors and exclusive definers” of climate change until the end of 
1988 (Carvalho, 2007, p. 228). These findings align with Craig Trumbo’s analysis of US 
coverage from 1985-1995, which showed that scientists were quoted less often, and 
politicians more often as the story developed over time (Trumbo, 1996). If climate change 
had “arrived” as an issue in the summer of 1988, by the end of that year, it had ceased to 
be simply a scientific matter: “At the end of 1988, the scope of potentially necessary 
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political, social and economic transformations necessary to address climate change 
started to become visible” (Carvalho, 2007, p. 229).  
 
2.5 Concerns over the communication of science and journalistic accuracy 
 
A related strand of early research on the media coverage of climate change relates to 
concerns of journalistic accuracy. Research into media miscommunication of science has 
its origins in the 1930s, when the method of inquiry involving sending news clippings to 
the scientists concerned and asking them to evaluate their accuracy (Bell, 1994). A study 
of journalists’ accuracy when reporting climate change in the New Zealand media in 1988 
found that the coverage was largely accurate (1994), and also noted that scientists had a 
negatively biased view of media reporting on science in general. Environmental 
journalists in the US were found to have an adequate working knowledge of the 
greenhouse effect, but they did not properly understand other related climate processes 
(Wilson, 2000). A survey of Danish broadsheet coverage from 1997 to 2009 showed that 
the reporting was “moderately inaccurate” (Vestergård, 2011). The question of sources 
used in media coverage of climate change is also of concern to scientists and science 
communicators: “Journalists frequently adopt (in the scientists’ view) an overly broad 
definition of who is qualified to comment on scientific issues” which “raises the question 
of evidence over assertions” (Weigold, 2001, pp. 181–2).  
 
Many scientists believe they are poor communicators and are wary of engaging with the 
media.  One climate scientist who presented a case study of how research was reported 
in the Australian media, states that while scientists may be adept at communicating 
science, this does not equate to facility in communicating through the mass media. “There 
are very few scientists who have the natural ability, and learn or cultivate the talents of 
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effective communication with and through the media…” (Henderson-Sellers, 1998, p. 
430). Scientists suffer from “a widespread perception they [they] are not effective 
communicators, at least when the audience is the general public.” (Weigold, 2001, p. 
172). Scientists “regard journalists with suspicion” (Gascoigne and Metcalfe, 1997, p. 
278), often because they are “shocked by the ‘inaccuracies’” (Henderson-Sellers, 1998, 
p. 431) they see in science reporting. 
 
Most journalists in the United States who write about science have no qualification in a 
science subject, but learn about science reporting on the job (Weigold, 2001, p. 169). 
Research also shows that fewer than three per cent of American journalists majored in 
mathematics, physical or biological science (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1994). However, more 
recent research suggests that 14 per cent of science reporters who were members of the 
Society of Environmental Journalists held degrees in environmental science (Wilson, 
2000, p. 3). Despite these differing figures, we can say that the level of formal science 
education among American science journalists is low. This does not mean that their 
knowledge of science subjects is lacking. Indeed, one survey showed that all science 
journalists were familiar with the term “global warming”, and most knew that carbon 
dioxide was a greenhouse gas. However, knowledge of the other greenhouse gases, or of 
the state of scientific consensus on a number of climate change issues was not so complete 
(Wilson 2000). Despite a lack of scientific qualification and incomplete knowledge on 
the part of science reporters, “the studies that have examined the issue have found general 
satisfaction among scientists with news story accuracy” (Weigold, 2001, p. 184). Indeed, 
scientists may have an unnecessarily negative stereotype of journalists: they consistently 
rate science reporting in general as inaccurate, yet often rate the stories in which they 
themselves are quoted as entirely accurate. (Bell, 1994, p. 271). Indeed, Bell concludes 
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that science reporting in general, and climate change reporting in particular is probably 
“largely accurate”. 
 
Many of these early studies of media coverage of climate change view the media’s 
“performance” on the issue from the scientists’ side of the table: did the reporter get the 
facts right? Was the science of climate change accurately reported? Were scientists 
consulted in the first place, or given adequate status in the story? The incident that forms 
the basis of a paper by Henderson-Sellers on science-media miscommunication is 
instructive (Henderson-Sellers, 1998). The author was involved in issuing a press release 
related to research on the frequency and power of tropical storms. The press release 
mentions, near the end of the document, that a projected 10-20% increase in the intensity 
of tropical cyclones may have implications for the insurance industry in Australia. The 
author expresses chagrin that some media outlets decided to base their news coverage on 
this insurance angle, rather than on the climate science behind it. She is surprised that 
other parties (e.g. insurance industry spokespersons) were asked for comment. She is 
aghast that a newspaper used the phrase “supercyclones” in a headline referring to the 
possible 10-20% increase in storm intensity in a climate-changed world. The “lessons 
learned” have mostly to do with how someone in her position will be judged by their 
peers in the scientific community. In other words, dealing with the media is judged 
entirely in the light of the norms of science. It may be argued that the author has strayed 
into an error identified by Wilkins: much science communication research has  “analysed 
media coverage of science according to the standards of science itself. Coverage which 
is accurate according to the standards of the scientific community has been praised. Little 
effort has been made to link the coverage itself with an underlying value system that 
spans both mass communication and science.” (1993, p. 74). 
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2.6 The influence of professional norms 
 
Much early research into media coverage of climate change from the science 
communication perspective draws attention to the differing norms of science and 
journalism. These differences are viewed almost entirely from the point of view of the 
science community (with the exception of Wilkins, mentioned above) and contain the 
implication that scientific norms are the standard against which journalistic norms are 
measured. Firstly, scientists point out that journalism is fast-moving, while science is 
slow; journalism seeks unequivocal facts, while scientific progress is incremental and 
most scientific statements are equivocal (Bell, 1994, pp. 259–60). Journalists believe it 
is part of their job to be critical of sources, while scientists assign less weight to this 
function; journalists accept that their job has an entertainment function, but  scientists do 
not accept this function as readily; journalists go to great lengths not to “talk down” to 
their audience, whereas scientists have a paternalistic attitude to media audiences (Peters, 
1995, pp. 44–5). Perhaps most importantly, scientists expect journalists to support the 
scientist’s goals, whereas journalists are neutral as to the goals of the scientific endeavor 
they are covering. 
 
These journalistic norms have been described by the science communication research 
community as they have encountered them: that is, from the science side of the 
communication process. There has been much valuable research undertaken from other 
disciplines also. For example, the work of political scientist W. Lance Bennett (touched 
upon above) was an important influence on two major works of scholarship on media 
coverage of climate change. Bennett argued that there were three first order journalistic 
norms: political, economic and journalistic (Bennett, 1996). In their influential paper, 
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Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) focused on the journalistic norm of balance. Balance is 
various defined as neutrality (Entman, 1989) or presenting both sides of an argument 
(Gans, 1979). However, simply quoting a source with an opposing view can be a way of 
avoiding checking the validity of the initial claim; it is a “surrogate for validity checks” 
(Dunwoody and Peters, 1992, p. 10). Boykoff and Boykoff’s content analysis of the US 
prestige press from 1988 to 2002 showed that “balanced” reporting has produced a biased 
account of the scientific consensus. They conclude that “balanced reporting is actually 
problematic in practice when discussing the human contribution to global warming and 
resulting calls for action to combat it.” (2004, p. 134). In a subsequent paper, the same 
authors develop their conceptualisation of journalistic norms, suggesting there are first 
order norms (personalisation, dramatisation, and novelty) and second order norms 
(authority-bias and balance) (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2007). The authors undertake a case 
history of US newspaper and television coverage of climate change from 1988 to 2004. 
They conclude that: 
Adherence to the norms of dramatisation, personalisation, novelty, balance, and 
authority-order is part of a process that eventuates in informationally biased coverage of 
global warming. This informational bias has helped to create space for the US 
government to defray responsibility and delay action regarding climate change. (2007, p. 
12) 
 
The demonstration by Boykoff and Boykoff’s 2004 paper that the standard journalistic 
practice of “hearing the other side” was not appropriate to media coverage of climate 
change and in fact produced an informational bias had a sobering effect on environmental 
journalists, in the US particularly (Hiles and Hinnant, 2014).  Indeed, subsequent studies 
found that the practice of quoting sceptics had declined considerably in the US press by 
2006 (Boykoff, 2007a).  
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2.7 The effect of news values on media coverage of climate change  
 
Bennett’s normative theories emerge from a broader sociological tradition pioneered by 
Herbert Gans and Robert Entman, media scholars and social theorists rather than 
dedicated journalism scholars. To some extent they echo earlier scholarship relating to 
“news values” – characteristics necessary for any event to be covered by the news media. 
Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge’s investigation into how events become news has been 
called the “single piece of research that most cogently advanced a general understanding 
of news selection processes”. (Zelizer, 2004, p. 54). Originally presented at the First 
Nordic Conference on Peace Research in Oslo in 1963, the paper considers the factors at 
play in the selection of foreign news in the Norwegian press. They suggest 12 factors: 
frequency (discreet events, such as a murder, are more likely to be covered than long-
term social trends); threshold (events must be reasonably uncommon); unambiguity (the 
more easily an event can be understood, the more likely it is to be selected); 
meaningfulness (the more an event fits into the selector’s cultural frame of reference, the 
more likely it is to be regarded as news); consonance (the selector may want, or predict, 
that something will happen; if it does, it has a greater chance of becoming news); 
continuity (if something is already news, that increases its chances of staying in the news); 
composition (an event may be included because it helps the overall balance or 
composition of a newspaper or broadcast); reference to elite nations (the actions of elite 
nations are seen as intrinsically more consequential that those of other nations); reference 
to elite people (famous people may be seen by news selectors as consequential);  
reference to people (news is presented as the result of individuals’ actions rather than the 
result of social forces); reference to something negative (negative news is seen as more 
unexpected and happens over a short time span). (Galtung and Ruge, 1965, pp. 65–71).  
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In a critique of Galtung and Ruge’s work, Harcup and O’Neill examined over 1200 news 
articles in the UK press, and suggested that certain categories of story were not accounted 
for in the earlier taxonomy of news values. They suggest that picture opportunities, 
entertainment, sex, humour, reference to animals, reference to elite organisations, 
campaigns and promotions and reference to something positive be added. (Harcup and 
O’Neill, 2001). Quite apart from satisfying various news values, events and topics may 
need to provide dramatic stories with compelling narratives (McComas and Shanahan, 
1999); this requirement for drama – which is often born of conflict over the certainty and 
risks of climate change or the costs or benefits of action  (Nisbet, 2011) – is close to 
Boykoff’s norms of personalisation and dramatisation discussed above. It is clear that for 
a happening to become news, it must fit a quite rigid template of what journalists consider 
newsworthy. 
 
Some environmental communications scholars have suggested that news values tend to 
predispose the media to rely on official sources (Anderson, 2009; Hansen, 2011), or to 
foreground conflict between scientists (Corbett and Durfee, 2004). Journalists often use 
government or other official sources to confer authority on their reports, while sources 
gain “authoritative status” in a “reciprocal utility” (Carlson, 2009, p. 530). These sources 
often assume the role of “primary definers” who can exercise power over the terms in 
which social problems are discussed. The term was coined by Stuart Hall et al (1978) in 
a study of news coverage of crime in the UK and the associated moral panic. In Policing 
the Crisis, the authors describe how journalists continuously quote official sources in 
their reports. This leads to a structural bias within the news media, they argue. This level 
of access allows institutional sources (such as government official and law enforcement 
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officers) to establish the initial definition of the issue, in turn setting the terms of future 
debate (ibid., p. 58). The authors offer an example:  
Once race relations in Britain have been defined as a ‘problem of numbers’ (i.e. how 
many blacks there are in the country), then even liberal spokesmen, in proving that the 
figures for black immigrants have been exaggerated, are nevertheless obliged to 
subscribe, implicitly, to the view that the debate is ‘essentially’ about numbers.  
(ibid., p.59)  
 
Hall et al acknowledge that this preference for official sources is not ideologically driven, 
but rather is based on journalistic norms and newsroom work practices. However, the 
practice does have the effect of reinforcing the political and economic status quo (Louw, 
2005). In relation to climate change, Lisa Antilla has noted that in the 1980s, scientists 
were the primary definers of the issue, but that by the early 1990s, politicians had taken 
over this role, suggesting that climate change had ceased to be a matter of scientific 
evidence and had become more politically contested (Antilla, 2005). 
 
 
News values are often not understood by protestors (Gavin, 2010), and scientific reports 
which do not contain appeals to news values such as personalisation or dramatisation 
may be ignored by the media (O’Neill, H. Williams, et al., 2015). However, there is a 
lack of scholarship examining the impact of news values on media coverage of climate 
change from a journalistic perspective. Field theory has been used to explore journalist’s 
deployment of news values (Willig, 2012), and indeed the two are related: a journalist’s 
standing among peers is related to an ability to research and write an impactful news 
story, and the standard of this work is judged according to the norms of news values. This 
links to the Bourdieusian notion of journalistic doxa – “the unspoken, unquestioned, 
taken-for granted, understanding of the news game and the basic beliefs guiding 
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journalistic practice” (Ibid., p. 374). However, the large preponderance of studies 
examining media coverage of climate change, and which allude to the influence of news 
values on such coverage, do so from a perspective outside the media. In other words, they 
examine media texts and discern the influence that news values may have had in their 
production. There is little acknowledgement of the role news values may have played in 
the commissioning of such coverage in the first place, and little understanding of how 
difficult a story climate change is for journalists to cover, given the newsroom cultures 
in which they operate, and the news values by which their work is judged. In Chapter 6 
of this thesis, such perspectives are explored in detail. 
 
2.8 No time, no money – economic pressures and media coverage of climate change 
 
The economic pressure on the media industry may also influence the extent and quality 
of climate change reporting. Members of the American Society of Environmental 
Journalists found that the amount of time they were given to research science subjects 
was insufficient and that they were expected to do general news reporting as part of their 
job, thus further depleting the time they were able to devote to researching their science 
stories. They also remarked on the decline of the number of dedicated science 
correspondents in the American press in general. (Wilson, 2000). Alison Anderson points 
out that “Economic, organisation and institutional pressures means that journalists in the 
United Kingdom have become increasing reliant upon prepackaged information, 
principally from public relations (PR) professionals, industries and news agencies 
(Anderson, 2011, p. 538). Such dependence was found to be “extensive” (Lewis, 
Williams and Franklin, 2008, p. 7), with almost half of all stories including some copy 
from prepackaged information. The “carrying capacity” (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988) of 
newspapers has increased over the last two decades, staffing levels have not kept pace 
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and cutbacks have affected many journalists who are working on the environmental beat 
in the UK and the US (Anderson, 2011, p. 538). Furthermore, under-funded newsrooms 
may have to assign climate change stories to general news reporters. These “are usually 
written by general-interest journalists (given that the economic crisis has reduced the 
presence of specialised journalists in editorial departments), who, on top of it all, have 
very demanding deadlines, so the notes supplied by press offices and wire services 
become the main (or only) source of news” (Hoyos, 2014, p. 94). In the new digital media 
ecosystem, science journalists are expected to fulfil more diverse roles, with the roles of 
convenor, curator, civic educator and public intellectual being added to the “legacy” role 
of reporter (Fahy and Nisbet, 2011). However, reduced newsroom staffing and budget 
cuts may make fulfilling these and other roles assigned to journalists difficult if not 
impossible  (Beam et al, 2009). In tabloid newspapers, the pressures can be even more 
intense (Boykoff and Mansfield, 2008), with tabloid reporters given scant training in 
science and environmental reporting and expected to be a “jack of all trades” (Deuze, 
2005b, p. 887). Putting general news beat reporters to work on specialist areas such as 
climate change can exacerbate distortions of scientific information (Anderson, 2013). 
 
2.9 When and why media coverage of climate change rises and falls 
 
The study of levels of media attention to climate change is based on the premise that the 
public equates levels of coverage with salience and on the assumption that high levels of 
coverage equate to high levels of public concern on the issue. Many studies – including, 
in part, this one – measure levels of coverage over time and attempt to discover the 
underlying reasons for various rises and falls in attention levels (see Schmidt et al. 2013 
for an overview). Many scholars are in agreement that media coverage of climate change 
gradually increased from its initial appearance on the media agenda in 1988. Some early 
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peaks are evident in 2000 and 2001, and the coverage then builds to high point in 2009, 
before dropping back to roughly 2005 levels from early 2010 (Grundmann and Scott, 
2014). The ICE CaPs (International Collective on Environment, Culture and Politics) 
project at the University of Boulder, Colorado, has been monitoring global print media 
coverage of climate change since 2004. Their data confirms the picture of a gradual 
increase up to late 2009, early 2010 followed by a steep decline. Levels of coverage have 
increased in the period of late 2015/early 2016, but have declined again since then, and 
indeed even this most recent peak did not approach the levels seen in late 2009/early 
2010. 
 
 
Chart courtesy of ICE CaPs collective, Centre for Science and Technology Research (CIRES), University 
of Colorado Boulder, accessed December 20, 2016. 
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This trend has been confirmed in many territories: The United Sates (Boykoff, 2011), 
Finland (Lyytimäki and Tapio, 2009), the UK (Boykoff and Mansfield, 2008), Canada 
(Ahchong and Dodds, 2012), Germany and France (Grundmann and Krishnamurthy, 
2010), Japan (Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui, 2009) and Sweden (Shehata and Hopmann, 
2012). In their key paper, Andreas Schmidt and colleagues (2013) analysed levels of 
climate change coverage in 27 countries from 1996 to 2010 and found that coverage had 
increased in all territories studied, and that coverage was especially high in “carbon 
dependent countries with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol” (2013, p. 1233).  
 
The various peaks and troughs in coverage are linked to political events (the 2001 
withdrawal of the US from Kyoto, for example), extreme weather events (Hurricane 
Katrina, August 2005), media events (the documentary An Inconvenient Truth, May 
2006), national and international reviews and reports (the Stern Review, October 2006, 
AR4 of the IPCC, early 2007) and international conferences (the Copenhagen COP, 
December 2009) (Grundmann and Scott, 2014, p. 223). Schmidt et al also found that 
coverage peaked around COPs and the publication of IPCC reports (Schmidt, Ivanova 
and Schäfer, 2013, p. 1241). This may be because COPs provide a forum for political 
actors, to whom the news media are attracted (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Harcup and 
O’Neill, 2001; Anderson, 2009), and because NGOs concentrate their activities around 
such conferences (Benford, 2010). Media coverage of climate change has been shown to 
peak at the time of COPs in the US (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2007; Boykoff and Mansfield, 
2008), in Switzerland (Besio and Pronzini, 2010), Mexico (Gordon, Deines and Havice, 
2010), India (Billett, 2010), Canada (Ahchong and Dodds, 2012), Japan (Sampei and 
Aoyagi-Usui, 2009) and Germany (Schäfer et al., 2014). The publication of Assessment 
Reports of the IPCC also coincides with peaks in media attention (Hulme, 2009).  
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However, other research has found that weather events have no effect on levels of media 
attention for climate change, nor do scientific publications, whereas feedbacks from 
politicians and ENGOs serve to increase media attention (Schäfer et al., 2014). A 
correlation between temperature development and media attention for climate change has 
been found to be non-existent (Liu, Lindquist and Vedlitz, 2011) or very slight (Shanahan 
and Good, 2000). There is some debate as to whether extreme weather events are linked 
to increased media coverage of climate change: a study of German, Indian and Australian 
media coverage of climate change showed that extreme weather events played only a 
subordinate role in driving attention (Schäfer et al., 2014), while elsewhere, heatwaves, 
droughts, storms and heavy rain have been found to increase coverage of climate change 
in the media (Ungar, 1992; Gordon, Deines and Havice, 2010; Aykut, Comby and 
Guillemot, 2012), as have incidents of flooding (Gavin and Marshall, 2011). In a study 
of Irish print media coverage of flooding, it was found that a frame linking flooding and 
climate change was beginning to emerge in the media discourse (Devitt and Neill, 2017). 
 
There have been suggestions that this decline follows the failure of the Copenhagen COP 
to arrive at an agreement, leading to a general disillusionment on the part of politicians 
and journalists (Lyytimäki, 2011; Schmidt, Ivanova and Schäfer, 2013), or that the 
decline post-2009 is due to the constriction of resources in newsrooms (Boykoff and 
Yulsman, 2013), which in turn has led to a reduction in the number of specialised 
environmental correspondents employed by media organisations (Hansen, 2011). Others 
have suggested that the global financial crisis “crowded out” (Djerf-Pierre, 2012a) 
environmental news and political attention shifted to dealing with the issue (Gupta, 
2010). 
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It should be noted that there are underling issue dynamics at play regarding levels of 
media attention, quite apart from external events such as international conferences, inputs 
from actors and claims-makers, and extreme weather events. These dynamics relate to 
the ways in which certain issues enter and subsequently rise or fall in the media and policy 
agenda, and will be considered in the following chapter.  
2.10 The presence of sceptic discourses in media coverage of climate change 
 
From the 1980s onwards, there was a well-funded, well-organised campaign to 
undermine the scientific consensus on climate change. Conservative “think tanks” played 
a prominent role (McCright and Dunlap, 2003; Jacques, Dunlap and Freeman, 2008; 
Klein, 2014). This campaign was waged primarily in the media, and primarily in the US. 
(Oreskes & Conway 2010; Antilla 2005). In several countries, such as France (Brossard, 
Shanahan and McComas, 2004), Germany (Weingart, Engels and Pansegrau, 2000b), and 
Holland (Dirikx and Gelders, 2010), the media “exhibit less uncertainty about climate 
science” than in the UK and US (Painter, 2015, p. 11). The media have been found to 
give undue prominence to sceptics in the US and the UK (Boykoff & Boykoff 2004; 
Boykoff 2007; Boykoff & Mansfield 2008), mainly due to journalists seeking to 
“balance” their stories by quoting a sceptic source. Some research into sceptic views 
present in the media concluded that contrarian or denialist views had been relegated to 
the margins of media discourse by the mid-2000s (Ereaut & Segnit 2006; Boykoff 2007).  
 
James Painter and Neil Gavin have pointed out some problems with this conclusion that 
the era of “false balance” was over: the studies claiming the sceptics had been 
marginalised were published in the period up to the mid-2000s “and predate very 
significant developments” such as the Climategate controversy, disputes over some 
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findings in the IPCC report of 2007 and the 2009 Copenhagen COP (Painter and Gavin, 
2015). Furthermore, subsequent research showed that UK tabloids continued to give 
space to sceptic arguments (Boykoff and Mansfield, 2008). A comparison of sceptic 
representations in the print media of six countries (Brazil, China, France, India, US, UK) 
found that, while sceptic views in the first four had declined between 2007 and 2009-10, 
they had in fact increased in both the US and UK (from 18% to 34% and from 15% to 
19% respectively) (Painter and Ashe, 2012). Painter and Gavin conclude that “sceptical 
voices were present is about one in five of all climate change articles in the main UK 
newspapers” between 2007-2011 (Painter and Gavin, 2015, p. 15). Further research 
focusing on two periods, 2007, and 2009-10, “would support the view that the USA is 
particularly notable for the presence of sceptics who question the need for strong climate 
change policy proposals. It would also be true of the UK, where the GWPF [the sceptic 
Global Warming Policy Forum] has had a major impact in the media since its formation 
in November 2009” (Painter and Ashe, 2012, p. 6). In a study of broadcast and online 
media coverage of the Copenhagen COP of 2009, it was found that “in both the 
conventional and new media, contrarian claims, assumptions and lines of reasoning were 
still very much in evidence around the high-profile Copenhagen negotiations, or 
presented in such a way as to lend them undeserved authority (Gavin and Marshall, 2011, 
p. 1041). Even at the prestigious British Broadcasting Corporation, where guidelines had 
suggested sceptics not be given equal time to proponents of the scientific consensus 
(Jones, 2011), the science of climate change continued to be framed as uncertain in 
reports from Copenhagen. 
 
Some of this academic disagreement over whether sceptics “disappeared” from the media 
by the mid-2000s can be cleared up by examining the methodologies of early studies, and 
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especially be examining their definitions of what constitutes scepticism. Much of this 
early, establishing work was done by American academic Maxwell Boykoff (Boykoff 
and Boykoff, 2004, p. 128; Boykoff, 2007a, pp. 474–5; Boykoff and Mansfield, 2008, p. 
4). His methodology, broadly speaking, consisted of measuring the content of news 
articles against four possible portrayals of climate change: it’s all due to anthropogenic 
causes; there is a significant anthropogenic contribution; there is a “balance” between 
these two, and there is little anthropogenic contribution (Painter & Gavin 2015, p4). Only 
the second portrayal is deemed “accurate”, while all others are coded as “inaccurate”. 
This approach is narrow and reductive, and does not take into account the complexity and 
diversity of sceptic attempts to influence media discourses on climate change. For 
instance, sceptics do not restrict themselves to questioning the attribution of global 
warming (Gavin and Marshall, 2011). In fact, there are three categories of sceptic 
(Rahmstorf, 2004): trend sceptics, who argue that global warming is not happening at all; 
attribution sceptics, who concede global warming in happening, but deny the 
anthropogenic contribution, and impact sceptics, who accept the human contribution, but 
suggest climate impacts may be beneficial, or that climate models are not robust enough, 
and/or question the necessity for policy interventions (Painter and Ashe, 2012, p. 3). (A 
shorthand version is: it’s not happening; it’s happening but it’s not us; it’s happening and 
it’s us, but there’s nothing we can do).  
 
Thus, scepticism goes far beyond questioning the science of climate change, although 
sceptics do question the integrity of the satellite data, the usefulness of computer 
modelling, and claim that warming is due to natural variability or solar activity (Oreskes 
& Conway 2010). Trend sceptics may also direct attention to a medieval warming period 
that cannot be attributed to CO2 emissions, or to an alleged “pause” in warming since 
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1998. Other sceptics ignore the scientific evidence altogether, suggesting instead that 
climate science is itself a conspiracy, that individual scientists dare not confess this for 
fear of destroying their careers, that there is a rigorously enforced orthodoxy akin to a 
religion, that the IPCC is politicised, that climate change is actually a means by which 
socialists can implement anti-capitalist programmes. (See Booker 2009; Booker & North 
2007; Lawson 2008 for a range of sceptic positions and Monbiot 2011 for a refutation).  
 
There is some evidence to suggest that the presence of sceptics in newspaper coverage of 
climate change is linked to ideological stance of the news organisation in question 
(Carvalho, 2005, 2007; Carvalho and Burgess, 2005). These three studies analysed the 
period 1985 to 2000 and concluded that, of the three newspapers examined (the Times, 
Independent and the Guardian), the ideological stance of the Times became strongly 
apparent by the mid-1990s. Others note that the Daily Mail coverage of climate change 
reflected the scientific consensus least, and suggest “a key element shaping the difference 
may be the politically conservative stance of the newspaper” (Boykoff and Mansfield, 
2008, p. 4). A study of commentary in News Corporation outlets in the UK, US and 
Australia revealed a tendency to emphasise uncertainty and to frame consensus views as 
motivated by political correctness or adherence to orthodoxy, while sceptics were 
portrayed by News Corp as courageous dissenters (McKnight, 2010). It has also been 
found that, while other major news organisations “overwhelmingly reflected the 
consensus view on the reality and causes of climate change” between 2009-2010, the 
Wall Street Journal did not (Nisbet, 2011, p. 57).  
 
It is clear from the foregoing that early studies of scepticism in media coverage of climate 
change focused on a narrow definition of scepticism; thus, when the sceptics ceased to 
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focus simply on denials of climate science, they ceased to be recorded as sceptics at all 
in these early coding methodologies. Once the complexities and nuances of scepticism 
were more fully understood, and their tactics uncovered, a more thorough content 
analysis of media could be undertaken. This showed that, far from being banished to the 
margins of media coverage of climate change, they had in many cases increased their 
presence. In the US and UK at least, they are very far from being a “dead norm” (Boykoff, 
2007a). 
 
2.11 The influence of celebrities on media coverage of climate change 
 
In a study of modern news values with which events must align before being deemed 
newsworthy by the media, the authors state “The UK press seems obsessed with 
celebrities such as TV soap stars, sports stars, film stars and, of course, royalty” (Harcup 
and O’Neill, 2001, p. 270). The interest in celebrities is not restricted to the UK. 
Celebrities “are increasingly appearing as key voices within the climate change debate, 
providing a powerful news hook with a human-interest angle, crystallizing issues that 
may otherwise be perceived as relatively removed from people’s everyday lives. This 
reflects a growing connection between the entertainment industry and politics in many 
liberal democracies.” (Anderson, 2011, p. 535). The academic research into the influence 
of celebrities follows on earlier scholarship relating to the status of “primary definers” of 
climate change (Antilla, 2005). It has been shown that, in the first phase of media 
coverage of climate change from 1988 to the mid-1990s, scientists were the most used 
source in climate change news stories. As the issue of climate change moved from the 
scientific into the political realm, the scope of participation (Schnattschneider, 1960) 
broadened, and politicians, activists and other actors featured in, and sometimes 
dominated, media coverage. Some researchers have attempted to classify climate 
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celebrities. There may be six types: celebrity business people (e.g., Richard Branson); 
celebrity musicians (e.g., Sheryl Crow, Coldplay); celebrity politicians (e.g., Arnold 
Schwarzenegger); celebrity actors (e.g., Leonardo De Caprio); celebrity athletes/sports 
figures (e.g., David James); and celebrity public intellectuals (e.g., Michael Crichton, 
George Monbiot) (Boykoff and Goodman, 2009), or there may be four types: celebrity 
endorsers (e.g., Oprah Winfrey, members of the British Royal family); celebrity 
advocates (e.g., Bono, Angelina Jolie); celebrity politicians (e.g., Arnold 
Schwarzenegger or Ronald Reagan); and politicians turned celebrity. (’t Hart and Tindall, 
2009). 
 
There has been a substantial increase in celebrity involvement in climate change 
advocacy in Australia, the UK, the US and Canada between 1987 and 2006 (Boykoff and 
Goodman, 2009), while the publication in the UK news media from 2000-2006 of 
photographs of celebrities as advocates for the environment has become more common 
(Smith and Joffe, 2009). A case study found that 165 celebrities were involved with 53 
environmental groups, but their activities had little impact on news coverage. 
Furthermore, large ENGOs such as Greenpeace rarely use celebrities in their awareness-
raising activities (Anderson, 2011). Photographs of celebrities in news coverage of 
climate change conferences are rarely published (Wozniak, Wessler and Lück, 2016), 
and the use of celebrity photographs may be counter-productive in any case. In a study 
of the impact of visual representations, it was found that images of celebrities strongly 
undermines salience (O’Neill et al., 2013), while the use by ENGOs of celebrity 
authorizers may also serve to mute and de-legitimise their message (Anderson, 2011). 
The generation of news coverage by celebrities is not guaranteed, but is dependent on 
variables such as their claim to fame, the role they fulfill and the issue they endorse (Panis 
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and Bulck, 2014). It appears that the use of celebrities to endorse climate change 
campaigns in increasing, that such use can benefit both the news media and the cause to 
which the celebrity has signed up, but the exercise is fraught with unintended 
consequences, among them a backlash against an affluent elite attempting to change 
individual behaviour (Laidley, 2013). It is difficult to disagree with Alison Anderson’s 
verdict that the use of celebrities to promote environmental causes is “a double-edged 
sword” (Anderson, 2011). 
 
2.12 Visual representations of climate change in the media 
 
There is a considerable body of scholarship based on the analysis of visual 
representations of the environment, of climate change and of environmental issues. These 
images evoke climate change in particular ways, and certain visual framings of climate 
change have become dominant, while others have become marginalised, and the 
academic study of the impact of such images seeks to understand the ways in which they 
contribute to the cultural politics of the issue (O’Neill and Smith, 2014). While this study 
concentrates on print coverage, it is important to acknowledge that the study of visual 
aspects of climate change communication is a growing research area. The ability of the 
visual to present factual depictions which may also evoke strong emotional responses, to 
engage audiences and to present complexity, make it a powerful means of communication 
about climate change (O’Neill et al., 2013). Furthermore, although the reality of climate 
change may be contested in the print media, “this element of uncertainty is removed in 
visual depictions. Viewing an image of a melting iceberg or a retreating glacier, for 
example, is much more definitive. It says to the reader that climate change is happening 
and here is the evidence to prove it. Concretisation of impacts in newspaper images, 
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therefore, speaks against the argument that climate change science is uncertain” (Smith 
and Joffe, 2009, p. 658).  
 
In a study of images used in six UK Sunday newspapers, it was found that climate impacts 
were the most common category of visual representations published (over 50%), 
followed by personification images (photos of people affected by climate change, either 
as victims of an extreme weather event or as exemplars of the kind of lifestyle that is 
contributing to CO2 levels) and quantitative data graphics. (Smith and Joffe, 2009). A 
study of two Canadian newspapers’ use of imagery found that photographs of humans 
dominated (66%), with nature (42%) and industry and technology 29%) featuring 
strongly. The authors note that Canadian visual media coverage of climate change avoids 
expected visual tropes. Polar bears, for instance, hardly feature (3%), although they are a 
powerful symbol for Canadians. The selection of uninvolving imagery suggests the topic 
is not a priority for the Canadian media. (DiFrancesco and Young, 2011). In a study 
examining the frames present in climate change images in 11 US newspapers from 1969 
to 2009, it was found that images relating to government and politics were most common 
(34%), with science and scientists (21%), measurements of environmental impacts 
(21%), images of warming (15%) people affected by climate change (no precise 
estimate), food (10%), technology (9%) and landscapes (9%) among the image categories 
recorded. (Rebich-Hespanha et al., 2015). A study of visual representations in 13 UK, 
US and Australian newspapers, found that images of people predominated (48%) 
(O’Neill, 2013). Politicians were the most common group of people featured in all 
countries, while celebrities, scientists and other public figures rarely featured. Other 
categories of image, in descending order, were climate impacts, climate protests, causes 
of climate change, solutions, science and technology, and weather. In contrast to claims 
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that visual images of climate change are more categoric than written text, this study 
argues that images of people can and do portray the politicised and contested nature of 
the climate change debate in the three countries studied. Furthermore, imagery than is 
distancing for the viewer is also commonly used to accompany media coverage of climate 
change (Ibid.). 
 
2.13 Frame analyses of media coverage of climate change  
 
The origins of framing, its usefulness and its drawbacks will be addressed more fully in 
a subsequent chapter dealing with the methodology of this thesis. It is the intention here 
to survey and analyse the academic literature that has used framing as a conceptual tool 
for analysing media coverage of climate change. We have already seen how framing is a 
frequently used approach in media coverage of climate change research (Fig 2.2 above). 
Framing is “one of the most fertile areas of current research in journalism and mass 
communications” generally (Riffe, 2004, p. 2), and media coverage of climate change in 
particular (Schäfer et al., 2016, p. 9). In frame studies of media coverage of climate 
change, researchers may use deductive frames (i.e. frames derived from theory and from 
the existing academic literature), inductive frames (i.e. frames which emerge from the 
data being analysed), or a mixture of both. Some scholars suggest that all media content 
can be ascribed to just two deductive frames: episodic and thematic (Iyengar, 1991), 
while others suggest there are in fact five generic frames into which all news media 
content falls:  the responsibility, conflict, (economic) consequences, human interest and 
morality frames (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). A rare example of research on media 
coverage of climate change which takes a purely deductive approach (based on Semetko 
and Valkenburg’s approach) is a 2010 study of Dutch and French media coverage of 
COPs between 2001 and 2007 which found that the consequences and responsibility 
	 58	
frames were most common, while the conflict and human interest frames were rare 
(Dirikx and Gelders, 2010).  
 
A wider set of deductive climate change frames, drawn from the literature of science 
communication and studies of various science-related controversies, such as nuclear 
power and biotechnology, has been put forward by Matthew Nisbet, who suggests eight 
frames applicable to climate change: social progress (akin to the opportunity frame in 
other studies), economic development and competitiveness (the economic frame in other 
studies), morality and ethics, scientific and technical uncertainty, Pandora’s Box, public 
accountability and governance, middle way/alternative path and conflict and strategy 
(Nisbet, 2009). The same author, in collaboration, has also suggested a slightly more 
concise typology: economic development, morality/ethics, scientific uncertainty, 
Pandora’s Box, public accountability and conflict/strategy frames (Nisbet and Scheufele, 
2009). A more recent study proposes a typology which includes health, security and 
settled science frames (O’Neill et al., 2015).  
 
Although many studies have examined ways in which media coverage of climate change 
is framed in different countries at different times, it has been argued that only seven 
studies explicitly define their analytical approach as “issue framing”. (O’Neill et al., 
2015). (These are: Antilla 2005; Doulton & Brown 2009; Olausson 2009; Nisbet 2009; 
Shehata & Hopmann 2012; Painter 2013; O’Neill 2013). Taking these seven “pure” 
framing studies as a starting point, then, it is possible to discern commonalities in the 
frame typologies uncovered.  
(i) In her study of newswires, scientific journals, 225 regional and national 
newspapers in the US, Lisa Antilla “encountered four discernable frames: 
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valid science; ambiguous cause or effects (indicating a degree of disregard for 
the gravity of climate change); uncertain science; and controversial science.” 
(Antilla, 2005, p. 344). The author notes that frames emphasizing debate, 
controversy and uncertainty were plentiful.  
(ii) Doulton and Brown’s 2009 study sits uncomfortably in the category created 
by O’Neill et al, in that it bases its analysis on Drysek’s discourse analysis 
approach (Doulton and Brown, 2009, p. 192) and lays no claim to identify or 
analyse frames. However, the discourses uncovered by the authors align with 
frames found in other climate change research: optimism, rationalism, 
disaster, ethics and opportunity. They conclude that UK prestige newspaper 
coverage of climate change between 1997 and 2007 is dominated by 
catastrophism and fails adequately to represent “the uncertainty inherent in 
many aspects of our climate understanding” (Doulton and Brown, 2009, p. 
201).  
(iii) Ulrika Olausson, in her study of 144 climate change articles in three Swedish 
newspapers from 2004-2005, found that, although “Collective action against 
climate change is…a central theme of the Swedish print media reporting on 
the issue”, adaptation and mitigation frames were seldom mentioned in the 
same article. (Olausson, 2009, pp. 425–6). 
(iv) Shehata and Hopkins’s comparison between US and Swedish coverage of 
climate change between the Kyoto (1997) and Bali (2007) climate summits 
showed little difference between coverage in the two countries, and identified 
three broad frames: the climate change frame (similar to the settled science 
frame in other studies), the scientific uncertainty frame and the economic 
consequences frame. The authors also found, in a case study of coverage of 
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the Bali and Kyoto summits themselves, that the scientific uncertainty frame 
was “totally absent in news coverage of the two summits” (Shehata and 
Hopmann, 2012, p. 188).  
(v) Matthew Nisbet’s essay on the framing of climate change is one of the most 
cited works on the media treatment of the issue (468 citations at time of 
writing) and sets out a convincing rationale for the need to frame scientific 
information in ways that resonate with one’s audience. The author provides a 
typology of climate change frames (which will be discussed in detail in a 
subsequent chapter) and thereby “suggests a deductive set of mental boxes 
and interpretive storylines that can be used to bring diverse audiences together 
on common ground, shape personal behavior, or mobilize collective action.” 
(Nisbet, 2009, p. 22).  
(vi) James Painter’s 2013 book includes a cross-national study of six countries 
(US, UK, India, Australia, France and Norway) for various dates from 2007 
to 2012 and identifies four frames: disaster or implicit risk, uncertainty, 
opportunity, and explicit risk. (Painter, 2013).  
(vii) Saffron O’Neill’s study of visual climate change frames shows that two main 
framings dominated coverage in 13 newspapers across three territories 
(Australia, UK, US) in 2010: a distancing frame and a contested frame. The 
contested frame was especially apparent in titles owned by Rupert Murdoch’s 
News Corporation, while it was also more present in Australian news titles 
generally than in UK or American ones. The author speculates that depicting 
climate change as contested, politicised and distant from everyday life “is 
unlikely to increase a sense of issue efficacy.” (O’Neill, 2013, p. 18). 
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Although the methodologies of these framing studies are interesting, their findings are of 
greater interest to those wishing to establish how media coverage of climate change is 
framed in different countries at different times and in relation to different aspects of the 
wider climate change issue. In a recent study US and UK print and broadcast and social 
media coverage of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, it was found that different frames 
were used in coverage of the different Working Group reports, that different media types 
used different frames, and that different media outlets favoured certain frames. Of 
particular relevance to this research is the finding that the political or ideological contest 
frame (similar to the conflict/strategy frame in other studies) dominated print media 
coverage of all Working Group reports (O’Neill, H. T. P. Williams, et al., 2015).  
	
Meanwhile, in Peru, a “solutions” and “effects” frame was dominant, while frames 
relating to policy and science were limited (Takahashi, 2011). In a frame analysis of the 
coverage by two US and two UK newspapers of the “Climategate” email hacking 
controversy, frames of scientific dishonesty, scientific explanation, criminal activity and 
political advocacy were identified using a cluster analysis which permits the frames to 
emerge from the data themselves. (Bowe et al., 2012). An analysis of sceptic discourses 
and US newspaper op eds uncovered three frames: diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational. (Hoffman, 2011).  
 
The frames of “new evidence or research”, “scientific background”, “consequences”, 
“economics”, “domestic politics”, “international relations” and “current weather” were 
used by Brossard et al (2004) and McComas and Shanahan (1999). While 
environmentalists and others frame climate change as a looming disaster (Nisbet, 2010), 
conservative groups who deny the anthropogenic element of climate change counter that 
climate change may bring benefits and that efforts to mitigate or adapt to climate change 
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would be counterproductive (McCright & Dunlap 2014). The “apocalyptic frame” (coded 
as a disaster frame in other studies) may persuade the public there is little they can do to 
avert the impacts of climate change (Foust & Murphy 2009, p.164), while episodic 
framing that focuses on people and personalities is more involving (Iyengar and Kinder, 
1987b). Although cosmopolitan and communitarian frames in climate change coverage 
have been examined (Cottle, 2009; Laksa, 2014), thematic framing of climate change in 
the media is less frequent (Iyengar, 1996).  
 
2.14 Research into media coverage of climate change in Ireland 
 
Ireland has been relatively neglected as a subject territory for the study of media coverage 
of climate change. It has “only recently emerged as a distinct field of inquiry” (Fox and 
Rau, 2016, p. 1). The first two pieces of research into the levels and nature of media 
coverage of climate change in Ireland were published in 2013; the first was the 
publication by Andreas Schmidt and colleagues of a cross-national study of media 
attention levels for climate change from 1996 to 2010. Ireland was one of 27 countries 
studied, and the Irish Times was the only paper whose coverage was recorded. Ireland 
conformed to the broad international trends: coverage peaked at about 4% of all news 
coverage in late 2009 (Schmidt et al, 2013). However, as this research has found, the 
Irish Times, especially in the 1996-2010 period, published greater levels of climate 
change stories than any other title, and therefore it may not be representative of Irish 
media generally. Also in 2013, sociologist Gerard Mullally and his colleagues presented 
some data on newspaper coverage of climate change to a conference in University 
College Cork. Coverage in the Irish Times, Irish Independent and Irish Examiner, along 
with 13 regional titles, was studied for the period 2008 to June 2013. The Irish Times 
coverage, which had been close to 500 stories in late 2009, dropped dramatically to fewer 
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than 100 by 2013; the two other national titles did not approach the peak in coverage 
shown by the Irish Times, and their coverage, while it decreased post-2009, did not suffer 
such as dramatic decline. Of the 13 provincial papers studied, only the Corkman and the 
Kerryman devoted notable levels of coverage to the issue. (Mullally et al., 2013).  
 
The levels of attention for climate change in the broadcast media in Ireland is also a 
neglected area of academic research. A single, exploratory study of RTE’s coverage of 
the issue from October 2010 to October 2013 was undertaken at the request of the RTE 
Audience Council. This research concluded that the national broadcaster’s coverage was 
“infrequent, sporadic and clustered around a small number of topical areas.” The report 
also found that there was a decline in the number of climate change items broadcast from 
October 2010 to October 2011, a period during which the broadcaster left the post of 
environment correspondent unfilled. In the main TV news programmes, climate change 
was seen as an international, rather than an Irish, story, nor was climate change linked to 
any topical stories. However, sceptical views were not present in the coverage studied. 
(Cullinane and Watson, 2014, p. 19) 
 
Levels of climate change coverage in three Irish newspapers (the Irish Independent, Irish 
Times and Sunday Business Post) from 1997-2012 formed part of the data for a study by 
Wagner and Payne on the representation of climate change in the Irish media. This study 
confirmed earlier findings that Ireland’s newspaper coverage rises and falls at times of 
international conferences and major scientific reports, and that levels of coverage 
declined steeply in late 2009/early 2010. The authors conclude that the Irish print media 
present a narrow, ideological view of climate change, one that is supportive of the 
country’s political and economic elites. (Wagner and Payne, 2015). Another study, by 
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Brenda McNally, which focuses on the Irish media’s representation of low carbon 
transition and decarbonisation and is therefore tangentially related to media coverage of 
climate change, examined coverage in a wide range of titles: these were the Irish Times, 
Irish Independent, Irish Examiner, Sunday Business Post, Mirror and Sunday Mirror, 
Sunday Tribune, Sunday Independent and Irish Daily Mail. Again, coverage of these 
climate change-related topics (low carbon transition, decarbonisation) peaks in late 2009, 
and again, the Irish Times publishes a far greater number of articles on these topics than 
the other titles (212 articles, compared to 52 in the Irish Examiner, the next highest). 
(McNally, 2015).  
 
An overview of the scholarship of media coverage of climate change in Ireland has 
recently been provided by an entry on Ireland in the Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of 
Climate Science (Fox and Rau, 2016). The authors survey the literature mentioned above, 
concluding that (i) coverage of climate change has steadily increased since 1997; (ii) 
there was a steep “post-crash drop” in late 2009; (iii) the Irish Times has a “track record 
of providing the most coverage” and (iv) that coverage is largely driven by events. (2016, 
p. 8). They further find that coverage presents climate change as a challenge that must be 
dealt with from within the existing institutional and economic system, and that broadsheet 
newspaper coverage relies heavily on the optimistic discourse of ecological 
modernization (2016, p. 9).  
 
A climate change frame formed part of a frame analysis of Irish media coverage (Irish 
Times, Irish Independent, Irish Examiner) of flooding, in which the authors noted that 
the media relied on descriptive reporting and emphasised humanitarian responses to 
individuals rather than long-term adaptation policies. (Devitt and Neill, 2017). More 
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recently, a climate change-related study of Irish media coverage in the Irish Independent, 
Irish Times, Irish Examiner, Sunday Independent and Irish Daily Mail of the Papal 
encyclical on climate change, Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home, examined 
frames used by the Irish print media. The encyclical was published in June 2015 and 
received widespread media coverage. The study found that the morality or ethics frame 
dominated, while the settled science frame was also prominent, with the political or 
ideological struggle frame relegated to third place. (Robbins 2017). A report on Irish 
media coverage of climate change, including print, social, broadcast and online media, is 
in preparation (Culloty et al., forthcoming). 
 
The academic literature on media coverage of climate change in Ireland is evidently 
somewhat threadbare. It may be argued that, in the case of Ireland, the academy has 
bypassed certain stages in the process of analysing media coverage of climate change, 
stages that have been undertaken with regard to other countries. Whereas the general 
scholarship of media coverage of climate change began with concern over levels of 
attention and scientific accuracy, these areas have not heretofore been addressed with 
regard to Ireland. Furthermore, the range of academic disciplines represented elsewhere, 
such as communications, media, journalism and science communications studies, have 
not contributed to the study of Ireland’s media coverage of climate change. Of the 
substantive research undertaken on Ireland, the influence of sociology and public policy 
(Wagner and Payne, 2015; Devitt and Neill, 2017) is apparent. These scholars use media 
data to make broader points about political economy and social structures rather than the 
media itself and its influence on public engagement with climate change. In considering 
representations of carbon (McNally, 2015) and of flooding (Devitt and Neill, 2017), the 
literature relating to Ireland’s media coverage of climate change has left other, more 
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central questions unanswered. This research aims to address some of these shortcomings, 
firstly by measuring media attention in print media in seven national titles over a period 
of over nine years, and secondly by presenting a more media-focused perspective and 
analysis, emphasising the scholarship of media and journalism studies and presenting the 
viewpoints of working journalists, politicians and media advisors for the first time. 
 
2.15 Recent trends in media coverage of climate change scholarship 
 
Recent scholarship of media coverage of climate change has moved away from the 
treatment of the issue as a homogenous entity. Perhaps partly in acknowledgement of the 
complexity of climate change, and partly because of the contribution of earlier research, 
scholars have focused on its constituent parts. [There are exceptions to this trend, such as 
studies of media coverage of climate change in South Korea (Chang et al., 2016), the 
Canadian arctic (Stoddart and Smith, 2016) and Greenland (Davies, Wright and Alstine, 
2016)]. Recent studies have considered, for instance, the social media coverage of 
individual COPs (O’Neill et al. 2015), of flooding (Gavin, Leonard-Milsom and 
Montgomery, 2011; Escobar and Demeritt, 2014; Devitt and Neill, 2017), online 
comments sections on climate change (Koteyko, Jaspal and Nerlich, 2013), climate 
change coverage in science magazines (Nielsen and Schmidt Kjærgaard, 2011), scientist 
bloggers (Thorsen, 2013), letters to the editor on climate change (Young, 2013), images 
used to illustrate climate change (O’Neill, 2013; Rebich-Hespanha et al., 2015), 
representations of coal (Bacon and Nash, 2012), carbon (Feldpausch-Parker et al., 2015; 
McNally, 2015) and fracking (Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014). The academy has moved on 
from establishing whether media coverage of climate change accepts AGW as happening 
and has begun to consider what a post-climate change world might look like. 
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However, certain characteristics remain persistent. The perspective of journalists is all 
too rare, a recent survey of elite environmental correspondents notwithstanding (Hiles 
and Hinnant, 2014). In her review of media coverage of climate change trends, Alison 
Anderson suggests that “research involving in-depth interviews with editors and reporters 
would provide important insights into the factors impeding or enhancing climate change 
coverage” (Anderson, 2009, p. 176). The view from the other side of the media fence, 
from those wishing to increase, influence or dominate media coverage of climate change 
is also lacking. Anderson adds: “Studies involving in-depth interviews with news sources 
would provide us with a greater understanding of competition to control the issue and the 
behind-the-scenes factors influencing patterns of reporting.” (2009, p. 176). Anderson 
echoes a similar suggestion made by Max and Jules Boykoff that “… interviews with 
journalists would better situate and extract explanations as to why journalists continue to 
adhere to the norm of balanced reporting on the issue of global warming at certain times, 
and not in others. Also, future studies could integrate macro-structural analysis with the 
micro-process analysis featured here. Furthermore, future work could delineate partial 
predictive influences on the production of ‘balanced’ coverage, of global warming, or 
divergence from it, in order to more finely texture explanations of this media coverage” 
(Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004, p. 134). It is possible to argue that the academic field has 
failed to shake off its origins in science communication, and remains overly concerned 
with scientific accuracy and portrayals of science; the difference is that now, such 
concern relates to representations of issue such as carbon capture and storage and wind 
turbines rather than climate change itself. 
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2.16 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, in order to place the study of media coverage of climate change in a wider 
theoretical context, a review of general media theory was presented, and the ways in 
which the media are organised, and in which they are expected to perform in society were 
examined. Subsequently, a review of the literature relating specifically to media coverage 
of climate change was undertaken. It is possible to discern several broad areas of 
agreement between scholars. For instance, it has been found, both globally and in relation 
to many individual territories, that media coverage of climate change is episodic, 
exhibiting peaks and troughs of media attention. It peaks at times of international climate 
change conferences and the release of major scientific reports. There is debate about the 
influence of other factors, such as extreme weather events, or political or celebrity claims-
making. There is also general agreement that, in the wake of the global financial crisis 
and the failure to reach agreement at the Copenhagen COP of December 2009, coverage 
declined steeply. The Paris COP of December 2015 received high levels of coverage, 
approaching the levels of Copenhagen, but in general coverage has not attained its pre-
2009 levels worldwide. Other commonalities include findings that climate change is often 
covered as a political or economic issue in ways that reflect the political stance of the 
media organisation (Carvalho, 2007), that adaptation receives more coverage than 
mitigation (Boykoff and Roberts, 2007), and that the disaster frame is attractive to 
journalists (Ereaut and Segnit, 2006; Hulme, 2007; Hart and Feldman, 2014). 
 
The general media theories examined in the opening sections of this chapter have much 
to contribute to an understanding of the broad forces influencing the media’s coverage of 
climate change. Macro-level concerns such as media structure, ownership, and the 
political economy of the media industry are all important considerations when examining 
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media coverage of particular issues. However, this research is concerned with how media 
coverage of climate change is framed, and with the competition between various agenda-
driven actors to impose their framing of the issue on the discourse. In seeking to establish 
how various actors frame climate change, whether it is journalists covering the topic or 
other actors whose claims may be reported in the media, it is necessary to examine media 
texts. Broader theories provide a context in which the media operate, but more journalist-
centric approaches can contribute much to understanding how and why particular frames 
are reproduced in the media. 
 
Despite the constraints placed on media organisation by political economy 
considerations, individual journalists, concerned with legitimation and attached to 
professional norms and work routines, often strive to perform their normative roles. In 
adopting a newsroom-level view, we may uncover the influences of organisation cultures, 
the extent to which journalists are reliant on information subsidies from the PR industry, 
and, most importantly in my view, the extent to which news values shapes coverage of 
climate change. 
 
It is evident in surveying the broad sweep of scholarship of media coverage of climate 
change that certain aspects have been foregrounded, while others have been neglected. 
For instance, the extent to which coverage is scientifically accurate, or reflects the 
scientific consensus on climate change, has been something of a preoccupation. The 
framing typologies used in many studies reflects this: for instance, in an influential study 
on the politics of media coverage of climate change, the four frames examined all related 
to representations of science (Carvalho, 2005), while numerous other studies also 
included frames concerning the portrayal of science (for example, Brossard et al. 2004). 
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It is only in more recent scholarship that broader framings which relate climate change 
to wider spheres such as politics, economics, and to notions of morality and opportunity, 
have emerged. However, even though the frames examined have moved away from 
scrutiny of scientific accuracy, the scholarly perspective has remained resolutely outside 
the media, drawing attention to the ways in which media coverage is misleading, deficient 
or otherwise inadequate. The perspectives of those actively engaged in framing climate 
change for media audiences has been lacking, and therefore an understanding of how the 
media and others involved in the climate change discourse operate is largely absent.  It 
may also be argued that scholars in the disciplines of sociology, political economy and 
political communication have used media coverage as a proxy for public opinion or 
societal attitudes, that, in the absence of expensive survey data, media data has been used 
as a surrogate, and that there is a need for scholars of journalism and communications to 
contribute to a debate that is passing them by. This research aims to address these issues 
by analysis frames in the Irish media coverage of climate change and by triangulating 
these results with semi-structured interviews with journalists, politicians and media 
advisors. 
 
An argument has been presented here for more media-centred perspectives in the study 
of media coverage of climate change. In the following chapter, the literature concerning 
the effects of media coverage on public and policy opinion, and on theories of issue 
agendas is considered. The aim of my research is to investigate the framing strategies of 
those involved in the frame competition around climate change. These strategies form 
part of a larger arena in which various issues and “issue entrepreneurs” compete for media 
and policy prominence. Again, the extent to which media agency is accounted for in these 
theories forms part of the analysis and discussion. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Media effects and issue dynamics 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the literature relating to the media’s coverage of climate change 
was discussed. The focus on the performance of the media in relation to climate change 
is based on several assumptions. The first is that the more an issue appears in the media, 
the greater the level of importance the public assigns to that issue (Ungar, 2000b). The 
second is that those aspects of an issue given prominence by the media in their coverage 
– how the issue is framed – affects how the public perceives it (Chong and Druckman, 
2007b). A third reason for analysing media coverage of climate change involves working 
backwards from an assessment of political responses to the issue. Thus, the perceived 
lack of political responses to mitigating against, or adapting to climate change is a starting 
point, and the extent and nature of the media’s coverage of the issue is examined as a 
possible contributory factor to this state of affairs. In this chapter, the media’s role is 
placed in the wider context of other social, political and policy dynamics at play in 
responses to climate change. 
 
Thus, the focus moves outside the media and the texts they produce, and considers the 
effects these texts have on various audiences. As Mazur and Lee point out (1993, p. 682): 
“the most widely accepted effect of the news media on public opinion is agenda setting 
– the placing of certain issues or problems foremost in the public mind”. A well-known 
aphorism in journalism scholarship puts it thus: the news media “may not be successful 
much of the time in telling people what to think, but [they are] stunningly successful in 
telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen, 1963, p. 13). This agenda-setting effect 
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(McCombs and Shaw, 1972) is important with regard to climate change because, unlike 
some other issues of which citizens have direct experience, such as poverty, or the impact 
of health or taxation policy, the public “draws most of its knowledge” about the issue 
from the news media (Anderson, 2011, p. 535). 
 
Much of communications scholarship is predicated on the notion of media effects, both 
in terms of the power of the media to “set the agenda” for discourse and policy priorities 
within a society, and in terms of setting the tone, content and limits of these debates. The 
media select certain frames through which they present their coverage. These media 
frames have been defined as the words, images, phrases, and presentation styles that a 
media outlet uses when relaying information about an issue or event to an audience 
(Gamson and Modigliani, 1989), and the process of their selection is referred to as frame 
building (Scheufele, 1999). Frame setting (Ibid.) takes place when media frames interact 
with audiences, who in turn have their own favoured frames through which they view 
certain issues.  
 
The framing effect takes place between the media and their audiences. Other academic 
perspectives place the media in a broader social and political context. For instance, in 
relation to climate change, the media may be studied because they constitute a central 
forum for discussion of climate policy (Nanz and Steffek, 2004, p. 321) or because high 
levels of media coverage are an important indicator for policymakers of an issue’s 
salience (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2011), or may create circumstances in which 
governments are forced to act, or at least may find it difficult not to act on climate change 
(Newell, 2000, p. 94). These perspectives consider the media as participants in systems 
relating to public and political systems.  Theories of agenda systems concern themselves 
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with how and why certain pressing issues are promoted to the top of the political agenda, 
while others, which may be just as pressing, or even more so, remain at a low priority 
level. Agenda systems approaches take into account the interaction of various “streams” 
(Kingdon, 1995) or “arenas” (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988) which generally include the 
media, politics and policy environments. However, some allow for more agency on the 
part of the media, and on the part of journalists, than others.  
 
This thesis is concerned with uncovering the framing strategies of those involved in the 
“frame competition” (Borah, 2011; Nisbet et al., 2013) around climate change in Ireland 
from 2007 to 2016. The data collected in pursuit of this research goal include newspaper 
articles (which in turn allowed for the detection of frames) and interviews with 
environmental journalists, government ministers and their media advisors. Thus, many 
of the key elements considered by agenda systems form part of this research, and the 
perspectives offered by agenda systems theories offer valuable explanations as to how 
frame competitions play out. 
 
The key question which theories of agenda systems seek to address is “how does an issue 
or a demand become or fail to become the focus of concern and interest within a polity?” 
(Cobb and Elder, 1972, p. 12). In general, theories suggest that issues, or social problems, 
exist in the background until some “focussing event” (Kingdon, 1995) or “information 
shock” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991) brings them to the attention of policymakers and 
politicians. The issue is then subject to “information feedback” (Ibid.) comprising of 
input from concerned constituencies which further amplify the issue’s claims for priority. 
In a systematic test of two influential agenda systems models (John Kingdon’s agenda-
setting model and Baumgartner and Jones’s punctuated equilibrium model), Xinsheng 
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Liu and his colleagues described “feedback” as emanating from the routine work of 
government officials in monitoring programmes, opinion polls, complaints from the 
public, pressure from interest groups, criticism from “thought leaders”, and the findings 
of scientific research. It is notable that the media is absent from this list of constituencies 
from which feedback may originate. Yet it is in all likelihood from the media that 
policymakers learn of the initial “information shock”; furthermore, the media are the 
most likely forum for “information feedback” to be disseminated. The extent to which 
these agenda systems theories take account of media influence will be discussed in the 
sections below. 
 
3.2 Theories of media effects 
 
It is helpful to think of the process of mediation of an issue as having two stages. The 
first stage concerns the work of the media in sourcing, writing and publishing news. The 
processes and routines involved in this work, the internal and external pressures at play, 
both on the individual journalist and on media companies in general, were discussed in 
the previous chapter. The second stage in the process concerns what happens after the 
news item is published. Research relating to this stage is focused on the effects media 
coverage has on public opinion and on the priorities of policymakers. Much of this 
research takes the form of investigations into who sets the public and policy agenda. The 
ability to set the agenda on an issue, or to bring an issue to the top of the agenda, is an 
exercise in power. Indeed, McCombs calls it “the epitome of political power”. Citing the 
example of President G. W. Bush’s ability to sideline environmental concerns and 
proceed with an energy policy based on fossil fuels, he notes that “Controlling the 
perspective of the political debate on any issue is the ultimate influence on public 
opinion.” (McCombs, 2004, p. 82). In the following sections, the literature relating to the 
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media effects of agenda-setting, second-level agenda-setting, priming and framing is 
presented and discussed.  
 
3.3 Agenda-setting 
 
The theory that the media influences public perceptions of issue importance is now 
almost 50 years old. The original Chapel Hill experiment (in which voters were asked 
about the election issues they thought were most important; their answers were compared 
to the media coverage of these issues, and a correlation was found) took place in 1968 
(McCombs and Shaw, 1972), but the origins of the notion that audiences perceive a 
mediated environment rather than an actual one is even older, going back to Walter 
Lippmann’s suggestion that the public responds to a “pseudo-environment” rather than 
reality or a real environment (Lippmann, 1922). In a later account, one of the originators 
offers a definition of the concept: “The core theoretical idea is that elements prominent 
in the media picture become prominent in the audience’s picture. Those elements 
emphasised on the media agenda come to be regarded as important by the public.” (Ibid 
p. 68). Others have emphasised correlation rather than causation, noting that agenda-
setting “refers to the idea that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass 
media place on certain issues (e.g., based on relative coverage or amount of coverage) 
and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences”. (Scheufele and 
Tewksbury, 2007). 
 
The publication of these findings marked a new departure in communications research. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, the “hypodermic” or “magic bullet” approach had dominated, 
which put forward the notion that the mass media directly influenced their audiences 
(Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). This paradigm was in turn disrupted by the work of 
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sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld of Columbia University’s Bureau for Social Research in the 
1940s. Lazarsfeld placed an intermediary between the press and the public, arguing that 
the media influenced “opinion leaders” who in turn influenced the public, a “two-step” 
communication process (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1948). Furthermore 
Lazarsfeld contended that, in contrast to the belief of journalists, advertising executives 
and politicians that mass media campaigns can produce widespread changes in public 
opinion, the opposite is the case (cited in Katz 1987). This strand of research emphasised 
the limited effects of the media and transferred power to the individual and away from 
the media on the basis of each individual’s selective perception of the world. McCombs 
and Shaw disagreed with the diminution of the effect of the media, as McCombs later 
stated: “…the idea of powerful media effects expressed in the concept of agenda-setting 
was a better explanation for the salience of issues on the public agenda than was the 
concept of selective perception, which is a keystone on the idea of minimal mass media 
consequences.” (McCombs, 2004, p. 6).  
 
Many instances have been found of the correlation between the media’s agenda and the 
public’s agenda (McCombs 2004, pp.8–16), yet the agenda-setting effect is not 
straightforward. For example, the timeframe is important when measuring agenda-setting 
effects: the effect of agenda-setting is most marked in the month after coverage appears, 
and declines thereafter. TV news has the most immediate agenda-setting effect, but also 
has the shortest period before ‘decay’ sets in. “It is primarily the accumulation of these 
lessons over the period of one to eight weeks that is reflected in the responses of citizen 
students when we enquire about the most important issues facing the nation.” (McCombs, 
2004, pp. 46–47). The medium also seems to matter, in that print has a greater agenda-
setting impact than television. (Ibid p. 49). The circumstances in which agenda-setting 
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occurs is important too. Agenda-setting is at its most powerful when the public requires 
orientation regarding an issue which is relevant to them but about which they are 
uncertain. The author cites the example of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal; although media 
coverage was extensive and prolonged, it did not appear as a matter of importance in 
public opinion as it was an issue on which the public was not in need of orientation. (Ibid 
p. 56-7). Whether an issue is obtrusive or unobtrusive has an effect on the media’s 
agenda-setting impact (Ibid p. 61-2). The agenda-setting power of the media was found 
to be strong for unobtrusive issues of which the public has little personal knowledge, but 
weak for more obtrusive issues more directly experienced by individuals. For instance, 
Canadians followed the media agenda for unobtrusive and abstract notions such as 
Canadian unity but not for inflation, of which they had daily experience (Winter, Eyal 
and Rogers, 1982). 
 
The competition between issues to gain media attention has been emphasised by agenda-
setting scholars. McCombs himself states: “The intense competition among issues for a 
place on the agenda is the most important aspect of this process.” (McCombs, 2004, p. 
38). Other scholars broaden the definition: agenda-setting is “an ongoing competition 
among issue protagonists to gain the attention of media professionals, the public and 
policy elites.” (Dearing and Rogers, 1996). There is an implication here that it is through 
the media that influence can be exerted by ‘issue protagonists’ on both the public and 
policymakers. Thus, in this later, broader definition, the media becomes an arena in which 
claims makers compete for attention. The introduction of a third party to this process, i.e. 
when claims makers are introduced to a dynamic which had heretofore concerned only 
the media and their audience – recalls Lazarsfield’s model discussed above. The 
difference is that, in this definition, the media remains as the agent of influence.  
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Agenda-setting establishes a correlation between the media’s agenda and the public 
agenda. However, as can be seen with the studies relating to obtrusive and unobtrusive 
issues, this is not universally the case; it is issue dependent. It is also dependent on the 
need for orientation in the audience. This dependence cuts to the heart of the problem 
with agenda-setting theory: there is often a correlation (but not always), but that does not 
establish causation. The evidence for agenda-setting “is insufficient to show a causal 
(emphasis in original) connection between the various issue agendas: 
“…the further one moves from the general notion that media direct attention and shape 
cognitions, and towards examining actual cases, the more uncertain it becomes whether 
such an effect actually occurs…[agenda-setting remains] a plausible but unproven idea”. 
(McQuail, 2010, p. 513). 
 
The empirical evidence confirms that there is a strong correlation between the media’s 
agenda and the public agenda. This correlation is accepted by journalists and politicians 
(and other media-centric industries, such as lobbying and advertising) and plays out in 
real life (Davis, 2007; Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2011). Furthermore, if politicians accept 
the agenda-setting role of the media, and respond to media pressure, then the effect is 
manifest. In other words, the agenda-setting power of the media is such a well-researched 
area of communications that, although it has yet to be comprehensively proven, it is 
widely accepted in media, social and political systems theories. Indeed, much of media 
scholarship is based on the notion that media texts have an effect on their audiences, and 
that agenda-setting is one of them; framing, which is considered in a later section, is 
another. 
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3.4 Second-level agenda setting 
 
Much of agenda-setting research is related to elections and policy priorities, and is 
concerned with issues of political communication and public opinion. The origins of 
agenda-setting in political communication are evident in McCombs’s discussion of 
attributes and second-level agenda-setting. The media is influential in telling the public 
which aspect of a person is most note-worthy, he argues, but it is clear that he is referring 
to election candidates. He remarks that second-level agenda-setting focuses on which 
aspect of “an issue or a candidate” gains more salience (McCombs, 2004, p. 71). 
However, not all news material is related to policy issues. Indeed, the original Chapel 
Hill study discussed above found that only about a third of media coverage was about 
public issues. The remainder concerned people, events and other news (McCombs and 
Shaw, 1972). The coverage of these issues also has an agenda-setting effect, because the 
media can influence which aspect of a news event or a person was most deserving of 
attention. McCombs calls these “attributes”, and the influence of the media in 
emphasising them became known as “second-level agenda-setting”. Hester and Gibson 
(2003, p. 74) offer a valuable definition: “Examining the tone of news coverage, rather 
than simply the amount of coverage, is part of what is considered ‘second-level’ or 
‘attribute’ agenda setting. This second level analyses the attributes afforded issues and 
individuals in news coverage, whereas traditional agenda-setting research has focused 
primarily on amount and placement of news coverage.” Attributes may be straight-
forward (e.g. a person’s age, place of birth, whether they are left or right-handed) or more 
complex (e.g. their political alignment) (McCombs, 2004, p. 71). In selecting which 
attributes of an issue, or a person, to foreground, the media “not only tell us what to think, 
but that they tell us how to think about (emphasis in original) some objects.” (McCombs, 
2004, p. 71).  
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It is clear that second-level agenda-setting is similar to framing, in that it foregrounds 
certain aspects of an individual or issue. Indeed the terms have been used interchangeably 
(Castilla, Rodríguez and País, 2014), while McCombs states that “Attribute agenda-
setting explicitly merges agenda-setting theory with framing.” He also argues that a frame 
is an attribute “because it describes the object” (McCombs, 2004, p. 88). This seems like 
an attempt to annexe the area of framing research as part of the territory of agenda-setting. 
In some definitions, framing and second-level agenda-setting are aligned (Tankard et al., 
1991), while others resist the subsuming of framing into agenda-setting on the grounds 
that different cognitive processes are at work in each case (Scheufele, 2000). I would 
argue for a separation between second-level agenda-setting and framing on the grounds 
that framing is a more complex process. It involves not only foregrounding an aspect of 
an issue or individual (as takes place in second-level agenda-setting), but also involves 
placing the topic in a wider context and presenting it in ways that suggest both causes 
and solutions (Entman 1993). Furthermore, agenda-setting (and priming, discussed in the 
next section) place emphasis on story selection on the part of the media, whereas framing 
instead focuses on the ways in which those issues are presented (Price and Tewksbury, 
1997; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). A more detailed discussion of framing is 
presented in section 3.5 below. 
 
3.5 Priming 
 
In their 1987 paper, Iyengar and Kinder argued that the media not only influence public 
opinion as to what are the most important issues of the day, but also that the media suggest 
that certain issues are the ones the performance of governments, political parties and 
individual politicians are to be judged against. (There is some debate over the origins of 
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the concept of priming. Some scholars suggest that it is a well-worn communications 
approach, “dating back at least to 1975” (Weaver, 2007, p. 145), while others credit 
Iyengar and Kinder as the originators (McQuail, 2010, p. 514)). Priming “changes in the 
standards that people use to make political evaluations” (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987a, p. 
63). Other definitions have refined the concept: “Priming occurs when news content 
suggests to news audiences that they ought to use specific issues as benchmarks for 
evaluating the performance of leaders and governments.” (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 
2007). Thus, priming as a media effect is a consequence of the agenda-setting influence 
of the media. Many studies have found empirical evidence of a priming effect (Miller and 
Krosnick, 1996), while some have found that, while an effect exists, it is minimal (Pan 
and Kosicki, 1997). Again, McQuail is sceptical of priming as an established theory of 
media effects: “Like agenda-setting, although it seems true to what is happening, it is 
difficult to prove in practice.” (McQuail, 2010, p. 514). 
 
Much of the academic literature comparing and analysing the differences between 
agenda-setting, priming and framing discuss their operation at a psychological level 
(Scheufele, 1999; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007; Weaver, 2007), focusing on the 
influence each effect may have on the ease with which issues (or frames) can be brought 
to mind or retrieved from the memory of the individual. As noted in this and previous 
sections, there is ample evidence of an agenda-setting effect of the media. The effects of 
agenda-setting and priming have been established, yet the processes by which they take 
place are not entirely clear. 
 
Of the three media effects considered so far, agenda-setting is the most influential; 
second-level agenda-setting and priming derived from it, and are refinements, seeking to 
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analyse and codify different aspects of the agenda-setting effect. However, the agenda-
setting effect is a relatively unsophisticated one: high levels of media attention signal to 
the public that an issue is important, but not what, if anything, should be done about it. 
Framing, on the other hand, which is considered in the next section, presents information 
in ways in which causation and solution are implied. This thesis pays attention to agenda-
setting by recording attention levels for climate change in seven national daily titles from 
2007-2016 for the first time, but focuses more intently on frames because of their greater 
power in focusing audience attention on potential action. 
 
3.6 Framing 
 
In the previous chapter, frame analyses of media coverage of climate change were 
examined. In this section, it is intended to place framing as a methodological approach in 
its context as a theory of media effects. Framing analysis is a common analytical 
framework for analysing socially constructed concepts and has become much more 
prevalent in recent times than agenda-setting or priming. For instance, a search of the 
Communication Abstracts database for the timeframe 2001-2005 found 165 framing 
articles, as opposed to 43 agenda-setting studies and 25 priming studies (Weaver, 2007). 
The relative popularity of framing as an analytical approach may be because it “provides 
a strong hypothesis that an audience will be guided by journalistic frames in what it 
learns.” (McQuail, 2010, p. 511). Framing studies are particularly prevalent within media 
and science communication (see Anderson 2009 for an overview) and political science 
(Chong & Druckman 2007b). Framing is the most frequently used theory in leading 
international journals in the field this century (Bryant and Miron, 2004). Framing’s 
founding text is Framing analysis: an essay on the organisation of experience by Erving 
Goffman (1974) and the approach has its origins in sociology. Goffman used framing as 
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a metaphor for “the organisation of information in everyday life” (Bowe et al 2012: p. 
158).  
 
Many definitions of framing build on Goffman’s original notion that information is 
organised or interpreted for the receiver. Frames have been described as “organising 
principles” (Reese, 2003, p. 11); a frame is “a central organising idea” (Gamson and 
Modigliani, 1989, p. 3); framing is “the setting of an issue within an appropriate context 
to achieve a desired interpretation or perspective” (de Blasio and Sorice, 2013, p. 62) 
which “organises the world for both journalists and those who rely on their reports” 
(Bowe et al, 2012, p. 158). Some scholars argue that framing is done subconsciously 
(Lakoff, 2009), but most agree it involves some level of conscious selection in a way 
“that encourages certain interpretations and discourages others” (Kitzinger, 2007, p. 134). 
Framing is “an inevitable process of sense-making” (Ibid.) that structures what might 
otherwise be random and unconnected information. Indeed, “there is no such thing as 
unframed information” (Nisbet, 2009, p. 15) 
 
Framing selects some aspect of an issue for emphasis, thus encouraging audiences to 
think about it in a certain way. This process of selection also involves promoting “a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993, p. 52 emphasis in original). This 
aspect of framing – that it entails elements of problem definition, a diagnosis of causes 
and a suggestion for solution (Entman, 2004) – is central to the attraction of framing as a 
methodological tool. In interacting with framed information, audiences may perceive 
what the problem is, who is to blame, and what needs to be done. 
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Framing may be a much-used method of interrogating texts, but there is some dispute as 
to whether it is a paradigm. Entman (1993, p. 395) suggests it may become a unified 
research paradigm, which he defines as a “general theory that informs most scholarship 
on the operation and outcomes of any particular system of thought and action”. Framing 
has been used as an interpretive methodology in several disciplines, yet scholars have 
differing approaches to the concept (R. M. Entman, 1993; Vreese, 2005; Vliegenthart and 
van Zoonen, 2011). Entman observes that “despite its omnipresence across the social 
sciences and humanities, nowhere is there a general statement of framing theory that 
shows exactly how frames become embedded within and make themselves manifest in a 
text” (Entman 1993: p. 51). D’Angelo (2002), in a response to Entman’s call for a unified 
approach, suggests that in fact, framing is comprised of three (at least) separate 
paradigms:  
(i) Cognitivist – texts of journalistic accounts become embodied in the thoughts 
and words of those affected; 
(ii) Constructivist – journalists provide ‘interpretive packages’ of the sponsors 
(sources) of news; 
(iii) Critical – frames are the outcome of news-gathering routines and the values 
of elites. 
 
Framing is also open to criticism due to the lack of a standardised approach to detecting 
frames in a given text. Each new study tends to develop its own more or less unique frame 
set (Dahl 2015: p. 44). Suggestions have been made for a set of generic and issue-specific 
frames (de Vreese 2005), while others have pointed out the unsuitability of such a 
taxonomy (Porter and Hulme, 2013).  Frames are usually operationally defined (Bowe at 
al 2012: p. 158), meaning that for each study, a specific set of frames is created for the 
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research project at hand. Framing researchers “have a tendency to ‘reinvent the wheel’” 
(Nisbet, 2010, p. 46) when identifying frames. However, journalists use “generic frames” 
that do not depend on time, place or subject matter (Iyengar, 1991; Neuman, Just and 
Crigler, 1992; Valkenburg, Semetko and de Vreese, 1999). For instance, Semetko and 
Valkenburg (2000) found that five frames recur in general news coverage: the 
responsibility, conflict, (economic) consequences, human interest and morality frames. 
 
Entman (1993) suggests that framing is under-theorised, while Matthes, who undertook 
a 15-year content analysis of framing studies in leading communications journals, found 
five areas for concern: the lack of transparency between the conceptualisation of the 
frame and its operationalisation; the lack of distinction between generic and thematic 
frames; the predominance of descriptive rather than theoretical studies; the lack of 
attention to the contribution of visual elements to the creation of frames, and the lack of 
reliability reporting in “a vast amount of studies” (Matthes, 2009, pp. 359–360). The 
diversity of approaches has “pushed the field towards incoherence (Bowe et al., 2012, p. 
158). Some believe that scholars “often give an obligatory nod to the literature before 
proceeding to do whatever they were going to do in the first place” (Reese 2007: p. 151). 
Standing back from the debates over methodological incoherence in framing research, 
McQuail questions whether news frames produce a media effect at all: “Despite the 
complexities, there is insufficient evidence, especially from political communications 
research, to demonstrate the occurrence of effects that are in line with news frames.” 
(McQuail, 2010, p. 512). Others argue that framing effects can occur, but for them to do 
so, an audience is required to pay close attention to a text: “Attention to messages may 
be more necessary for a framing effect to occur than an agenda- setting effect. Mere 
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exposure may be sufficient for agenda setting, but it is less likely to be so for framing 
effects.” (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). 
 
Other perceived shortcomings of framing include a contention that it concentrates on the 
“micro level” of analysis and therefore may miss the real-world experience of a 
competitive message. Because framing concentrates its analytical focus at the level of the 
text – a newspaper article or television news report, for example – it “does not allow for 
individuals being exposed to competing frames simultaneously” (Nisbet et al., 2013, p. 
767). The frame effects contained in one text may be reduced or eliminated by competing 
frames in other media (Borah 2011; Chong & Druckman 2007a; 2007b; Sniderman & 
Theriault 2004).  
 
This criticism of framing relates to the impacts of frames on audiences, who may be 
exposed to alternative frames from other media or inputs of a non-media kind. However, 
it has been shown that certain frames encourage public engagement with issues (Nisbet, 
2009) and that politicians are acutely sensitive to the second-level agenda-setting power 
of the media (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2011). Frames do produce a media effect, even if 
that effect is diluted or countered by other influences. Indeed, I would suggest, arguing 
against framing as a research approach on the basis that media frames may be diluted by 
other frames seems like an argument supporting the power of frames in general. 
Furthermore, it is possible to argue that framing is not really a “micro-level’ approach. 
Measurements of media attention calculated by means of basic content analysis may fall 
into this category: they count mentions of a topic such as climate change and demonstrate 
how these rise and fall. Framing, on the other hand, gives context by analysing which 
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frames, out of all possible frames, have been selected. Frames show how, and not just 
how often, the media communicate on an issue.  
 
Framing often involves a process of selection and omission whereby certain aspects of 
an issue or an event are foregrounded and others are neglected or omitted. This process 
may be unconscious, but in the case of media frames, is the result of conscious decisions 
on the part of the journalist (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). Framing refers to modes 
of presentation that journalists and other communicators use to present information in a 
way that resonates with existing underlying schemas among their audience (Shoemaker 
and Reese, 1996). Most journalists, however, are not engaged in deliberate attempts to 
distort events or issues, or to deceive their audiences. They use frames as a necessary tool 
to reduce the complexity of an issue, given the constraints of their respective media 
related to news holes and airtime (Gans, 1979). Framing differs from gatekeeping, which 
is concerned with issue selection; framing refers to the process whereby certain aspects 
of a news event are emphasised: “Journalists are involved in a wider process of defining 
what is at issue in public debates” (Brüggemann, 2014, p. 62). Therefore, “journalists 
actively construct frames to structure and make sense of incoming information” 
(Scheufele, 1999, p. 115). 
 
Some scholars have argued that the frame selection on the part of journalists is one of 
three processes at work in “frame building”. The others are the political orientation of the 
media outlet and the influence of external actors (Scheufele, 1999). Others suggest that 
frames may also be jointly constructed by the public and the media (Zhou and Moy, 
2007), but both these approaches downplay the influence of newsroom cultures and news 
production routines (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007) in which the journalist is 
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somewhat insulated from outside influence and retains the power of agency when it 
comes to framing. 
 
Framing is particularly attractive to students of media coverage of climate change. It may 
be argued that some theoretical approaches to this topic, especially those which focus 
closely on the text of climate change communication, operate at too micro a level to offer 
insight into a problem that exhibits “tremendous complexity, transcending economic, 
political, scientific, and social boundaries across cultures.” (Bowe et al 2012: p. 159). 
Nor can macro-level theories of media alone explain the media’s reaction to climate 
change because they neglect the agency of the journalist, the news values which inform 
editorial decisions, newsroom cultures and the influence of professional norms.  A 
“meso-level” approach, which considers both the text and the context, is required. Such 
an approach would take into account the micro-level lexical choices of the individual 
journalist, but also permit analysis of the broader contexts in which these choices are 
made. Despite the many objections to frame analysis on the basis of lack of theoretical 
or methodological coherence, framing continues to be attractive to media and social 
science researchers. As Matthew Nisbet remarks: “Framing is an unavoidable reality of 
the communication process, especially as applied to public affairs and policy…most 
successful communicators are adept at framing, whether using frames intentionally or 
intuitively.” (2009, p. 15).  
 
3.7 Theories of agenda systems 
 
The various theories of media effects examined above are focused primarily on the media 
and its audiences. Many have their origins in the traditions of political communication 
and public opinion research, and many of the studies are concerned with media influence 
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on elections, candidates and issue priorities for citizens. In much of this research, news 
coverage of events and issues is an independent variable; it is a given whose influence is 
then measured and described. In this section, a body of scholarship which, among other 
aspects, places the media in a broader matrix of influencing factors is examined. This 
research is concerned, among other issues, with frame-building and agenda-building 
(Scheufele, 1999, 2000), processes whereby media frames are constructed in the media 
production processes. Who influences the media’s agenda is a key concern. McCombs 
has suggested, in an attempt to claim this area of academic inquiry for agenda-setting, 
that there are three main influences on the media’s agenda: sources, other news 
organisations, and journalists’ norms and traditions (McCombs, 2004, p. 113). Others 
propose a broader, constructionist approach, arguing that wider societal forces are at work 
in influencing the media agenda (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Scheufele and 
Tewksbury, 2007). The approaches presented in the following sections represent attempts 
to explain these dynamics. 
 
It is helpful first of all to consider briefly the development of broad theories relating to 
social problems. Initially, social problems were seen as those issues which were defined 
scientifically to be detrimental to human wellbeing (Manis, 1976, p. 25), that is to say 
they existed and were empirically shown to be harmful. Later approaches suggested that 
social problems did not exist until some strategic actors began to engage in claims-
making activity about them; social problems were essentially socially constructed. 
Spector and Kituse defined social problems as “the activities of individuals or groups 
making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions.” 
(1977, p. 75). Their constructionist approach became known as the “natural history” 
model of social problems, and was controversial at the time because it sought to divorce 
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social problems from social conditions (Best, 2002). Their thesis was summed up by 
Sheldon Ungar as: “No condition is a social problem unless groups with some power 
consider it one.” (1992, p. 484). This branch of the sociology of social problems was 
further critiqued on grounds that it focusses too narrowly on the role of claims-makers 
(Fritz and Altheide, 1987). Others suggested that the public arenas in which these claims 
were debated were more important that the claims themselves (Hilgartner and Bosk, 
1988). The influence of the media is largely absent from these analytical approaches. 
Primarily, this is because theories relating to social issues and policy agenda attempt to 
put forward unified, generalisable models, and do not consider in detail the internal 
dynamics of each relevant constituency, such as politics, policy, media and public. Each 
of these areas has its own internal and external constraints, professional norms and 
routines. However, it is possible to argue that the role of the media in the operation of 
some of these models of agenda dynamics has been downplayed to an unwarranted 
degree. 
 
3.8 Issue attention cycles 
 
Research on agenda-setting goes some way to explaining the role of the media in the 
promotion of issues on the public agenda. As Mazur and Lee put it, “the most widely 
accepted effect of the news media on public opinion is agenda setting – the placing of 
certain issues or problems foremost in the public mind” (Mazur and Lee, 1993, p. 682). 
There is no shortage of research into how issues “spring to life” (Djerf-Pierre, 2012b, p. 
499), but less on how they “fall from grace”, on “why real problems fall from the news - 
beyond the cliché that they become ‘stale’” (Mazur, 1998, p. 470). A paper published by 
Anthony Downs in 1972 attempted an explanation: issue attention cycles. Issues go 
through a predictable five stage cycle, he argued: 
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(i) A pre-problem stage, in which “some highly undesirable condition exists” but 
has yet to come to public attention; 
(ii) An alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm stage, in which a series of 
dramatic events (Downs offers the example of ghetto riots) both informs and 
alarms the public. There is great optimism about society’s ability to ‘solve’ 
the problem in this stage also; 
(iii) Realising the cost of significant progress, a stage in which it comes to be 
understood that ‘solving’ the problem is not that straight-forward and is going 
to be expensive and will involve sacrifice by a large section of society; 
(iv) Gradual decline of intense public interest, a stage in which, once the costs and 
sacrifices involved are known, people become discouraged, threatened or 
bored; 
(v) A post-problem stage, in which the issue is replaced on the public agenda and 
retreats to a “twilight world”. This is not equivalent to the pre-problem stage, 
for the issue retains the ability sporadically to recapture national interest; 
(vi) Downs speculated that environmental issues would not enter the fourth “post-
problem stage” as rapidly as other issues, because environmental damage was 
continually occurring, pollution was a persistent public topic, environmental 
issues lend themselves to “heroes and villains” narratives, and various 
technological solutions proposed for environmental problems were also 
interesting to the public. 
 
(Downs, 1972, pp. 39–41) 
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Not every issue was subject to such an attention cycle. To qualify, an issue must affect a 
minority of the population, it must have been created away from public attention and be 
capable of creating peaks of public attention. In the second half of his 1972 paper, Downs 
gave consideration to environmental issues, suggesting that, at the time, the environment 
was about half way through his attention cycle (1972, p. 43). 
 
Downs set forth his model “in largely anecdotal fashion” (Howlett, 1997, p. 7), and his 
criteria for the types of issues that go through the issue cycle process left many important 
social problems out. In considering the effectiveness of Downs’s issue attention cycle 
theory and Baumgartner and Jones’s punctuated equilibrium theory (discussed below), 
Holt and Barkmeyer suggest both could work simultaneously when it comes to coverage 
of environmental sustainability in worldwide print media from 1990 to 2009 (Holt and 
Barkemeyer, 2012). In a study of a decade of environmental coverage in the US, Downs’s 
model was found to be a “good fit” for the pattern of coverage (Trumbo, 1996). Indeed, 
Trumbo, although his research is over 20 years old, makes a salient point when it comes 
to the relevance of attention cycles to climate change research. He argues that Downs’s 
model “can be used as a more general basis” for examining and dividing patterns of 
coverage (Ibid 1996, p. 280). Other researchers have applied the model to media 
treatment of climate change (Brossard, Shanahan and McComas, 2004; Nisbet and Huge, 
2006), but it has been criticised for being vague (Howlett, 1997), too inflexible, too linear, 
and in focusing on the media and public agendas, it does not account for other influences:  
“The problem with Downs’s model is that it is too linear and inflexible. His approach 
tends to focus narrowly upon a limited number of fora, or arenas of influence, namely: 
the media and public agendas (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). We should not underestimate 
the role of political institutions, NGOs, the wider political culture and the scientific 
community in defining the important issues of the moment. None of these public arenas 
are discrete units; they encompass a wide range of overlapping platforms employing 
	 93	
different strategies and targeting a diverse range of audiences. This ‘one model fits all’ 
approach tends to downplay the complexity of public debates.” (Anderson, 2009, p. 169) 
  
Downs’s attention cycle describes what happens to certain issues with regard to the media 
and the public agenda, but not why. As Alison Anderson has pointed out, the model does 
not take account of other actors and claimsmakers in the issue process. Nor does it take 
into account factors internal to the functioning of the media themselves. In particular, the 
influence of news values is unaccounted for. News values (discussed in Chapter 2, section 
2.7 and also in Chapter 6) is a key concept in journalism studies, and shows that that the 
news media favour new information in particular (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Harcup and 
O’Neill, 2001), which makes it difficult for an issue to stay in the news form long as 
“newer” events push themselves into the news cycle. Downs’s model is not completely 
at odds with the scholarship of news values. The media is more likely to cover a story 
already in the news, which may prolong the media “shelf life” of an existing story. Downs 
also argued that only issues capable of being vividly dramatised were capable of going 
through the issue attention cycle; these kinds of stories are also favoured by the news 
media. However, the principle drive of the media is for novelty: “The media responds to 
breaking news, to new things, to change” (May and Pitts, 2000, p. 24). 
 
The attention cycle model has been found to be an inadequate explanation for the patterns 
of media coverage of environmental issues such as climate change. However, as Holt and 
Barkmeyer suggest, the model is useful as a starting point for research into the media 
“career” of certain issues. Nisbet and Huge use it as a general basis for their theory of 
mediated issue development (discussed in more detail below). Although it has been 
criticised for a lack of nuance, Downs’s attention cycle has proved a valuable tool for 
media analysts. 
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3.9 Punctuated Equilibrium 
 
In their theory of how changes in policy come about, Baumgartner and Jones argued that 
a single process could account for both slow and rapid policy changes. The process they 
outlined has several components:  
(i) Depoliticised and relatively independent subsystems of government (also 
called sub-governments) which are given charge of an industry sector. These 
subsystems are insulated from large-scale democratic forces and resistant to 
change; 
(ii) Policy images are the perception of the particular issue or industry held by the 
general public and the media. The authors note that policy images are 
generally either very positive or very negative, and swing between extremes; 
(iii) Policy venues are the institutions in society granted jurisdiction over a 
particular issue. These may change as an issue develops, and “those who 
previously dominated the policy process may find themselves in the 
minority”. 
(1993, pp. 1046–7) 
 
As an example of how rapid change may affect a previously stable policy system, the 
authors outline the hypothetical case of an American environmental campaign group who 
had lost several regulatory battles in the courts. The group then appeals to a new 
constituency, a previously uninvolved group in Congress, where they may receive a more 
favourable hearing. Congress may pass new laws which force other policy venues to give 
more weight to environmental considerations. The environmental campaigners are now 
strong in policy venues where previously they had been weak. The widening of the debate 
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may lead to changes in policy venue and policy image, so that “From one strategic appeal, 
a whole series of self-reinforcing changes in image and venue may potentially follow.” 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1991, p. 1049). A more oft-cited example is that of the nuclear 
energy industry (Mazur, 1981). Initially, when this policy area was dominated by science, 
engineering and public administration interests, its policy image was positive; when the 
policy venue changed following campaigns by environmental groups, it was no longer 
dominated by a narrow policy sub-system and its policy image was altered also.  
 
More broadly speaking, the concept of “punctuated equilibrium” comes from 
evolutionary theory, and suggests that evolutionary shifts can occur in relatively stable 
policy environments (Holt and Barkemeyer, 2012). A policy system can suffer an 
exogenous shock, after which prevailing power arrangements in dominant policy groups 
are altered irrevocably. As Baumgartner and Jones put it:  
“When shocks or changes are introduced in this system, they may lead not just 
momentary deviation from normal, with a more or less rapid return to the status quo, but 
rather to new points of stability, as the system settle down to a period quite radically 
different from the original. If policy and politics can be said to follow such a dynamic, 
then we expect stability during certain periods, but with the possibility of rapid, dramatic 
and non-incremental change.” (1993, p. 88) 
 
A further key concept in the theory of punctuated equilibrium is that of problem 
indicators: the baseline information about an issue. These can take many forms and come 
from many sources, but are usually provided to policy elites in the form of second-hand 
data sources and presented in quantitative form (Liu et al, 2011). These problem 
indicators may have existed for long periods before an issue comes to the attention of 
policy makers. A dramatic event (in Baumgartner and Jones’s model, an information 
shock) is required to bring these indicators to public attention. With regard to climate 
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change, the problem indicators include various types of climate data and information 
about climate impacts. The third element required to bring about rapid change in a policy 
environment is information feedback. It is not enough for problem indicators to exist, or 
for there to be an information shock; pressure from interested actors and groups, calls for 
action from campaigners and politicians, and other forms of communication from claims 
makers is also required to amplify the previous two stages (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; 
Liu, Lindquist and Vedlitz, 2011).  
 
Punctuated equilibrium theory seeks to explain agenda dynamics in an evolutionary way, 
arguing that some issues evolve slowly, while others may experience rapid change 
through a combination of problem indicators, information shocks and information 
feedbacks. The theory has much in common with multiple streams theory (Kingdon, 
1995), which will be examined in the subsequent section. Punctuated equilibrium builds 
on earlier work relating to the “scope of participation” and “conflict expansion” 
(Schnattschneider, 1960) and competition between social groups to advance selected 
issues (Cobb and Elder, 1972; Dearing and Rogers, 1996). It emphasises the concept of 
issue competition by suggesting that policy subsystems may compete for territory and try 
to annexe issues that previously belonged to other policy systems. Changes in regulation, 
or the entry of a new strategic actor into the field, may spark a competition for dominance 
in a once-stable and settled policy area. This accords with findings by Nisbet on the 
relative success in encouraging public engagement with social issues by re-framing 
scientific issues as moral or emotional ones (Nisbet, 2009). In this way, punctuated 
equilibrium is connected to the idea of framing, in that it suggests that those with the 
power to define or frame an issue will wield the most influence over policy. It is also 
significant in that it emphasises the concept of power in issue dynamics, arguing that the 
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power balance on policy issues may subject to rapid change, but that power ultimately 
rests with those who can dominate its definition and constrain the boundaries of 
discourse. 
 
3.10 Multiple Streams Theory 
 
The multiple streams approach (Kingdon, 1995) is similar in structure to punctuated 
equilibrium, in that it is based on ideas of pre-existing problems that come to policy 
attention because of a sudden change in circumstance. Kingdon argues that there are 
essentially two methods of policy prioritisation: agenda-setting, whereby issues worthy 
of attention are selected from the range of all possible problems, and alternative 
specification, whereby the set of conceivable alternatives for addressing each problem is 
selected (Durant and Diehl, 1989, p. 180). The former is characterised by sudden 
discontinuities and political actors; the latter by incremental change and nonelected 
members of specialised policy communities. Kingdon suggests that policy formation is 
best conceptualised as “multiple streams”: a problem stream representing the real-world 
indicators that a problem exists; a policy stream, in which as range of solutions exists, 
awaiting a suitable problem, and a political stream comprised of factors that influence 
the body politic. These three streams flow along independently of one another until a 
policy window opens and the streams cross each other. (Béland and Howlett, 2016, p. 
222).  
 
The creation of these policy windows is subject to another set of influences. Kingdon 
suggests they can come about through focussing events (for example, a crisis or accident), 
or through the actions of policy entrepreneurs, advocates for a particular issue who may 
exist within or outside government. As Kingdon argues:  
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“windows are opened either by the appearance of compelling problems or by happenings 
in the political stream. … Policy entrepreneurs, people who are willing to invest their 
resources in pushing their pet proposals or problems, are responsible not only for 
prompting important people to pay attention, but also for coupling solutions to problems 
and for coupling both problems and solutions to politics.” (1995, p. 21).  
 
Once an issue has risen to the top of the policy agenda, it is subject to feedback (akin to 
information feedback in Baumgartner and Jones’s approach). This feedback may come 
internally from government officials monitoring the operation of programmes or policies, 
from scientists researching in policy-relevant areas, from public opinion polls or from 
interest groups (Liu, Lindquist and Vedlitz, 2011, p. 407). 
 
Kingdon’s model, in which problems and solutions wait in the wings until a policy 
window opens to allow for their “moment in the sun”, exhibits similarities to the “garbage 
can” model for policy formation put forward by Cohen et al (1972). Cohen’s model sets 
itself up in contrast to the comprehensively rational approach, whereby policy makers 
identify a problem or an aim, bureaucracies carry out a comprehensive analysis to 
produce various solutions and policy makers then select the best option. According to 
Cohen, policy makers and policy problems remain ambiguous and bureaucracies 
therefore have difficulty in researching and proposing solutions. Ultimately, the mix of 
problems, solutions and choices end up in the garbage can.  
 
Multiple streams theory has been criticised for being too US-centric and insufficiently 
tested for relevance to other territories (Béland and Howlett, 2016). Furthermore, the 
vivid language and metaphors of Kingdon’s original text may lead to a situation where 
the metaphors of streams and windows may become disconnected from the original 
theory (Ibid, p.224). It has also been criticised for arguing that rapid change can take 
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place only in the agenda-setting component of policy formation, rather than in both the 
agenda-setting and alternative specification components. This position means it “cannot 
fully capture the interaction of these analytically distinct streams.” (Durant and Diehl, 
1989, p. 182). 
 
Multiple streams theory draws on organisational theory, while punctuated equilibrium 
theory draws on evolutionary theory. Both suggest that long-standing social problems 
can be brought to the top of the policy agenda by means for focussing events (or 
information shocks) and feedbacks from interested groups, politicians or measurements 
of the public mood. Media are almost entirely absent from these models. Yet it may be 
argued that media are the means by which these information shocks are delivered, and 
feedback amplified. If agenda-setting theory assigns almost complete power to set the 
public agenda to the media, then these theories of issue dynamics downplays the media’s 
influence. Liu et al proposed a synthesis of both multiple streams theory and punctuated 
equilibrium theory – based on “problem indicators”, “focussing events” and “feedback” 
– which they called an “agenda system perspective” (Liu, Lindquist and Vedlitz, 2011). 
Again, the role of the media was downplayed in this synthesised model (Schäfer et al., 
2014). In a paper which took Liu’s approach as a model, factors relating to media 
production and journalistic norms and routines were also excluded from consideration on 
the basis that these routines and norms are relatively stable and do not change over short 
periods of time (essentially, they are an independent variable), and that levels of coverage 
of an issue are influenced by factors external to the media rather than by internal factors 
(Ibid 2014, p. 155). This omission of media influence, and the characterisation of the 
media as passive conduits in agenda systems, seems to underestimate media influence 
assigned by agenda-setting and theories of media effects. 
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Kingdon’s theory formed the theoretical basis for an examination of the promotion of 
adaptation to climate change in the UK, Finland, Italy and Sweden in which it was found 
that climate change adaptation experienced some success in the UK due to support from 
a broad coalition at local and national level whereas support in the other three countries 
was more dispersed (Keskitalo, Westerhoff and Juhola, 2012). An influential study of US 
media coverage of climate change and US Congressional hearings on the topic found that 
the agenda theories of Kingdon and Baumgartner and Jones were largely supported by 
the empirical evidence (Liu, Lindquist and Vedlitz, 2011). Issue dynamics relating to 
environmental matters in the Swedish media were found to be complex; increased 
coverage of some environmental issues can increase media attention for others (Djerf-
Pierre 2012b), while in times of crisis, the limited carrying capacity of the media means 
that news of war and economic crises “crowd out” environmental news (Djerf-Pierre 
2012a).  
 
3.11 The Public Arenas model 
 
In their attempt to develop of model of how social problems rise and fall, Hilgartner and 
Bosk suggest that it is necessary to adopt an approach “incorporating and moving beyond 
natural history models” (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988, p. 55). Their “public arenas” model 
has six components: 
(i) a dynamic process of competition among the members of a very large 
"population" of social problem claims; 
(ii) the institutional arenas that serve as "environments" where social problems 
compete for attention and grow; 
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(iii) the “carrying capacities” of these arenas, which limit the number of problems 
that can gain widespread attention at one time; 
(iv) the "principles of selection," or institutional, political, and cultural factors that 
influence the probability of survival of competing problem formulations; 
(v) patterns of interaction among the different arenas, such as feedback and 
synergy, through which activities in each arena spread throughout the others; 
and  
(vi) the networks of operatives who promote and attempt to control particular 
problems and whose channels of communication crisscross the different 
arenas. 
(Ibid 1988, p. 56) 
 
The public arenas in which these social problems compete for attention comprise the 
executive and legislative branches of government, the courts, made-for-TV movies, the 
cinema, the news media (television news, magazines, newspapers, and radio), political 
campaign organisations, social action groups, direct mail solicitations, books dealing 
with social issues, the research community, religious organisations, professional 
societies, and private foundations. Each of these arenas has a limited “carrying capacity”, 
a concept that echoes McCombs’s statement that “polling shows that the US public 
agenda ranges from two to six issues” at any one time (McCombs, 2004, p. 38).  
 
The authors suggest that “principles of selection” also influence which social problems 
rise to the top of the agenda. These include a need for drama, novelty, the organisational 
characteristics of the institutions involved, and the broad cultural and political concerns 
of these institutions (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988, p. 61 et seq.). To a media scholar, some 
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of these principles (for example, novelty and drama) appear closely aligned with news 
values (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Harcup and O’Neill, 2001). The public arenas model 
acknowledges that too much media attention can lead to saturation; high levels of 
coverage can “de-dramatise” a particular issue, or an entire class of issues. Again, this 
concept is closely related to the phenomenon of “issue fatigue” identified by 
communications research (Djerf-Pierre 2012), while at the same time running counter to 
much of the agenda-setting literature which suggests that high levels of coverage equate 
to high levels of public concern (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). A final component of the 
public arenas model is “feedback”, communications strategies or claims-making which 
can dampen or amplify the attention given to problems in public arenas. 
 
A key concept in the public arenas model is the idea of competition. Issues compete for 
limited attention in various public arenas. Advocates attempt to increase their chances of 
success by appealing to more than one arena, or by broadening the scope of their chosen 
issue. Indeed, “a relatively small number of very successful social issues tend to occupy 
much of the space in most of the arenas” (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988, p. 77). Furthermore, 
the authors argue that “the level of attention devoted to a social problem is not a function 
of its objective makeup alone but is determined by a process of collective definition” 
(Ibid 1988, p. 68). The power of definition over an issue is again related to the framing 
ability of the media. 
 
3.12 Issue cultures and social scares 
 
Sociologist Sheldon Ungar attempted to extend the public arenas model to suggest that 
social problems, especially environmental problems, have a better chance of success 
when they “piggyback” on real-world events (1992). These events may then trigger a 
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social scare; these scares are defined as “acute episodes of collective fear that accelerate 
demands in the political (or related) arena” (Ibid, p.485). When it comes to issues such 
as nuclear energy and climate change, Ungar argues, there is a latent dread present in the 
public mind; only when this dread becomes more pressing does a social scare ensue and 
only then do the claims-making activities of those involved with the issue gain pubic 
acceptance. The author cites the example of the summer of 1988 in the United States as 
an example of the dynamics of social scares: there was a severe heatwave, sales of air-
conditioning units increased dramatically, there was widespread drought, sewage 
treatment plants were affected and the water level of the Mississippi River dropped by 
10 metres. However, these phenomena were “necessary but not sufficient” to create a 
social scare (Ibid, p.491). Subsequently, UN Congressional hearings into the greenhouse 
effect, combined with the Toronto world conference on the changing atmosphere (both 
events occurred in June 1988) meant that: 
“Scientists and environmentalists sponsored global warming packages with extreme 
positions in political forums that had suddenly attracted great media attention. The scare 
shifted media practices away from official or conventional packages toward coverage of 
alternative frames. Cultural resonances also favored alternative frames, since the extreme 
physical impact of 1988 stoked latent anxieties about human-caused ecological 
catastrophes.” (Ibid, p.491) 
 
Ungar argues that the confluence of these factors – extreme weather, Congressional 
testimony about the greenhouse effect and the Toronto conference – combined to create 
a social scare. These events were able to tap into “a large reserve of latent public concern” 
over environmental issues which had been accumulating since the 1970s and was 
“waiting to be mobilised” (Ibid, p. 492). It is this “latent public concern” that is the focus 
of a subsequent paper by the same author (Ungar, 2014) in which the concept of a pre-
existing well of background information and concern is linked to the concept of “issue 
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cultures” first put forward by Gason and Modgliani (1989). Gamson and Modgliani 
suggested that every policy issue has its own specific culture, an “ongoing discourse that 
evolves and changes over time, providing interpretations and meanings for relevant 
events” (Ibid, p. 1). Their work is most often associated with the academic literature 
concerning framing, mostly because they argue that the media provide “interpretive 
packages” about social topics, but in this context, their proposal of “issue cultures” is 
more relevant to agenda dynamics because it offers an explanation as to why some issues 
succeed in gaining access to the public agenda while others fail. The media, argue 
Gamson and Modgliani, are central to the process of the creation is issue cultures, as they 
provide a forum in which an issue culture may be created while at the same time playing 
an active role in creating it: “… media discourse dominates the larger issue culture, both 
reflecting it and contributing to its creation.” (Ibid 1989, p. 3). 
 
Ungar takes this concept of issue cultures a step further by suggesting that the existence 
of an issue culture is a pre-requisite for the creation of a social scare (Ungar, 2014). For 
example, he argues, there is a long-standing issue culture around infectious diseases 
(Ebola, “Mad Cow” disease, SARS, swine flu), the atmosphere (the ozone hole, the 
greenhouse effect) and national security (the 9/11 attacks, the “war on terror”). These 
“extended cultural preoccupations” (Ibid, p. 238) provide a ready-made context for 
similar issues as they arise. Thus a social problem with an established issue culture is 
more likely to rise to the top of the public agenda because the public are already familiar 
with similar issues in the same culture: “The media and the public become far more 
receptive to claims-making that meshes with the prevailing issue culture than to claims 
that do not fit or resonate with it.” (Ibid, p. 238). 
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The dynamics explored by Ungar, although characterised by the author as a development 
of the public arenas model (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988), also have much in common with 
both multiple streams theory (Kingdon, 1995) and punctuated equilibrium theory 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1991; Jones and Baumgartner, 2012), in that issues such as 
nuclear power, climate change and other social problems need a “focussing event” to 
bring them to public attention, before they can “piggy-back on real-world events”. 
Hilgartner and Bosk suggested that each policy arena had its own culture – akin in many 
ways to Bourdieu’s ideal of “the field” – which made it resistant to a greater or lesser 
degree to change. They also suggest that, among the “principles of selection” for an issue 
to gain traction on the policy agenda, is “culture”, which they define as “deep mythic 
themes or broad cultural preoccupations” (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988, p. 71).  
 
3.13 Mediated issue development  
 
Matthew Nisbet and Mike Huge use Downs’s attention cycle model as a starting point 
for their attempt to construct a generalisable theory of “mediated issue development” 
(Nisbet and Huge, 2006). Taking the issue of plant biotechnology, the authors sketch the 
rise and fall of media coverage using the Downsian approach, before combining other 
approaches from the sociology of social problems to come up with their own model which 
conceptualises “several important underlying social mechanisms that drive cycles of 
media attention and definition to policy issues” (Ibid 2006, p. 7).  Downs’s model, as we 
have seen above, has been criticised for being descriptive, anecdotal and for failing to 
examine the underlying factors that drive his attention cycle; here, the authors attempt to 
address some of these criticisms by paying attention to these underlying factors. In 
particular, they identify and investigate four factors which, they argue, influence the 
progress of an issue through the attention cycle:  
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(i) the type of policy venue where the debate takes place or is centred.; 
(ii) the media lobbying activities of competing strategic actors as they attempt to 
interpret or “frame” the issue advantageously; 
(iii) the tendency for different types of journalists to depend heavily on shared 
news values and norms to narrate the policy world, and  
(iv) the context relative to other competing issues. 
(Nisbet and Huge, 2006, p. 7) 
 
The first factor in whether an issue achieves “celebrity status” is policy venue. The 
authors argue that, when issues are confined to technical and scientific policy venues 
from which the public is excluded, media coverage is low, change occurs incrementally 
and discourse is characterised by consensus. In these venues, the “scope of participation” 
(Schnattschneider, 1960) is also low. However, when an issue moves into administrative 
and more overtly political arenas, consensus is replaced by conflict, change can be non-
incremental and media coverage is increased. In regulatory policy venues, science and 
industry may be granted a “political monopoly” and the authority of science is defended 
through the use of impersonal language and technical discourse. Secondly, the authors 
consider the framing strategies of those actors trying to broaden the scope of participation 
of an issue, and to move it from technical venues to more political ones. This approach 
acknowledges the importance of the power to define an issue and therefore to frame it in 
advantageous ways. As other researchers have noted, “framing an issue is therefore a 
strategic means to attract more supporters, to mobilise collective actions, to expand 
actors’ realm of influences, and to increase their chances of winning” (Pan and Kosicki, 
2001, p. 40). Schnattschneider goes even further, calling the ability to define a given issue 
“the supreme instrument of power” (Schnattschneider, 1960).  
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Nisbet and Huge also give weight to the work practices and routines of journalists in their 
model of mediated issue development. Just as moving from technical to political policy 
venues can help promote an issue, so too can changes in the kind of journalist covering 
it. The authors argue that, when a scientific or technical issue is covered solely by science 
correspondents, it tends to be framed in scientific or technical terms. However, once it 
begins to be covered by political correspondents, it is more likely to be presented in the 
strategy frame and media coverage increases (Nisbet and Huge, 2006, p. 13). The authors 
do not elaborate on the fourth factor in their model, “context relative to other issues”, 
perhaps because it is self-evident that more urgent and dramatic news usually rises to the 
top of the news agenda. Indeed, in the opening to their paper, the authors outline a 
controversy over the contamination of food products with genetically modified corn. Just 
when public concern was at its height, the recount in Florida at the conclusion of the 2000 
US presidential election came to dominate the news agenda. 
 
The model of mediated issue development is attractive because it examines the 
underlying factors which produce Anthony Downs’s issue attention cycle. It draws 
together concepts from Baumgartner and Jones’s punctuated equilibrium theory 
(specifically, the analysis of sub-governments, their inherent biases and relative 
imperviousness to outside influence) and from earlier social theorists such as 
Schnattschneider and Cobb and Elder (1972) on the changes in power structures that 
come about when new participants join the debate relating to an issue. The proposed 
mediated issue development theory is also attractive because it gives due 
acknowledgment to the role of the media in issue dynamics and because it is attuned to 
the norms and practices of journalists. The authors give regard to the influence of the 
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media in general in providing the forum in which various claims-makers may be heard, 
but also to the individual journalist and the influence of the framing choices he or she 
may make as a correspondent or editor.  
 
3.14 Conclusion 
 
This thesis is aimed at discovering and examining how climate change was framed by 
various actors engaged in communicating about this issue during a key period in the 
history of Irish environmental politics. To understand the framing strategies of 
environmental journalists, government ministers and media advisors, it is necessary to 
place them in the context of what is known about frames and framing, and in the context 
of our understanding of the interaction of the media, policy and political arenas in relation 
to complex social problems. In this chapter, theories of media effects and theories of 
agenda systems were discussed with a view to exploring how these perspectives can 
promote understandings of issue dynamics. 
 
In the case of each of these theories, the imprint of its academic origins is evident. 
Theories of media effects are often proposed by journalism scholars and emphasise the 
social power of the media or the individual agency of the journalist. Theories of agenda 
systems often originate in sociology or political science, and place the media in wider 
social and political processes in which the agency of the media (and of individual 
journalists) is neglected. 
 
For instance, agenda-setting theory, proposed by two journalism professors (McCombs 
and Shaw, 1972), sought to re-establish the notion of powerful media influences on 
audiences after a period in which the academy had favoured communications models 
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which suggested the influence of mass media on individuals was minimal (Katz, 1987; 
McCombs, 2004). Agenda-setting also enabled other theories of media effects to be 
proposed, such as second-level agenda-setting (Hester and Gibson, 2003) and priming 
(Iyengar and Kinder, 1987b). Taken together, these three related approaches suggest the 
media has the power to tell people what to think about, how to think about it and by what 
standards they should judge politicians. Thus, they assign almost complete power to set 
the public and political agenda to the media and, it can be argued, fail to acknowledge 
the agency of other actors and the possibility that other forces can control or influence 
the media themselves. 
 
The media effect of framing is, I would argue, of a different order to the three agenda-
related theories mentioned above. It must first be acknowledged that framing is similar 
to second-level agenda-setting in that frames foreground certain aspects of a topic or 
issue. However, a key difference is that frames also contain elements of issue definition, 
attribution of responsibility and problem solution. Frames place issues in context, 
interpret and organise information for their intended audience. For instance, presenting 
the issue of climate change in an economic frame suggests that the origins of, 
responsibility for, and solutions to the problem lie in the economic arena.  
 
It is important to emphasise that both agenda-setting and framing theorists foreground 
the idea of competition. Agenda-setting promotes the idea of competition between issues 
(Dearing and Rogers, 1996; McCombs, 2004) for media attention, while framing theorists 
focus on the competition over how such coverage is framed, and on who prevails in the 
competition to establish the dominant frame (Borah, 2011; Nisbet et al, 2013). 
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Another conceptual approach which takes account of a general media effect is that of 
issue cultures and social scares (Ungar, 1992, 2000b). This approach suggests that the 
media create cultures around certain long-standing problems, and therefore the public is 
more receptive to news from this issue culture and may more readily place new 
information in the context of the existing culture. Examples of topics with issue cultures 
are nuclear power, infectious diseases, the atmosphere, and national security. Thus, when 
news relating to any of these topics is forthcoming, the public is already in possession of 
certain baseline information and a “latent fear” may be activated to produce a “social 
scare” and lead to demands for political action. The concept is attractive, as it may help 
explain why some issues come to dominate the policy, media and political discourse, but 
it has not been developed past its initial outlines, and remains a fringe sociological 
concept. 
 
The influence of media coverage is placed in a wider perspective by theories of agenda 
systems. These theories seek to understand how policy, political, media and other arenas 
interact to promote certain issues to the top of the policy agenda, while other issues 
remain undiscovered or at a low priority level. There is a common process to these agenda 
models, even though the terminology, imagery and precise operational details differ. The 
models discussed – the punctuated equilibrium (Jones and Baumgartner, 2012), multiple 
streams (Kingdon, 1995) and public arenas (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988) models – all 
provide situations in which a problem exists in the background, a sudden event brings it 
to public attention, various interested parties provide feedback which serve to increase 
attention. 
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Some of these models propose concepts which correspond to existing ideas in media 
theory. For instance, the public arenas model suggests that each arena (the media is one 
such) has its own cultural, political and institutional factors which affect an issue’s ability 
to survive. This concept is related to the professional norms and news values described 
by journalism scholarship. Furthermore, all of the models allow for a media role (if not 
influence) in providing or amplifying the feedback offers by claims makers. 
 
The mediated issue development model (Nisbet & Huge, 2006), however, allows for a 
more developed role for the media as a whole and for individual journalists. This 
approach is attractive because it attempts to synthesise some of the elements and 
processes involved in agenda systems (such as policy venue) with the scholarship of news 
values and the sociology of the newsroom. It also privileges the frame competition 
between various sectors and actors and provides a more plausible account of how issues 
develop in the media and policy realms. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The study of media coverage of climate change has proliferated over the past decade 
(Olausson and Berglez, 2014) and a wide variety of methodologies have been employed 
to interrogate the extent and nature of such coverage (Metag, 2016). Many scholars set 
out from a starting position that the media’s coverage of the issue is important because, 
quite apart from the agenda-setting influence of the media, which was discussed in the 
previous chapter, “Most people do not experience climate change first-hand but have to 
rely on communicative content to develop an understanding of climate change” (Metag, 
2016, p. 2). Because climate change involves complex processes which take place over 
long periods of time and affect large spatial entities such as continents, hemispheres or 
even the entire planet, and because it is measured and described by scientists from an 
increasing number of different disciplines using complex models and measurements, “the 
scientific community has long acknowledged the importance of media communication 
on climate change” (Schäfer and Schlichting, 2014, p. 143). Media coverage of climate 
change is important not only for the general public, but also for stakeholders and decision-
makers (Arlt, Hoppe and Wolling, 2011). In their meta-analysis of the research field, 
Schäfer and Schlichting (2014, pp. 148–152) found that print was the most analysed 
medium (67% of 199 studies from 1960 to 2012), European countries were studied most 
(39.4%), although studies of Asian countries (14%) were becoming more common. They 
also found that qualitative (44.8%) and quantitative (47.8%) methods were almost 
equally represented, while single-country case studies (39.6%) were the most common 
focus of research. The research presented here sits squarely in this research tradition, 
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being a single-country case study in which print media coverage of climate change is 
analysed. However, there are elements of the research design of this thesis which differ 
from the majority of similar studies. Schäfer and Schlichting note that case studies 
“typically focus on coverage in one national context and within a given, mostly short 
period of time” (Ibid 2014, p. 152); this research covers a longer period of time (a decade, 
from 2007 to 2016). This study is also relatively unusual in combining both qualitative 
and quantitative methods, an approach adopted by only 7.5% of other studies. In the 
following sections, each aspect of the methodology is considered, beginning with a 
description of the research question and the general design of the research. 
 
4.2 Research question and general research design 
 
In formulating a research question, Booth et al (2008)suggest a four-step process, in 
which the researcher begins with a broad topic, adds a conceptual question, explains its 
conceptual significance and outlines its potential practical application. He proposes the 
following template as a means of clarifying the research question and answering 
questions as to the significance of the research project (the “so what?” question): 
“I am studying X topic 
because I want to find out why/how Y occurs,  
in order that my reader understands more about Z, 
so that they might be better able to do A” (Ibid, p.61).  
 
In the case of this research, the following formula sets out the process of arriving at the 
research question:  
“I am studying the media’s coverage of climate change, 
because I want to find out how the issue is framed, 
in order to help my reader understand the framing strategies of journalists, politicians 
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and political advisors, so that they might better evaluate claims making about complex 
scientific, environmental and social issues such as climate change.” 
 
The research question this thesis seeks to answer is:  
“What were the framing strategies used by Irish journalists, politicians and political 
advisors around climate change in the period 2007 to 2016?” 
 
In pursuit of these research goals, a content analysis of articles in eight national print 
newspaper titles was undertaken (n = 12,865) and certain independent variables were 
coded for. Subsequently, this sample was reduced by excluding articles of fewer than 500 
words (n = 7,059) and a random sample of this corpus was extracted by selecting every 
10th story (n = 706). A frame analysis was then carried out on this reduced sample using 
NVivo coding software. The results of this quantitative and qualitative analysis were then 
triangulated with semi-structured interviews with journalists, politicians and political 
advisors active in the climate change space during the timeframe under study.  
 
It is helpful to consider other studies using a similar sample size and similar corpus 
reduction methods. In relation to frame analyses and sample size, a study of visual news 
content relating to COPs 16,17,18 and 19, examined a corpus of 451 images (Wozniak, 
Wessler and Lück, 2016), and a study of climate change coverage in the Russian print 
media over a seven-year period analysed 82 articles (Wilson Rowe, 2009). A framing 
analysis of a week’s coverage around a climate change conference in Peru analysed 52 
articles (Takahashi, 2011). A study of the framing of climate change in US newspapers 
from 2007-2009 examined a corpus of 800 op-ed articles (Hoffman, 2011). An analysis 
of frames found in US coverage of biotechnology over a 26-year period (1974-2001) 
examined 841 articles, which comprise the universe of available articles (Nisbet, 
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Brossard and Kroepsch, 2003). In a study of Chilean climate change coverage, a reduced 
sample of 269 articles were analysed for frames out of total coverage amounting to 1,628 
articles over three separate years. (Dotson et al., 2012). A study of 20 years of climate 
change coverage in US, UK and Canadian news magazines carried out a frame analysis 
of 476 articles, chosen from random years (Tillinghast and McCann, 2013) 
 
In relation to corpus reduction methods, a comparative study of US and Swedish coverage 
of climate change used methods similar in some respects to this thesis: a content analysis 
of coverage over a 10-year period (N=1781 news stories) and a frame analysis of a 
smaller sample of 1008 paragraphs (equivalent to approximately 120 news stories) 
(Shehata and Hopmann, 2012). Maxwell Boykoff, in his examination of US and UK 
climate change coverage between 2003 and 2006, found that 9465 articles on the topic 
were published. He carried out a frame analysis on a random sample of these, using 
methods similar to those employed here: selection every 6th article as they appeared 
chronologically. His reduced sample comprised 1607 articles, 17% of the available 
population (Boykoff, 2007a). The same author employed a similar corpus reduction 
methodology in a study of US television and print climate change coverage, randomly 
sampling coverage over a 10-year period (Boykoff, 2007b). This thesis analyses 706 
climate change articles published between 2007 and early 2016. In terms of sample size, 
it is comparable to other studies, and in terms of corpus reduction methods, it is also 
aligned with previous work.  
 
This approach – quantitative data on media coverage of climate change triangulated with 
qualitative methods of data interpretation and semi-structured interviews has been used 
by geographer Maxwell Boykoff and his collaborators several times (Boykoff, 2007b, 
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2008; Boykoff and Mansfield, 2008) and by other researchers (Jennings and Hulme, 
2010; Keskitalo, Westerhoff and Juhola, 2012) . This combination of methods allows for 
empirical findings about the extent, prominence, authorship and nature of media attention 
for climate change, but also permits more nuanced analysis of the content and context of 
the coverage. In the sections which follow, the decisions and processes involved in this 
methodology is described and justified in more detail. 
 
4.3 Ireland as a case-study: from the particular to the general 
 
 
There are several reasons why Ireland is of interest to students of media coverage of 
climate change. Firstly, it is under-represented in the literature (Fox and Rau, 2016). 
Although several scholars have recently considered Ireland’s media coverage (as 
described previously in section 2.16), considerable gaps remain, and the perspectives of 
journalists, politicians and other stakeholders and claims-makers is absent. Secondly, the 
role of the Irish media in agenda-setting on climate change may be of interest in a 
European context: climate change is a low priority for the Irish public, as it is for states 
in northern Europe compared to their fellow EU members further south, (Lorenzoni and 
Pidgeon, 2006). Only 13% of Irish citizens considered it to be the most serious global 
problem, compared to 20% in the EU as a whole in a 2011 survey (European 
Commission, 2011); this figure had risen to 15% by 2015 (European Commission, 2015). 
It is possible that the media coverage of the issue may be a factor in the low priority 
assigned to the issue by the Irish public.  
 
Furthermore, two events which took place during the timeframe of this study make 
Ireland a relevant case study in an international context: the Green Party of Ireland 
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entered a coalition government following the election of 2007, and Ireland’s public 
finances collapsed, necessitating the institution of a financial rescue package. Ireland’s 
media, it is argued, did not give sufficient warning of the impending banking and property 
market collapse in 2008 and some journalists concede that they failed in their normative 
duties (Fahy, O’Brien and Poti, 2010), becoming mere “cheerleaders” intent on keeping 
Ireland’s booming economy growing indefinitely (Mercille, 2014b). The role of Ireland’s 
media in reporting on climate change is therefore of interest, given their earlier failure to 
alert the public to structural economic issues. The role of the media in reporting climate 
change during an economic crisis may also be of interest to other countries who came 
under pressure from European institutions to implement so-called austerity programmes, 
such as Portugal, Spain and Greece.  
 
Also, the influence of having a Green Party in government on media coverage of climate 
change is of interest in a wider context, as is the question of whether, once a Green Party 
falls out of favour with the electorate, those issues most closely associated with it also 
fall out of favour. The Irish Green Party is part of the European Greens organisation, and 
similarities between the political progress of Green parties in several European states 
have been found (Dumont and Back, 2006); therefore the impact of the Irish Green Party 
on media coverage of climate change may be of interest to scholars in other territories. 
 
4.4 Timeframe: why the period 2007 to 2016 is relevant 
 
The timeframe under examination in this research is January 2007 to March 2016. This 
period is chosen because it allows for the interrogation of Irish climate change coverage 
from several perspectives over a considerable period of time. In terms of research into 
Irish media coverage of environmental issues, the timeframe of this study is slightly 
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shorter than the 2000-2013 timeframe studied by McNally (2015) and the 1997-2012 
period examined by Wagner and Payne (2015). However, it is longer than comparable 
single-country studies such as Bosch’s (2012) study of a single year of South African 
coverage. This research covers a similar timescale to several other influential studies, 
such as Yang (2010) (China, 2000-2007), Grundman and Scott (2014) (France, Germany, 
US, UK, 2000-2010), and Brossard et al (2004) (France, US 1987-1997). The timeframe 
covered by this research is 10 years, a period which permits the discovery of patterns and 
influences that might not be evident in research studying shorter periods.  
 
It has been established that media coverage of climate change peaks during international 
conferences, the release of climate reports and at times of extreme weather (Schäfer et 
al., 2014). The timeframe chosen for this research includes the release of the Fourth 
(2007) and Fifth (2014) Assessment Reports (abbreviated to AR4 and AR5) of the UN 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and nine Conferences of the Parties 
(COPs) to the UN Framework Convention of Climate Change. This research, building on 
and broadening the work of Wagner and Payne (2015), will establish whether 
international norms and patterns of coverage are replicated in Ireland.  
 
The IPCC Assessment Reports are published at intervals. For instance, regarding AR4, 
the report of Working Group I (concerned with the physical sciences) was published in 
March 2007. The report of Working Group II (concerned with impacts, adaptation and 
vulnerability) was published in September 2007, while Working Group III’s report 
(concerning mitigation of climate change) was published on May 2007 (summary for 
policymakers) and September 2007 (full report released online). Each Assessment Report 
is summarised finally into a Synthesis Report, which is published separately. The AR4 
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Synthesis Report was published in November 2007. In the case of AR5, the 
corresponding dates were: WGI (physical sciences) September 2013; WGII (impacts, 
adaptation and vulnerability) March 2014; WGIII (mitigation) April 2014; Synthesis 
Report November 2014. It has been argued that the staggering of the publication of the 
reports of the various working groups has affected media attention, with high coverage 
for the WG1 report, and progressively less coverage for subsequent WG reports. This 
arrangement may also contribute to disaster framing in the media as reporters concentrate 
on the findings related to the physical sciences, while narratives related to adaptation and 
mitigation strategies are relatively neglected (O’Neill et al. 2015). This project also 
investigates whether the tendency to foreground apocalyptic framings of climate change, 
while neglecting frames that emphasise the social and economic opportunities offered by 
adaptation strategies, is manifest in Irish coverage. This investigation builds on other 
scholarship, which has found that the disaster frame dominates coverage of IPCC reports 
(Painter 2014; E Nisbet et al. 2013) and that coverage decreases with the publication of 
each WG report (O’Neill et al. 2015). 
 
The timeframe also encompasses other climate-related events, including the so-called 
Climategate controversy in which emails stolen from the University of East Anglia’s 
(UEA) Climatic Research Unit in November 2009 were published online. The release of 
the emails – which it was claimed showed that climate scientists were manipulating their 
data to promote the theory of anthropogenic climate change – coincided with preparations 
for the December 2009 COP in Copenhagen. This conference was expected to produce a 
binding global agreement to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases. In the event, a less 
ambitious agreement was adopted. Subsequently, three separate investigations cleared 
the UEA scientists of any wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the controversy was seized upon by 
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climate sceptics (Hoffman, 2011). The Climategate controversy may have been a factor, 
along with the much-anticipated COP 15 in Copenhagen, in producing a global peak in 
media coverage of climate change towards the end of 2009. In fact, levels of coverage 
have not generally attained 2009 levels in the interim (Schäfer et al., 2014; McAllister et 
al., 2017). Several reasons have been suggested for this decline: the post-Copenhagen 
frustration of those involved in the climate governance process, journalists and other 
actors (Lyytimäki, 2011), the global financial crisis (Djerf-Pierre, 2012a), the decline in 
the financial resources available to newsrooms (Boykoff and Yulsman, 2013) and the 
subsequent decline in the number of specialist environmental correspondents available to 
cover and advocate for climate change in newsrooms (Hansen, 2011). The “crowding 
out” effect identified by Monica Djerf-Pierre (2012), whereby news of wars and financial 
crises reduce media attention for environmental issues, seems the most powerful of these 
factors, with post-Copenhagen dejection and lack of newsroom resources contributory 
but secondary factors. In addition to investigating whether a post-2009 decline in 
coverage is evident in Ireland, this research aims to interrogate the nature of the Irish 
media’s coverage of climate change conferences and other climate-related events. 
 
Initially, the proposed timeframe for this research was 2007-2014, with the beginning 
and end dates selected to coincide with the release of the fourth and fifth IPCC 
Assessment Reports. However, it was decided to extend the time period to include two 
other significant events: the publication in June 2015 of a Papal encyclical on climate 
change (Franscis, 2015) and the 21st Conference of the Parties in Paris in December 2015. 
The Paris COP produced the Paris Agreement, a global accord which committed all 
signatories to climate action (Obergassel et al., 2016) and led to increased media 
coverage, especially in Europe (McAllister et al., 2017). Previous research has shown 
	 121	
that the Papal encyclical was widely covered in the Irish media and that a moral or ethical 
frame dominated the coverage (Robbins, 2016). This research aims to examine both 
events in the context of longer-term media coverage of climate change in Ireland. 
 
In addition to considering the influence of international events such as climate reports 
and conferences, this project analyses the media coverage of events and developments 
more locally focused. In particular, it focuses on the impact on media coverage of climate 
change of two events:  
(i) the entry for the first time of the Green Party/Comhantas Glas into 
government following the general election of May 2007, and 
(ii) the global financial crisis of 2008, which led to the imposition of a financial 
rescue package for Ireland implemented by the European Commission, the 
European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (known as “the 
troika”). 
It has been argued that the presence of a Green party in government has a positive effect 
on a country’s progress towards achieving emissions-reduction targets (Jensen and 
Spoon, 2011), and indeed the Irish Green Party instituted several initiatives aimed at 
reducing emissions from the energy, transport and housing sectors (Pape et al., 2011). 
The Irish Greens have been accused of propounding an eco-modernist approach to 
combating climate change, “that is, by producing and reproducing the argument that that 
the best way to address climate change was through a combination of the use of market 
incentives and technological advances” (Wagner and Payne, 2015, p. 21). However, it 
has not been established whether the presence of the Green Party affected the extent or 
nature of media coverage of climate change. The methodology of this research, including 
interviews with the two Green Party ministers in government from 2007 to 2011, will 
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contribute to a deeper understanding of media coverage of climate change during this 
period. 
 
In November, 2010 Ireland availed of a €67.5bn financial support programme. The funds 
were used primarily to support the country’s banks, which had become over-extended in 
the property market. The Irish media’s role in reporting both the property market boom 
and the subsequent bailout have been examined (Mercille, 2014a, 2014b); however, the 
effect of the “boom and bust” on media coverage of climate change in Ireland remains 
unexamined. There is considerable evidence to suggest that news of financial matters and 
armed conflict “crowd out” coverage of environmental issues (Djerf-Pierre, 2012a; 
Ungar, 2014). The timeframe chosen for this research allows for an investigation as to 
whether this “crowding out effect” occurred in Ireland also. 
 
4.5 Type of media analysed: the enduring influence of print 
 
At the outset, it must also be conceded that many researchers focus on print media 
because there are established print media databases available such as Pro-Quest and 
Lexis-Nexis, whereas for radio, TV, online and social media, comparable data are 
difficult to collect. Thus, any decision to analyse print media as opposed to various forms 
of digital communication such as the online editions of media companies, postings to 
social media networks or personal blogs requires some robust justification, given the 
attraction of accessible data mentioned above, the decline in legacy print media reach 
(Kleis Nielsen and Levy, 2011; Westlund, 2013) and the over-representation of print in 
the academic literature. Firstly, in contemplating the media landscape in Ireland, it is 
apparent that legacy media companies still command considerable audiences when their 
print and digital offerings are taken into account. The Independent media group has reach 
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of 44% of the population over 18, while the Irish Times has a 37% reach. These 
companies rank second and third in terms of reach behind the public service broadcaster 
RTÉ (64%) (Kirk et al., 2016). 
 
Other scholars, in selecting print media as a data source, did so because of the less 
ephemeral nature of the print product and because national print journalism has an 
agenda-setting effect on other media (Harcup and O’Neill, 2001). For instance, in their 
study of Australian, German and Indian media coverage of climate change, Schäfer, 
Ivanova and Schmidt chose to examine print media because the prestige press are seen 
as “leading media” whose coverage of issues influences other media (Schäfer et al., 2014, 
p. 159). In the case of Ireland, print media often set the agenda for the state broadcaster’s 
morning news radio programme, and journalists were the primary interview subjects here 
during the economic crisis (Rafter, 2014). A longitudinal study of the visual 
representation of climate change in the Canadian media also chose to examine print 
media. Young and Dugas contend that, while blogs and other online forms of 
communication have important contributions to make to the public debate on climate 
change, “they cannot reach the breadth of reach enjoyed by mainstream media” (Young 
and Dugas, 2011, p. 3). Particularly in the case of environmental issues, newspapers, in 
both their print and online editions, remain the “predominant source” of information for 
most people (Antilla, 2010, p. 245). An influential 2007 study of the influence of 
journalistic norms on media coverage of climate change also chose to study print media 
– as well as television coverage – because the newspapers examined (the New York Times, 
Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal) had a considerable 
influence on other smaller, regional newspapers (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2007, p. 5). 
 
	 124	
The coverage of climate change on social media has been studied by scholars, including 
Twitter coverage of IPCC AR5 (O’Neill, Williams, et al. 2015), Twitter usage around 
climate change protests (Segerberg and Bennett, 2011), participatory dynamics on 
YouTube (Porter and Hellsten, 2014) and in online reader comments (Koteyko, Jaspal 
and Nerlich, 2013) regarding the Climategate controversy. Social media content 
mentioning climate change or containing a climate change-related hashtag was the 
subject of an extensive study covering a year’s worth of tweets in four languages: 
Portuguese, Spanish, English and Russian. The researchers concluded that 40% more 
tweets in English are posted between 7am and 12 noon than at other times, leading to 
speculation that “this difference suggests that a sizeable amount of tweeting on climate 
change originates from a workplace, possibly as part of Twitter users’ work duties” 
(Kirilenko and Stepchenkova, 2014, p. 180). In other words, a considerable amount of 
Twitter activity is from “professional” tweeters, a finding at odds with portrayals of 
Twitter as a social media platform enabling the empowerment of non-journalists in 
breaking news and reporting from events (Newman, 2009; Hermida et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, the same study found that 34% of tweets referred to an existing online 
resource. Of the top 10 of these external resources, “nine belong to the prestige press, top 
popular science magazines, and news aggregators, and only one (ThinkProgress.org) is a 
blog” (Ibid: p. 180). These findings are in line with those reported by Brulle et al. (2012) 
in a study of 74 surveys of public concerns regarding climate change. They found that 
mass media coverage and elite cues were among the three most important factors in 
forming public opinion (the third factor was related to economic conditions).  
 
The retransmission of Twitter messages is highly concentrated, with 50% of the retweets 
pointing to just 0.37% of Twitter users mentioned in climate change tweets. The top 
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mentions are an almost identical list of online prestige press outlets and news aggregators, 
with addition of popular bloggers and celebrities. The evidence of ‘‘core’’ resources is in 
agreement with prior studies (Kirilenko and Stepchenkova, 2014, p. 179). Hindman 
(2008) noticed that the political discussions in the Internet tend to be highly concentrated, 
with the majority of hyperlinks pointing to very few newspapers, journalists and 
prominent bloggers, which makes it hard for minorities and non-mainstream messages to 
be heard. In the context of Twitter discussions of the news, Heim (2013) found that the 
elite journalists dominate the discourse, while other research has found that 99% of 
stories linked to from blogs came from legacy outlets (Pew Research Centre, 2010). 
 
Although there is some evidence to suggest that social media inadvertently exposes users 
to diverse political opinions (Brundidge, 2010), there are many who believe that social 
media, and especially Twitter, are merely echo chambers in which users are reinforced 
in their previously held beliefs (Wilhelm, 1998; Davis, 1999; Noveck, 2000; Mutz and 
Martin, 2001; Sunstein, 2001; Bimber and Davis, 2003; Galston, 2003). Social media 
allows users to select information and interactions, and this has resulted in a tendency to 
prefer partisan information (Bimber and Davis 2003). Similar balkanisation and self-
segregation is also evident in political blog sites (Adamic and Glance, 2005).  
 
The use of “pro-sumer” content (produced by people who both produce and consume it) 
is common, but this means that social media has become another source for journalists, 
rather than a means of collaboration between journalist and audience. Indeed, it is argued 
that social media has enhanced the power of journalists rather than diminished it because, 
thanks to postings on social media, they have access to places and events that they would 
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not have had in the past. Journalists become curators of social media content produced 
by others and their gate-keeping status in enhanced. (Phillips, 2015).  
 
Although new media has been heralded as “one of the greatest tools in achieving a true 
democracy” (Head, 2009), scholars concede there are difficulties for citizens wishing to 
access reliable information (O’Neill and Boykoff, 2012). Digital literacy (skill in use of 
technology devices and search techniques) does not equate to information literacy (skill 
in evaluating the sources and reliability of information) (Nicholas et al. 2008), and the 
growth of new media and social media has contributed to the spread of skeptical, 
contrarian and denialist views (Lockwood, 2008). Contrarian discourse in new media has 
been used to justify the inclusion of contrarian views in mainstream media, while the rise 
in popularity of climate contrarian blogs has added to the volume of contrarian discourses 
(Ibid). As O’Neill and Boykoff (2012: p. 239) conclude, “Perhaps then, even more than 
with traditional media and communications vehicles, evaluating information (and 
knowing who and what to trust) is a key issue in climate engagement through new 
media.” In short, as Sunstein (2007, p. 143) remarks: “those who consult blogs will learn 
a great deal. But they will have a tough time separating falsehoods from facts.” 
 
Social media are relatively popular in Ireland. On social media, 46% of Irish people use 
Facebook, while 14% use Twitter. This compares with figures of 40% and 11% 
respectively in the United States, and 29% and 14% respectively in the United Kingdom. 
Regarding online news consumption, the website of Ireland’s state broadcaster RTÉ is 
the most popular with 31% of the population accessing news here. However, print titles, 
despite being frequently dismissed as obsolete, provide news to a considerable audience. 
The Independent News and Media (INM) print titles (the Irish Independent, the Evening 
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Herald and the Sunday Independent) have a 33% reach, the Irish Times has a 25% reach, 
regional newspapers reach 25% of the population, Irish tabloid newspapers (the Irish 
Daily Mail, the Irish Mirror, the Irish Sun) reach 15%, and the Irish edition of the Sunday 
Times reaches 11%. It is evident that print media remain influential in the Irish media 
landscape. The relevance of so-called “legacy media” companies is even more striking 
when it is considered that the online versions of the INM titles and the Irish Times account 
for a combined 51% of the online news audience (Newman et al. 2015).  
 
Consequently, it is reasonable to analyse print media on three grounds: (i) such an 
analysis would form part of a pre-existing body of scholarship which has examined print 
media and may therefore contribute to a global academic conversation on the mediation 
of climate change; (ii) social media coverage of climate change is of dubious value as a 
large proportion of social media content links to resources provided by traditional media 
outlets; (iii) taken together, the print and online versions of newspapers are by far the 
most important source of news for Irish people.  
 
4.6 Content analysis 
 
This research employs three primary research methods: a quantitative content analysis of 
eight national newspapers over the period January 2007 to March 2016; a frame analysis 
of a random sample of the corpus of articles produced by the content analysis, and a series 
of interviews with journalists, politicians and political advisors involved with the Irish 
media coverage of climate change during the period under review. In this section, I wish 
to set forth some general argument as to why content analysis is an appropriate method 
for this research, and also to describe how the content analysis was carried out. 
 
	 128	
Content analysis is “a research technique for making valid and replicable inferences from 
data to their context” (Krippendorf, 1989, p. 403). In order to allow for replication, 
however, the technique can only be applied to data that are durable in nature. Content 
analysis enables researchers to sift through large volumes of data with relative ease in a 
systematic fashion (GAO 1996). It can be a useful technique for allowing us to discover 
and describe the focus of individual, group, institutional, or social attention (Weber, 
1990). It also allows inferences to be made which can then be corroborated using other 
methods of data collection. Krippendorf (1980, p. 51) notes that “much content analysis 
research is motivated by the search for techniques to infer from symbolic data what would 
be either too costly, no longer possible, or too obtrusive by the use of other techniques”. 
Content analysis is a something of an umbrella term for a variety of approaches to 
extracting and analysing data (Cavanagh, 1997) covering  a family of analytic approaches 
ranging from impressionistic, intuitive, interpretive analyses to systematic, strict textual 
analyses (Rosengren, 1981). However, this flexibility can lead to difficulties. As Hsieh 
and Shannon (2005, p. 1277), citing Tesch (1990), point out, “although this flexibility 
has made content analysis useful for a variety of researchers, the lack of a firm definition 
and procedures has potentially limited the application of content analysis.” Furthermore, 
some scholars have critiqued the results produced by content analyses. For example, 
Nosty (2014, p. 8) gives a trenchant account of the inadequacy of content analysis media 
research:  
“Content analyses, for example, verify the hypotheses that have already been discussed 
in many previous studies. Their journalistic discourse is poor, they are insufficiently 
specialised and the narrative tendency does not allow for the effects of an unsustainable 
industrial model to be perceived socially. They discover deficiencies in media content 
based on an ideal theoretical model based on the subjective perspective of the researcher, 
who takes an arbitrating position which is not always realistic. These studies, as a whole, 
are useful in asserting that the media do not fulfil the role that they are expected to play. 
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They even state that the media are unable to explain the weaknesses of a system in crisis, 
because they are part of its very core.”  
 
However, this analysis seems more critical of the purposes to which media scholars put 
content analysis, rather than of the method itself. 
 
In its strictly operational phase, content analysis provides for the coding of data according 
to criteria relevant to the researcher’s intent and the content of the research question. The 
process of sampling data, reducing the sample size and coding the data amounts to what 
Krippendorf (2004, p. 83) calls “data making”, and as such it is a precursor to the 
description and interpretation of the data. He recommends that a content analysis have 
the following elements and structure: unitising, sampling, recording/coding, reducing 
sample, drawing inferences, and narrating the answer to the research question 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 83).  
 
In a content analysis of framing studies in leading communications journals (Matthes, 
2009), the author searched a range of journals for “articles that identified, named and 
extracted media frames” (Ibid. p. 353). These were then coded for descriptive variables 
(media analysed, timeframe covered), conceptual variables (frame type, unit of analysis, 
frame definition etc.) and theory variables (whether hypotheses were tested, or whether 
a research question was considered). For this research, a search of the LexisNexis 
database was undertaken, using the search terms “climate change” OR “global warming” 
OR “greenhouse effect”. As LexisNexis does not permit searches that return over 3,000 
results, 111 individual monthly searches were carried out, producing a corpus of 12,751 
articles mentioning the search terms.  
 
	 130	
The newspaper titles searched are presented in Table 4.1 below. The eight titles represent 
a cross-section of daily (five) and Sunday (three) national newspapers, with five 
broadsheet and two tabloid titles represented, and one title (the Irish Independent) that 
published in broadsheet format for part of the timeframe under study, then appeared in 
both broadsheet and “compact” format (from February 2004) before finally appearing in 
the compact format only (from December 2012).  
 
The discrepancies in the dates for which each title was available presented a challenge in 
recording meaningful data. Therefore, a method was employed whereby the total number 
of relevant stories for each title in each month was recorded, and this total was then 
divided by the total number of titles available for that month. This produced a total for 
the average number of climate stories per title per month, a figure which could be usefully 
compared to other datasets, such as the one maintained by the ICECAPs collective in the 
University of Boulder, Colorado (McAllister et al., 2017). To give an example: for the 
early months of 2007, only four of the eight titles were recorded in the LexisNexis 
database, and thus the total of climate change stories was divided by four; later in 2007 
(from August), six titles were available, and the total was divided by six, and so on. It 
should be noted that the recorded content for the Evening Herald in LexisNexis covers 
less than a year, during which the title published just a single climate change story and 
therefore this title has been omitted from the analysis. 
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Table 4.1: Irish national newspaper records available in the LexisNexis database. 
Title	 Dates	available	
Irish	Times	 June	1992-present	
Irish	Independent	 July	2006	–	present	
Irish	Examiner	 Aug	2007	–	present	
Irish	Daily	Mail	 Feb	2012-present	
Evening	Herald	 Feb	2008	–	Jan	2009	
Sunday	Independent	 Oct	2006	–	present	
Sunday	Business	Post	 Aug	2007-present	
Sunday	Tribune	 Sept	2001-Feb	2011	
 
 
This process comprised the unitising phase of Krippendorf’s (2004) content analysis 
process. Subsequently, the sampling stage was undertaken. Krippendorf acknowledges 
that sampling is necessary in order to deal with large amounts of data, and suggests that 
random sampling is the best way to deal with “texts that stem from regularly appearing 
publications”. In this type of systematic sampling, every kth unit is extracted, with k is a 
constant. Thus the “rhythm” of the publication is reflected in the sampled data (Ibid. p. 
115). LexisNexis allows for sample reduction by permitting the selection of articles 
containing >500 words. This strategy reduced the sample of climate change articles from 
the eight newspaper titles to 6,959 articles. Employing a further systematic sampling 
strategy of selecting every 10th article further reduced the sample to 706. These three 
datasets, all climate change stories, climate change stories over 500 words, and every 10th 
climate change story over 500 words show the same trends (Fig 4.1). 
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Fig 4.1: Comparison of data samples 
 
 
This sample of 706 newspaper articles about climate change were then coded for a 
number of descriptive variables. These were: 
(i) Publication 
(ii) Headline 
(iii) Publication date 
(iv) Word count 
(v) Story type  
(vi) Author 
(vii) Section/Page number 
(viii) Science 
(ix) Climate focus 
(x) Dominant frame 
Several of these variables are self-explanatory. Others, such as “story type”, “science”, 
“climate focus” and “dominant frame” require further explanation. Each of the 706 
stories was coded as to story type, a classification which recorded whether the story was 
(a) a straightforward news story, written in a news style, with relatively few sources, (b) 
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a complex news story, with several sources and providing more detailed context, (c) a 
feature article, (d) an editorial, expressing the stance of the newspaper on a given topic, 
(e) an opinion article, (f) a regular column. The science classification recorded whether 
the science of climate change was accepted or portrayed as a given, in which case the 
story was coded as “settled science”; in cases where the science of climate change was 
not accepted, these stores were coded as “contested science”. The climate focus 
classification recorded whether climate change was the primary focus of the article, or 
whether it was a secondary focus. Stories were also coded according to their dominant 
frame. The approach to coding frames is dealt with in the following section. Articles were 
coded in their entirety for the presence of several frames, and articles typically contained 
more than one frame. In this descriptive phase, the frame present in the first paragraph 
(commonly called the lead or intro [or lede in US journalism]) or opening section of the 
article. 
 
Schäfer et al, in their “best practice” guide for media coverage of climate change 
researchers, state that “To analyse issue attention as a process of selecting one issue over 
others given limited editorial space, however, it is necessary to normalise these measures, 
e.g. by relating the number of CC-related articles to all articles published in a given 
medium over a given time span (see Schmidt et al. 2013; Schäfer et al. 2014). Such 
measures control for the size of the news hole and thus yield data comparable across 
outlets, time periods, or countries.” (2016, p. 7). Therefore, the media coverage of climate 
change is compared to all news coverage in the period under study. This was achieved 
by setting the parameters of the search within the LexisNexis database (date range and 
newspaper titles) but leaving the search term field blank. This method returned all news 
items for the titles with the specified dates. As LexisNexis does not allow searches to 
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return more than 3,000 articles, this exercise entailed 670 individual searches (five 
searches per month, over 134 months). The findings of this analysis are set out in Chapter 
5, section 5.3. 
 
As this thesis is also concerned with the influence of the Green Party on levels of media 
attention for climate change, a second content analysis was undertaken to discover the 
extent to which media coverage of climate change also mentioned the Greens. Again, the 
LexisNexis database was searched for the time period of January 2006 to December 2011 
for all articles mentioning “climate change”, “global warming” and “greenhouse effect”; 
subsequently, the same search was undertaken again, this time with the added search 
terms of “Green Party” or “Greens”. The results of this content analysis are discussed in 
Chapter 6, section 6.7.1. 
 
4.7 Frame analysis of the data 
 
Other researchers have found that a classic content analysis can provide insights as to the 
types of coverage and its relative frequency (for example, O’Neill 2013), or the 
“loudness” of an issue within a media environment, but that a more qualitative approach 
such as frame analysis is required to discern an issue’s “strength” (Chong and Druckman, 
2007b). O’Neill (2013) implies that a content analysis is a separate process and approach 
to a framing analysis, and indeed there seems to be considerable difference of opinion in 
the academy as to whether framing is a separate research method, or if it comprises a 
form of the coding of data which falls within content analysis. Krippendorf states that the 
coding phase of a content analysis involves “classifying the units according to the 
categories of the analytical constructs chosen” (Krippendorf, 1989, p. 407), a description 
broad enough to accommodate frames as a unit to be classified. 
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When considering climate change images in the media, Chong and Druckman (2013) 
make a distinction between content and frame analysis, and state that the latter has more 
in common with Critical Discourse Analysis because it is relevant to the construction of 
meaning (p. 13). Others consider framing as part of what Rosengran (1981) calls the 
content analysis “family”, suggesting that the framing approach is in effect a qualitative 
content analysis (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000, p. 97). Maxwell Boykoff combines 
“investigations of framing” with CDA in his study of the cultural politics of media 
coverage of climate change in UK tabloids (Boykoff, 2008).  
 
Some of the confusion about whether framing sits within content analysis or constitutes 
a separate methodology is due to the association of content analysis with quantitative 
approaches to data, and likewise with the association of framing analysis with qualitative 
approaches. However, this dichotomy is misleading, as a best-practice guide for media 
coverage of climate change research points out: quantitative and qualitative methods can 
be both descriptive and explanatory (Schäfer et al., 2016). Content analysis is more 
usually concerned with statistical data and the coding of descriptive variables of each unit 
of analysis. Framing, meanwhile, may appear more subjective as the identification of 
frames, and the detection of their presence, is often left to the individual researcher. It 
would sometimes appear that those scholars interested in the cultural resonances of media 
coverage of climate change, or in linking coverage with social or political theory, tend to 
view frame analysis as separate from content analysis, while scholars more interested in 
the construction of meaning within the media view framing as existing within the territory 
of content analysis.  
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For the purposes of this research, I take the position that frame analysis can be part of a 
content analysis, and that frames may be coded accordingly. The danger of subjectivity 
in selecting a typology of frames may be diminished by using typologies from previous 
research, and measures to ensure inter-coder reliability may also dispel fears that the 
presence of frames has been subjectively identified. 
 
One of the criticisms of framing studies is the absence of a uniform approach that each 
one creates a framing typology ab initio to suit the research topic at hand (Dahl, 2015), 
that the frames are operationally defined (Bowe et al., 2012) and that framing researchers 
exhibit a tendency to “reinvent the wheel” (Nisbet, 2010, p. 46). Some of this debate on 
how best to operationalise frame analysis involves arguments as to whether generic 
frames (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000) or “episodic” frames (Iyengar, 1991) are best 
suited to providing replicable results. Tankard recommends  the “list of frames” 
approach, which identifies 11 framing mechanisms, and has, he claims, the the advantage 
of being replicable, of taking the subjectivity out of the identification of frames, of being 
reliable, and of allowing theory-building and theory-testing (Tankard, 2001, p. 101). 
Tankard and others (for example, Nisbet & Scheufele 2009) concede that, while using 
established frame typologies can help bring coherence to a fragmented field, there will 
always be a need to allow issue-specific frames emerge from the data. Tankard states that 
“…frames and frame indicators must be discovered and defined for each new topic under 
investigation. This step seems unavoidable, since framing deals fundamentally with the 
differences in the ways particular stories are presented.” (2001, p.102). The authors of a 
“best-practice” guide for researchers into media coverage of climate change recommend 
that scholars “look for existing conceptual tools” while also pointing out that generic 
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approaches are best suited to issue-comparison studies, while issue-specific approaches 
are best suited to in-depth analysis  (Schäfer et al. 2016, p.5-10).  
 
Accordingly, this thesis uses a combination of existing frame typologies, while also 
allowing new frames to emerge from the data. The broad coding schema derives from 
typologies put forward by Matthew Nisbet (2009) and Saffron O’Neill et al (2015). 
Nisbet, in an influential essay on the importance of frames for public engagement, 
suggested a typology of frames relevant to media analyses of climate change: social 
progress, economic development and competitiveness, morality and ethics, scientific and 
technical uncertainty, Pandora’s Box, public accountability and governance, middle 
way/alternative path, conflict and strategy. In their supplementary material supplied with 
their research paper, O’Neill and her colleagues provide a thorough examination of 
frames in existing studies before putting forward the following typology: settled science, 
uncertain science, political or ideological struggle, disaster, opportunity, economic, 
morality and ethics, role of science, security and health (O’Neill, H. Williams, et al., 
2015). In addition to these frames commonly found in science-related policy debates, two 
other frames specific to the issue of climate change in an Irish context were detected in 
the data: a communitarian/cosmopolitan frame and an agriculture frame. The complete 
typology of frames is set out in Table 4.2 below. 
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Table 4.2 Typology of frames coded in this thesis 
Frame	 Contains	
Political	 or	
ideological		
contest	
References	to	summits,	conferences	and	talks,	to	climate	change	as	a	political	issue,	to	the	stances	on	climate	
change	of	political	parties	or	politicians,	to	political	posturing	in	advance	of	climate	talks,	to	political	point-
scoring	and	jockeying	for	position	on	the	issue	of	climate	change,	to	assessments	as	to	who	is	“winning”	or	
“losing”	in	the	political	battle	to	implement	climate	policies,	to	the	“game”	of	climate	negotiation,	to	climate	
change	 as	 a	 battle	 between	 elites,	 and	 explicit	 references	 to	 a	 “left	 versus	 right”	 conflict	 regarding	 the	
implementation	of	climate	policies.	
Policy	 or		
technical	
References	 to	measurements,	 records,	or	assessments	which	are	policy-neutral	and	which	do	not	 suggest,	
recommend	or	imply	any	particular	course	of	action	
Morality		
or	ethics	
References	 to	 the	 moral	 imperative	 of	 dealing	 with	 climate	 change,	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 inaction	 on	 future	
generations,	 to	 climate	 change	 generally	 as	 a	 religious	 issue,	 to	 climate	 change	 as	 related	 to	 humanity’s	
stewardship	of	the	planet,	to	the	impact	of	climate	change	on	those	who	have	done	least	to	cause	it	(climate	
justice),	or	to	explicit	references	to	fairness,	justice	or	equity.	
Opportunity	 References	to	climate	change	as	an	economic	or	business	opportunity,	to	positive	impacts	or	consequences	of	
climate	change	mitigation	and	adaptation,	to	economic	benefits	of	energy	efficiency,	to	strategic	opportunities	
for	Ireland	in	developing	green	technologies,	to	the	benefits	of	reducing	dependency	on	imported	fossil	fuels,	
and	to	opportunities	in	replacing	fossil	fuel	with	renewables.	
Agriculture	 References	to	the	impacts	of	climate	change	on	agriculture,	to	the	contribution	of	agriculture	to	Ireland’s	total	
emissions,	and	to	reactions	to	suggestions	that	these	emissions	be	reduced,	to	the	cultivation	of	forestry	as	a	
carbon	sink,	to	the	reduction	of	meat	in	human	diet,	to	land	use,	to	CAP	reform	or	talks,	and	to	food	security.	
Settled		
science	
References	to	the	reality	of	climate	change	and	to	the	necessity	of	doing	something	about	it,	to	the	science	of	
climate	change,	to	the	publication	of	scientific	reports	(including	IPCC	reports),	to	the	issuing	of	climate	data,	
to	specific	ways	in	which	individuals	or	governments	can	undertake	mitigation	or	adaptation	measures,	and	to	
the	measured	impacts	of	climate	change	(e.g.	flooding,	rising	sea	levels,	species	depletion,	crop	failure,	famine,	
temperature	rise).	
Contested		
science	
References	to	climate	change	as	not	happening,	or	being	due	to	natural	causes,	suggestions	that	any	initiatives	
to	mitigate	 climate	 change	 or	 to	 reduce	 individual	 or	 sectoral	 emissions	 are	misguided,	 references	which	
confuse	weather	 and	 climate,	which	 suggest	 that	 the	 science	of	 climate	 change	 is	 contested,	 that	 climate	
scientists	 are	 in	 error	 or	may	 change	 their	minds,	 which	 cite	 the	 University	 of	 East	 Anglia	 email	 theft	 as	
evidence	 of	 a	 conspiracy	 among	 climate	 scientists,	 which	 contain	 dismissive	 or	 sarcastic	 dismissals	 of	
environmental	campaigners	or	politicians.	
Disaster	 References	 to	 climate	 change	 as	 an	unavoidable	disaster,	 or	 as	 a	 looming	 apocalypse,	 to	 the	 catastrophic	
impacts	of	climate	change	(which	do	not	contain	references	to	the	possibility	of	mitigating	climate	change	or	
adapting	to	it,	or	to	a	combination	of	both),	to	the	impact	of	climate	change	on	specific	species,	or	parts	of	the	
world,	or	to	exclusively	negative	economic	impacts.	
Domestication	 or	
communitarianism	
References	 to	 Ireland’s	 emissions	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 global	 emissions,	 to	 Ireland’s	 emissions	 targets,	 to	
Ireland’s	negotiating	strategies	in	climate	change	talks,	to	the	impacts	of	climate	change	on	Ireland	specifically,	
and	 to	 the	 minimal	 impact	 on	 global	 emissions	 any	 mitigation	 measures	 Ireland	 may	 take	 are	 coded	 as	
featuring	this	frame.	
Economic	 References	to	the	economic	cost	of	mitigation	or	adaptation,	to	market-based	solutions	to	climate	change,	to	
entrepreneurial	activity	in	the	climate	sector,	to	the	effects	of	climate	change	on	various	areas	of	economic	
activities	(car	manufacturing,	aviation	etc.),	to	the	cost	of	energy	production.	
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In addition to these frames, two topics were also coded for in the analysis of the data: 
stories mentioning the Green Party and stories alluding to turf-cutting2. The idea of 
coding a Green Party frame was considered, but it was found that stories concerning the 
Green Party were accommodated more naturally in other, more conceptual frames. The 
Green Party was therefore recorded as a topic rather than as a frame. Turf-cutting has 
been a contentious subject in Ireland for at least two decades, ever since the National 
Parks and Wildlife Service surveyed Ireland’s peatlands in the late 1990s and 139 raised 
bogs were designated under the EU Habitats Directive (Lowes, 2013). In 1998, the Irish 
Government sought and was granted a 10-year derogation on implementing the Habitats 
Directive; the derogation expired in 2008, and in 2010, the Green Party minister for the 
environment announced that, under the terms of the Directive, the cutting of turf on these 
bogs would cease. There was opposition to the ban, especially in the Sligo, Leitrim and 
Roscommon areas. Candidates opposing the ban were elected to the Irish parliament and 
the European parliament. In 2015, the government renewed efforts to implement the ban 
(McGee, 2015b). Given the importance of bogs as carbon sinks (Cooke, 2014) and the 
impact on the climate of burning turf (Irish Peatland Conservation Council, 2009), it was 
thought that this issue was pertinent to the debate over climate action in Ireland. 
Furthermore, given its political prominence, with the election of protest candidates and 
the intervention of Green Party politicians, and the place of cutting turf for domestic use 
in the national consciousness (Clifford, 2016), the issue offered possibilities as a prism 
through which to view certain rural-urban aspects of the climate change debate in Ireland. 
  
																																																						
2	Only	two	articles	were	coded	to	the	turf-cutting	frame,	and	therefore	it	does	not	
form	part	of	the	frame	analysis.	
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4.8 Operational phase: how the data was coded using NVivo 
 
Once the data was collected, and a framing typology settled upon, each unit of analysis 
was coded for (i) the descriptive variables described above, and (ii) the presence of frames 
in each unit as described in the coding instrument. The data was imported into NVivo, a 
type of CAQDAS (computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software) designed for 
coding media texts including newspaper articles, audio and video texts, photographs and 
interviews. NVivo allows for a “code and retrieve” system, whereby pieces of data are 
coded according to the relevant coding instrument and may then be retrieved separately 
from the original data. The software also allows for advanced searching and interrogation 
of data. Although NVivo enhances the work of researches when it comes to efficiency, 
multiplicity and transparency, it “does not do the intellectual work” (Hoover and Koerber, 
2011, p. 71) and the features of the software “do not by any means replace the need for 
careful reading of every line of data” (Ibid, p. 77). The NVivo software affords a 
researcher some efficiencies and thereby “release some of the time used to simply 
‘manage’ data and allow an increased focus on ways of examining the meaning of what 
is recorded” (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013, p. 2). 
 
NVivo also allows for in-depth analysis of media content. In this study, every sentence 
of each article was coded for the presence of frames. This does not differ greatly from 
other methodologies which do not use CADQAS; for instance Brossard et al (2004) and 
Zamith et al (2012) manually code each article in its entirely. However, NVivo’s “code 
and retrieve” function allows for the direct comparison of all content coded as belonging 
to a particular frame. Its advanced search functions also allow for the demonstration of 
“coding density” (the number of frames in each story) and to track the rise and fall of 
frames in specific publications over time.  
	 141	
 
The coding process involved assigning each article a dominant frame (i.e. the frame 
present in the opening section of the article and/or recurring most frequently in the 
article), while also coding other frames present in the body of the text. This process 
allowed for analysis showing which frames were found alongside dominant frames most 
often. For instance, in articles assigned a dominant frame of “political or ideological 
contest”, it was possible to see which secondary frames were coded to those stories, and 
how often. Thus, a more complex and nuanced analysis of framing strategies was 
possible. Once the initial coding of frames had taken place, it was possible to analyse all 
text coded to particular frames (thanks the Nvivo’s “code and retrieve” function). A 
subsequent level of coding was then undertaken to identify the main sub-topics discussed 
in articles coded to certain frames. The results of these processes are presented in Chapter 
5. 
 
The data collection for this thesis also involved interviews with 12 subjects, a step 
discussed in more detail in the next section. The transcripts of these interviews were also 
imported into Nvivo, where they were coded according to a coding instrument based on 
the questions they were asked during the interviews. Details of this instrument, the coding 
instrument used for the frame analysis, and a fuller account of how material was 
organised and coded in Nvivo are given in Appendices 4 and 5. Table 4.3 below sets out 
in table form the methods used to collect and analyse the data. 
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Table 4.3: Data-building and content analysis process 
 
4.9 
Semi-structured interviews with politicians, advisors and journalists 
 
Interviews are typically a face-to-face conversation between the participant and the 
researcher (Gubrium, J. F. & Holstein, 2002). Interviews are useful for data collection 
because “they have the potential to overcome poor response rates of a questionnaire 
survey (Barriball and While, 1994, p. 329), they are well suited to exploring attitudes, 
beliefs and motives in depth (Smith, 1975), they provide the opportunity to assess the 
validity of a participant’s responses by abserving non-verbal cues (Gordon, 1975), and 
they ensure that the respondent is not prompted or does not otherwise receive assistance 
in answering the questions (Bailey, 1987). Srivastava and Thomson (2009) list three 
different types of interview: structured, unstructured and semi-structured. In research 
involving structured interviews, there is no variation in the questions between 
participants. Unstructured interviews have no predetermined set of questions (Crabtree 
and Miller, 1999; Patton, 2002).  
Step	 Unit	of	analysis	 Method	applied	
1	 Newspaper	article	 Quantitative	content	analysis	of	LexisNexis	database	for	eight	
national	newspapers,	using	search	terms	“climate	change”	OR	
“global	warming”	OR	“greenhouse	effect”.		
N	=	12,865	
2	 Newspaper	article	 Sample	reduction	1:	articles	containing	<	500	words	eliminated.	N	=	
7059	
3	 Newspaper	article	 Sample	reduction	2:	random	sample	extracted	by	selection	every	
10th	story.	N	=	706	
4	 Newspaper	article	 Content	analysis	1:	articles	coded	for	descriptive	variables	
5	 Newspaper	article	 Content	analysis	2:	articles	coded	for	presence	of	dominant	frames	
6	 Newspaper	article	 Content	analysis	3:	articles	coded	for	presence	of	secondary	frames	
7	 Newspaper	article	 Content	analysis	4:	text	coded	to	dominant	frames	coded	for	
presence	to	sub-topics	
8	 Interview	transcript	 Content	analysis:	text	of	transcript	coded	per	topic	
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In her research into the perceptions of climate change in the Russian Federation, 
Poberanska (2013, p. 330) used semi-structured interviews as a means of data collection 
for two reasons: “First, they are well suited for the exploration of the perceptions and 
opinions of respondents regarding complex and sometimes sensitive issues and enable 
probing for more information and clarification of answers. Second, the varied 
professional, educational and personal histories of the sample group precluded the use of 
a standardised interview schedule .”  
 
However, Diefenbach (2009, pp. 891–3) offers a trenchant criticism of semi-structured 
interviews, suggesting that the approach has flaws in the stage of research design (chiefly 
that the researcher’s subjectivities will affect the research question), data collection 
(chiefly that the selection of subjects is not systematic and objective), the data themselves 
(chiefly low internal validity, i.e. do not mirror reality), and findings (they cannot be 
replicated, nor can they be extrapolated into a general theory). For qualitative empirical 
research to be worthwhile, the researcher must put his findings into a broader societal, 
historical and ideological contexts. (Ibid: p. 893). 
 
The use of semi-structured interviews is an established methodology in the study of the 
mediation of climate change. Russell (2013) used semi-structured interviews in her 
analysis of climate change coverage of the 2011 climate conference in Durban, while 
Maxwell Boykoff and his collaborators have frequently used semi-structured interviews 
as a means of examining situated views of climate change (for example, Boykoff 2007; 
Boykoff & Mansfield 2008; Boykoff 2008). Keskitalo et al (2012) carried out 92 semi-
structured interviews in their study of support for climate change adaptation, and Geall 
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(2014) used semi-structured interviews in his study of the framing of climate change in 
the Chinese media. Following these methodologies, this research triangulates the data 
gathered by collection and analysis with semi-structured interviews with environmental 
journalists, government advisors and Green Party politicians.  
 
The use of interviews compliments the use of frame analysis. It allows for the 
examination of questions of transmission and reception, of conscious or unconscious 
agency. This combination of approaches allows for the investigation of the framing of 
the climate change issue by journalists and by politicians at source. For instance, one of 
the journalists interviewed confirmed that stories were more likely to be accepted by his 
editor if the issue was presented through a frame that emphasised jobs and economic 
opportunity. The use of interviews alongside frame analysis permits an exploration of the 
conscious and unconscious use of frames by actors on both sides of the discourse. 
Brüggermann suggests that content analysis alone is not sufficient for investigating the 
framing practices of journalists; interviews are also required (2014, p. 74). 
 
The selection of interview subjects was therefore informed by the desirability of hearing 
from those wishing to gain media attention for climate change and from those from whom 
such attention was sought. Green Party government ministers in the Fianna Fáil-Green 
Party coalition government of 2007 to 2011 gained extensive experience in dealing with 
the media while trying to advance an environmental agenda, while their media advisors 
also tried to attract media attention for environmental topics. Meanwhile, during this 
period, environmental correspondents for the national print and broadcast media were 
engaged in pitching stories related to their “beat” to their editors and dealing with various 
claims-makers in the environmental space.  
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Thus, it was decided to interview the two Green Party ministers who served in 
government, along with their media advisors, and the environment correspondents of the 
main media outlets in the state. Of particular interest were the inputs of two “poachers 
turned gamekeepers”: John Downing, a political journalist who was appointed to be the 
Green Party’s representative in the Government Press Office, and Liam Reid, a former 
environment correspondent with the Irish Times who became Minister John Gormley’s 
media advisor.  
 
The interviews were carried out in two phases: an initial set of interviews was undertaken 
in May and June, 2015 and a subsequent second set of interviews was carried out in 
January and February, 2017. The first set of interviews took place in advance of 
newspaper data collection and analysis, and the second set was carried out afterwards. 
The first group of interviews were undertaken at an early stage in the research project, 
partly to familiarize myself with the interview process, and partly to establish the context 
of the issue of communication about climate change during the period under examination. 
In cases where, following analysis of the media data, it was necessary to clarify or expand 
on a point made in these early group of interviews, supplementary interviews were carried 
out by phone or email. The full list of interviewees, along with the dates on which the 
interviews took place, are set out in Table 4.4 below. 
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Table 4.4: List of interview subjects and dates 
Name	 Position	 Date	interviewed	
Eamon	Ryan	 Leader	of	 the	Green	Party	of	 Ireland	and	 former	Minister	 for	Communications,	
Energy	and	Natural	Resources	
February	1,	2017	
Bríd	McGrath	 Former	media	advisor	to	Eamon	Ryan	 February	8,	2017	
Frank	McDonald	 Former	Environment	Editor	of	the	Irish	Times	 May	15,	2015	
Claire	O’Sullivan	 Former	environmental	reporter,	Irish	Examiner	 June	16,	2017	
John	Gibbons	 Environmental	blogger	and	former	columnist	with	the	Irish	Times	 May	1,	2015	
Paul	Cunningham	 RTE	journalist	and	former	environment	correspondent	 April	24,	2015	
John	Gormley	 Former	Minister	for	Environment,	Heritage	and	Local	Government	 April	12,	2015	
John	Downing	 Political	 columnist	 with	 the	 Irish	 Independent	 and	 former	 deputy	 government	
press	secretary	
February	23,	2017	
Liam	Reid	 Former	environmental	correspondent,	 Irish	Times,	and	former	media	advisor	to	
John	Gormley	
May	19,	2015	
Cormac	Bourke	 Former	 news	 editor,	 Irish	 Independent	 and	 currently	 editor	 of	 the	 Sunday	
Independent	
August	1,	2017	
Paul	Melia	 Environment	Editor,	Irish	Independent	 August	8,	2017	
Kevin	O’Sullivan	 Former	editor	of	the	Irish	Times	and	currently	Environment	Editor,	Irish	Times	 August	14,	2017	
 
 
The individuals interviewed are not intended to be a comprehensive survey of all those 
involved in climate change communication in the research period. Indeed, other political 
parties, individual politicians, NGOs, unions, employer groups and journalists were also 
deploying various communications strategies concerning climate change at the time. 
Instead, they are intended as a core group of journalists, politicians and media advisors 
working very closely on the issue. As such, their views are of value as to what was 
happening in the space where policy, media and politics came into contact. For instance, 
the Green Party ministers belonged to a political party for whom climate change 
legislation was a primary policy objective. They were in ministries with direct 
responsibility for climate-related areas: energy and environment. The journalists 
interviewed comprised the environment correspondents of the main media outlets in the 
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state, while the three “media handlers” interviewed operated in the interstices between 
the working journalists and the realm of policy and politics.  
 
As discussed above, the format of the semi-structured interview permits the interviewer 
to ask broad, open questions and to allow the interview to develop organically from the 
responses to these questions. For this research, several general, open questions were 
asked of each subject. Specific questions relating to the subject’s personal experiences 
and expertise were then asked. The general, open questions were: - How would you describe the Irish media’s coverage of climate change? - How would you describe climate change as a general media topic? - How would you describe the attitude of the Irish media towards climate sceptics? - Are there any recommendations you would like to make for journalists reporting 
on climate change? - Do you think having a green presence in government increased media attention 
for climate change? - How do you think the media frames climate change? - Do you think sceptic voices are represented in Irish media? 
The texts of the interviews was also imported into NVivo for analysis. The views of the 
interview subjects have been brought to bear on the discussion of the data analysis in 
Chapter 5. 
 
The interview subjects were contacted initially by email. It was explained to them that 
the interview would form part of the data for an academic thesis and might also be used 
in subsequent academic journal articles. It was also stated that the transcripts of the 
interviews might also be published subsequently. The interviews were transcribed, and 
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the transcripts sent back to the interview subjects for review. This process was approved 
by the DCU Research Ethics Committee. The data relating to these interviews comprised 
(i) audio files, (ii) text files and (iii) email addresses and other contact information. These 
have been stored securely on the university’s cloud drive system. 
 
 
4.10 Analytical tools: mediated issue development 
 
The final constituent of the research methodology concerns the analytical tools used in 
the discussion of the data. The theory of mediated issue development put forward by 
Nisbet and Huge (2006), which was discussed in the previous chapter, is a useful 
approach in analysing the rise and fall of climate change on the media and policy agenda. 
To recap briefly, Nisbet and Huge identify and investigate four factors which, they argue, 
influence the progress of an issue through the attention cycle:  
(i) the type of policy venue where the debate takes place or is centred.; 
(ii) the media lobbying activities of competing strategic actors as they attempt to 
interpret or “frame” the issue advantageously; 
(iii) the tendency for different types of journalists to depend heavily on shared 
news values and norms to narrate the policy world, and  
(iv) the context relative to other competing issues. 
(Nisbet and Huge, 2006, p. 7) 
 
Their model sythesises previous agenda theories, such as multiple streams theory 
(Kingdon 1995), punctuated equilibrium theory (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005) and other 
conceptual approaches such as Downs’s issue attention cycle. Mediated issue 
development adds to these theories by taking into account the norms and practices of 
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journalists, thus bringing together concepts from agenda systems and more media-centred 
approaches. This thesis is not intended as a test of the mediated issue development theory, 
but rather aspects of the theory will inform the discussion section. 
 
4.11 Acknowledgement of the limitations of the methodological approach 
 
While arguing that this research offers a contribution to knowledge about the coverage 
of climate change in the Irish print media, it is necessary also to acknowledge its 
limitations. Firstly, the incomplete nature of the data recorded in the LexisNexis database 
for Ireland means that there are gaps in the data. The research design attempts to 
overcome these lacunae, but it must be acknowledged that (i) the inconsistency of the 
media record over time and (ii) the absence of certain titles (such as the Irish edition of 
the Sunday Times) and the inadequate recording of others (such as the Herald) constitute 
a limitation of this research.  
 
Furthermore, the decision to reduce the data sample by choosing to analyse only stories 
of greater than 500 words means that many shorter news articles have been excluded. 
Tabloid stories, which tend to be shorter than stories published in broadsheet titles, are 
more likely to be excluded as a result of this decision. The focus on longer articles may 
also mean that comment articles may constitute a greater proportion of the sample 
analysed that might otherwise be the case. However, the reduced sample of 706 climate 
articles remains representative, replicating the same peaks, troughs and trends of the 
complete sample, and longer articles proved richer in nuance and complexity than shorter 
news reports.  
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The analysis of newspaper articles about climate change did not include consideration 
of news sources. That journalists tend to use official sources and routine news channels, 
and thereby support the political and economic status quo (Hall et al., 1978) “is one of 
the most reproduced findings in the study of journalism” (Carlson, 2009, p. 529). 
Furthermore, the intentions of sources shapes the presentation of information as “events 
look different to different people; who is asked shapes what is reported as true” 
(Carlson, 2016, p. 239). There is a considerable overlap between how news is framed, 
and the sources used in its construction (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007), but it is 
possible to argue that the power to frame the news rests ultimately with the journalist-
author, despite the influence of official sources. This framing power in turn influences 
how the public receives and perceives certain emphasised aspects of events or issues 
reported in the media. 
 
4.12 Conclusion 
 
The research question, and the methods employed in attempting to answer it, have been 
set out in this chapter. A robust, mixed methods approach, solidly grounded in the 
existing literature, was employed. Initially, a quantitative content analysis was carried 
out, identifying every story mentioning climate change, global warming or greenhouse 
effect appearing in eight Irish national newspapers over the 2007-2016 period. This 
corpus (n = 12,865) was reduced by two measures: firstly, stories containing fewer than 
500 words were eliminated, reducing the corpus to 6,959; secondly, every 10th story was 
selected from this reduced corpus, giving a final representative sample of 706 stories. A 
frame analysis of these stories was carried out, using a typology of frames drawn from 
the existing media coverage of climate change literature. The results of the data analysis 
were then triangulated with interviews with journalists, politicians and media advisors. 
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The theory of mediated issue development put forward by Nisbet and Huge (2006) as an 
explanation of how and why certain issues rise and fall on the media and policy agenda 
was brought to bear on the analysis of the results.  
 
This research aims to measure and analyse Irish media coverage of climate change over 
a given time period, and to investigate aspects of issue dynamics. Therefore, the 
prioritisation of issues by journalists and politicians and the amount of media attention 
given to climate change relative to other issues is of interest. In the following chapter, 
the results produced by the employment of these data collection, description and analysis 
methods are set forth and discussed. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Irish print media’s coverage of climate change  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the empirical findings of my research are set out and analysed in the 
context of other research into fluctuations in, and influences on, media attention levels 
for environmental issues. The significance of the findings of this research in relation to 
theories concerned with the dynamics of media attention are also discussed.  
 
In the opening sections, the quantitative data are presented. These comprise the levels of 
Irish print media attention for climate change from January 2007 to February 2016, levels 
of coverage in each publication, and various attributes of climate change articles (story 
type and authorship). The levels of climate change coverage are also compared to general 
news coverage levels, as recommended by the authors of a “best practice” guide for 
researchers into media coverage of climate change (Schäfer et al., 2016). Subsequently, 
the results of the frame analysis are presented. The frequency of the frames outlined in 
Chapter 4, Figure 4.3 are outlined. The coding methodology allows for the coding of 
dominant frames (the frame appearing at the top of the article, through which the article 
is predominantly presented) and secondary frames. These are also analysed.  
 
In the latter sections, the implications of these descriptive findings are discussed and 
compared to the findings of other scholars, especially with regard to framing. They are 
also placed in the context of theoretical approaches to media attention, such as attention 
cycles (Downs, 1972) and mediated issue development (Nisbet and Huge, 2006). 
 
	 153	
It is useful to establish at the outset why findings in relation to the extent and nature of 
climate change may be significant. Firstly, establishing levels of media attention is a 
means of measuring the salience of climate change to the public and to policy domains, 
as audiences equate the prominence of an issue in the media with its importance relative 
to other issues (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Ungar, 2000b; McCombs, 2004). The public 
also gets most of its information about scientific issues such as climate change from the 
mass media (Nelkin, 1987; Wilson, 1995), so it is reasonable to assume that, in the 
absence of media coverage of climate change, the public would be largely uninformed 
about the issue. Secondly, establishing how climate change is framed in the media is 
helpful because the way in which a topic is presented in the media – rather than simply 
how often it is presented – can affect public attitudes and engagement. Technical and 
administrative framings may have a distancing effect, while more emotive framings, such 
as moral or political frames, may be more engaging (Nisbet, 2009). Thirdly, the 
authorship of climate change articles is also important, both for public engagement with 
the issue, but also in promoting higher levels of coverage. When a scientific topic such 
as climate change is covered primarily by science writers, it tends to be framed in dry 
and technical terms. When it is covered by general news reporters or by political 
correspondents, it is framed in more engaging ways. A move from the science section 
into the main news section, or the politics section represents a promotion up the news 
agenda, leading in turn to more extensive coverage (Nisbet & Huge, 2006). Thus, the 
amount of coverage, how it is framed, and who writes it can have significant influences 
on the effect such coverage has on the public (Nisbet, 2009), on other journalists (Galtung 
and Ruge, 1965; Harcup and O’Neill, 2001) and on politicians and policy-makers 
(Newell, 2000). 
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5.2 The level of print media attention for climate change in Ireland 
 
Irish print media coverage of climate change follows well established international 
patterns: it peaks around international climate conferences and the release of international 
climate science reports (see Fig 5.1). Coverage gradually increases from 2007 onwards, 
with distinct peaks in November/December 2007, December 2009 and December 2015. 
The November (196 stories) and December (300 stories) 2007 peak coincides with (i) the 
publication of the Synthesis Report of the IPCC’s AR4 on November 16, 2007, and (ii) 
COP 13 in Bali from December 3-15, 2007.  
 
Fig 5.1: Number of climate change articles published in Irish national newspapers, Jan 2007-Feb 
2016 
 
 
The Bali conference is noteworthy in that it was the first COP to take place following the 
appointment of two Green Party ministers to government in June, 2007. One of these, 
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the conference. The Irish Times sent their environment editor Frank McDonald to cover 
the event and several Irish ENGOs also attended. Furthermore, the conference witnessed 
an unexpected change of policy direction by the United States to enable an agreement to 
be reached (McDonald, 2007). These factors – the drama of the event itself, the presence 
of a larger than usual Irish delegation, and the novelty of a newly appointed Green Party 
minister – were likely factors in increasing the level of media attention for climate change 
at that time. The Bali COP of 2007 agreed a “roadmap” as to how future climate change 
negotiations were to be conducted. By 2009 and COP15 in Copenhagen, there were 
expectations of a binding global agreement to limit GHG emissions (Fisher, 2010).  
 
Media coverage of climate change both in Ireland and internationally shows a steep 
decline in late 2009 and early 2010, a period which coincides with the global financial 
crisis. In late 2009, Ireland was in the middle of a long drawn-out banking crisis and 
finally availed of a €64bn financial rescue package from the IMF, the European Central 
Bank and the European Commission in 2010 (Breen, 2012; Fraser, Murphy and Kelly, 
2013; Palcic and Reeves, 2013).  
 
A second peak in Ireland’s print media coverage of climate change occurs in December, 
2015. The seven titles studied published a total of 345 stories mentioning climate change 
in that month, exactly the same number as they published in December 2009. The 
December 2015 peak coincides with COP21 in Paris, just as the December 2009 peak 
coincided with COP15 in Copenhagen. The Paris Climate Change Conference –which I 
attended (Robbins, 2015) – took place at the Le Bourget conference venue outside Paris. 
It was attended by 30,000 delegates and 6,000 journalists applied for accreditation 
(Howard, 2015). This is roughly equivalent to the number of registrants for COP15 at 
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Copenhagen, but much higher than the attendance at other previous COPs. For instance, 
COP13 in Bali had 10,828 registrants and COP11 in Montreal had 9,474 registrants 
(Fisher, 2010). It is interesting to note that COP15 and COP21, both were significant in 
that final treaty texts were expected to be agreed at both events, are equivalent in terms 
of attendance levels and media attention.  
 
5.3 Comparison of climate change coverage and total news coverage 
 
In their “best practice” guide for researchers of media coverage of climate change, 
Schäfer et al recommend measurements of media attention for the issue be normalised:  
“To analyse issue attention as a process of selecting one issue over others given limited 
editorial space, however, it is necessary to normalise these measures, e.g. by relating the 
number of CC-related articles to all articles published in a given medium over a given 
time span (see Schmidt et al. 2013; Schäfer et al. 2014). Such measures control for the 
size of the news hole and thus yield data comparable across outlets, time periods, or 
countries” (Schäfer et al., 2016, p. 7).  
 
This was achieved by setting the parameters of the search within the LexisNexis database 
(date range and newspaper titles) but leaving the search term field blank. This method 
returned all news items for the titles with the specified dates. As LexisNexis does not 
allow searches to return more than 3,000 articles, this exercise entailed 670 individual 
searches (five searches per month, over 134 months). In their study of 27 countries from 
1997-2009, Schmidt et al found that the average percentage of total news coverage 
concerning climate change was 0.60%. The authors found that countries with a high 
Climate Risk Index had higher levels of media attention for climate change, but that 
countries likely to suffer future negative impacts from climate change, as forecast by their 
placing on the DARA Vulnerability Factor, did not show increased levels of media 
coverage of climate change. Countries whose economies depend to a greater extent on 
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carbon-intensive industries show an increased level of climate change coverage 
(Schmidt, Ivanova and Schäfer, 2013). Ireland has a low Climate Risk Index score (Sönke 
et al., 2015) and a low to moderate exposure to climate vulnerability (DARA Climate 
Vulnerability Monitor, 2012). 
 
The authors note that, over the 27 countries they studied, two distinct periods of media 
attention for climate change could be identified.  In the 1997-2000 period, coverage was 
relatively low, although it had increased somewhat from the early 1990s. In the period 
2004-2009, a larger increase was recorded, what the authors call a “clear shift” (Ibid, p. 
1240). Their findings for Ireland show that coverage of climate change was 0.27% of 
total news coverage for the 1997-2000 period (against an average over 27 countries of 
0.20%); 0.51% for the period 2001-2005 (average = 0.29%) and 1.82% for the period 
2006-2009 (average = 1.26%) (Ibid. p. 1241). Thus, Ireland recorded above average 
levels of coverage for each of the three periods identified by Andreas Schmidt and his 
colleagues. However, it should be noted that Schmidt et al’s analysis is based on levels 
of coverage in the Irish Times only. As will be discussed is a subsequent section, the Irish 
Times has consistently covered climate change more extensively than other Irish 
newspapers, and therefore these findings cannot be said to be representative of Irish 
newspaper coverage more generally. 
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Fig 5.2: Climate change stories as a percentage of total news coverage by year 
 
 
 
The findings of this research align with those of Schmidt et al with regard to the period 
up to 2009: Irish newspaper coverage of climate change accounts for 1.76% of total news 
coverage in 2007, before falling slightly to 1.36% and 1.29% in 2008 and 2009 
respectively (see figure 5.2). The post-2009 decline seen in the total levels of news 
coverage is also starkly evident when the coverage of climate change is examined as a 
percentage of total news coverage, falling to 0.77% in 2010, 0.59% in 2011 and 0.33% 
in 2012. My research finds that news coverage mentioning climate change comprises 
0.843 of total news coverage over the entire time period studied. Although direct 
comparisons with Schmidt et al’s findings are not possible because the time periods under 
examination differ, some remarks may be made about the time periods when the two 
pieces of research overlap. Schmidt et al note that climate change coverage reached its 
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comprised 1.82% of total news coverage during that period. My research finds that, for 
the somewhat shorter period of 2007-2009, the equivalent figure is 1.47%. The difference 
can be explained by the fact that Schmidt and his colleagues recorded coverage from the 
Irish Times only, whereas my research records coverage from seven national newspaper 
titles.  
 
5.4 Coverage of climate change: how Irish newspapers compare 
 
Figure 5.3 below shows the total number of climate change stories published by the 
newspapers under study in the period January 2007 to the end of February 2015. It is 
immediately evident that the Irish Times has published considerably more climate-related 
stories than the other publications. Taking the three most significant peaks in coverage 
as points of comparison, in December 2007, the Irish Times published 143 climate stories, 
compared to 60 by the Irish Independent, 42 by the Irish Examiner, 21 by the Sunday 
Independent, 20 by the Sunday Business Post and 10 by the Sunday Tribune. The Irish 
Times (143) published nearly as many climate stories as the other publications combined 
(157). In December 2009, the Irish Times published 184 climate stories, compared to 60 
by the Irish Examiner, 54 by the Irish Independent, 24 by the Sunday Business Post, 13 
by the Sunday Tribune and 10 by the Sunday Independent. In this instance, the Irish 
Times’s total of 184 was more than all the other newspapers combined (161). In 
December 2015, the Irish Times total was 143, while the other newspapers (Irish 
Independent 72; Irish Examiner 69; Irish Daily Mail 28; Sunday Independent 33) 
amounted to 202. It total, over these three peak periods, the Irish Times’s story total of 
470 compares to a combined total of 520 for all the other publications. This finding is 
aligned with other research: the Irish Times was also the “dominant news organisation” 
reporting on low-carbon transition and decarbonisation between 2000 and 2013 
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(McNally, 2015). There is other evidence that the Irish Times published significantly 
more climate change-related articles than other Irish print titles (Mullally et al., 2013; 
Wagner and Payne, 2015; Robbins, 2016). 
 
It is also evident that the dominance of the Irish Times when it comes to climate change 
coverage is declining. In December 2009, it published 184 climate stories, compared to 
60 from the Irish Examiner and 54 from the Irish Independent, its nearest rivals, a 
difference of 60 stories; in December 2015, the Irish Times published 143 stories, just 
two stories more than the total of 141 published by its two closest competitors. In April 
2014, the Irish Times published 48 climate-related stories, but both the Irish Independent 
(40) and the Irish Examiner (30) were close behind in the extent of their own coverage. 
 
In figure 5.4 below, the extent of climate change coverage in publications excluding the 
Irish Times is shown. The Irish Independent and the Irish Examiner are the two dominant 
publications once the Irish Times is excluded. Otherwise, a fractured picture is evident, 
with several publications providing extensive coverage at certain points and showing 
much reduced levels of coverage at others. The relative decline of coverage levels in the 
Irish Times and the relative increase seen in the Irish Independent may be influenced by 
staffing issues at the two newspapers. Frank McDonald, the long-serving environment 
editor of the Irish Times, retired in June 2015. For some time before his retirement, he 
contributed mostly feature articles and was less concerned with reporting day-to-day 
environmental news. Up to 2007, McDonald had been assisted by an environment 
correspondent. This post was left vacant when Liam Reid left to become an advisor to 
the Green Party Minister John Gormley. With regard to the national broadcaster RTÉ, 
the post of environment correspondent was left vacant from 2010 to 2014 following the 
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departure of Paul Cunningham to another post. As it has been found that the media tend 
to cover issues and events already in the media, (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Harcup and 
O’Neill, 2001; Denham, 2014), the absence of a dedicated environment correspondent at 
the national broadcaster meant that an important intermedia agenda-setting effect was 
absent. Cunningham’s replacement was given the role of covering the environment and 
agriculture (RTE, 2014). The organisation in fact placed “agriculture” ahead of 
“environment” in the job title of this new role, and the appointee spoke at some length 
about the food sector, the farming backgrounds of his parents and the “great prospects 
for increased output and jobs” in the agriculture sector, before mentioning global 
warming (Ibid.). Others have pointed out the “inherent contradiction” of joining these 
two journalistic portfolios into the same role (Cunningham, personal interview, April 24, 
2015) given that agriculture contributes almost 30% of the country’s total emissions 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2013). More recently, Kevin O’Sullivan has stepped 
down as editor of the Irish Times and has been appointed to the post of Environment 
Editor. Meanwhile, at the Irish Independent, Paul Melia was appointed environment 
correspondent in February 2008. The effect of employing a dedicated environmental 
correspondent on the levels and nature of environmental coverage is examined in the 
discussion section. McDonald, Cunningham, O’Sullivan, Reid and Melia have been 
interviewed for this thesis. Their remarks are presented and analysed in the following 
chapter. 
 
A comparison between Ireland and Europe is possible by comparing the data compiled 
for this research with that of the International Collective on Environment, Culture and 
Politics (ICECaPs) based at the Co-operative Institute for Research in Environmental 
Sciences (CIRES) at the University of Colorado at Boulder. The CIRES project monitors 
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52 newspaper sources across seven regions using the LexisNexis, Proquest and Factiva 
databases (McAllister et al., 2017). The metric used by CIRES is average number of 
climate change stories per publication (i.e. the total number of climate change stories for 
a territory or region is recorded, and the total is then divided by the number of sources). 
I have used the same methodology to arrive at a similar measurement for Ireland. In figure 
5.5 below, it is evident that Irish print coverage of climate change follows the broad 
patterns of European coverage, exhibiting similar peaks and troughs, but at a lower level 
of overall coverage. However, it should be noted that the CIRES dataset for Europe is 
heavily UK-centric. The papers tracked by CIRES for Europe are: the Times and Sunday 
Times, the Sun, the Observer, the Guardian, the Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday, the 
Daily Mirror and Sunday Mirror, the Daily Telegraph and Sunday Telegraph, the 
Financial Times, the Independent, the Scotsman and Scotsman on Sunday (all UK), El 
Pais (Spain), the Irish Times (Ireland), and the Sofia Echo (Bulgaria). Several important 
territories, such as France, Germany, Italy and the Scandinavian countries, are absent 
from the CIRES dataset. 
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Fig 5.3: Coverage of climate change: number of stories per title, Jan 2007-Feb 2016 
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Fig 5.4: Stories per title Jan 2007-Feb 2016, excluding the Irish Times 
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Fig 5.5: Comparison of Irish and European coverage of climate change  
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Fig 5.6: World Newspaper Coverage of Climate Change 2004-2016 
 
McAllister, L., Nacu-Schmidt, A., Andrews, K., Boykoff, M., Daly, M., Gifford, L., and Luedecke, G. (2017). 
World Newspaper Coverage of Climate Change or Global Warming, 2004-2017. Center for Science and 
Technology Policy Research, Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences, University of 
Colorado, Web. [Accessed December 20, 2016]. 
 
5.5 Characteristics of Irish newspaper stories about climate change  
 
It is important to note that not every story containing the search terms “global warming” 
or “climate change” or “greenhouse effect” is primarily concerned with the climate 
change issue. Often, climate change is mentioned as one topic among many in stories 
about politics or policy, or it is alluded to as one factor among several others in 
considering other global issues, such as the refugee crisis, for instance. Stories which were 
primarily focussed on climate change were coded as such, and stories making substantial 
reference to the issue but in which climate was not the main topic were coded as having 
climate change as a secondary focus (see Boyd & Paveglio, 2012 and Mercado, 2012 for 
similar coding methodologies) . Stories with climate change as their main topic comprise 
39% of the corpus, and stories with climate change as a secondary focus comprise 61%.  
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Stories mentioning climate change were also coded as to story type. As was set forth in 
the previous chapter, stories were coded as either simple (single-source, basic) or complex 
(multiple-source) straight news stories, features, opinion articles, regular columns or 
editorials. Articles which allow for the presentation of the writer’s opinion (columns and 
opinion articles) account for 38% of the total, while articles based on news gathering and 
reporting (simple and complex news stories and feature articles) account for 59%.  
 
Fig 5.7: Climate change coverage: story categories 
 
 
 
The LexisNexis database is unreliable in recording the authorship of climate change 
coverage. In instances where the writer’s name is given in a blurb or standfirst or is 
otherwise prominent in the original article, it is recorded by LexisNexis. Thus, where the 
author’s name forms part of the display text of the article, it is noted; where it forms part 
of the body text (for example, where the author’s name is placed at the top of the first 
column of text, or where the device of inserting the writer’s name at the end of the first 
paragraph is used), it is generally not recorded. Accordingly, the data on story authorship 
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is presented with the caveat that it is not comprehensive: in only 285 instances out of 706 
(just over 40%) was it possible to code for authorship. This admittedly imperfect analysis 
shows that regular columnists were the most represented in the coverage (87), followed 
by non-journalist guest experts contributing opinion articles (71). Specialist 
correspondents were also strongly represented (69). Professional journalists (specialist 
correspondents, news reporters and news agencies) accounted for 99 stories of the 285 
coded (34.7%), while non-journalist contributors (guest experts and columnists) 
accounted for 158 (55.4%). 
 
Fig 5.8: Climate change coverage: story authorship 
 
 
5.6 How Irish newspaper coverage of climate change is framed 
 
This section presents the results of the frame analysis carried out on the corpus of 706 
articles as described in Chapter 4. A total of 1643 frames were found in the articles. The 
Political or Ideological Contest frame was the most dominant, with 399 instances, or 
24.28% of the total number of frames. Other frames strongly represented are settled 
science (238 instances; 14.48% of all frames), the economic frame (215 instances, 
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13.08%), the disaster frame (191 instances, 11.62%) and the policy or technical frame 
(184 instances, 11.19%). Frames that were not prominent in the print media coverage of 
climate change include the agriculture frame (51 instances, 3.1% of all frames), the 
morality or ethics frame (148 instances, 9%), the opportunity frame (111 instances, 
6.75%) and the contested science frame (94 instances, 5.72%). The presence of the 
domestication or communitarian frame is almost negligible, with just 12 instances, or 
0.73% of all frames, recorded (see fig 5.9 below). 
 
Fig 5.9: Frequency of frames in Irish print media coverage of climate change  
 
 
When we come to look at the framing of climate change in each newspaper title, it is 
apparent that the framing is relatively evenly spread between the titles. Figure 5.10 
presents the total number of frames present in each newspaper. It can be seen that the Irish 
Times leads in each category, simply because it publishes more climate change coverage 
than its competitors. It is more useful to consider the percentage of each paper’s coverage 
coded to a particular frame.  
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Fig 5.10: Instances of frames per newspaper title 
 
 
When the data is presented in this manner, some interesting preferences are apparent: the 
Sunday Business Post and the Sunday Tribune have the highest percentage instance of the 
economic frame (19.67% and 19.01% respectively), while the Irish Daily Mail records 
the highest percentage for the contested science frame (16.7%, compared to 9.65% in the 
Irish Independent, the next highest total recorded). The Irish Examiner (19.26% of 
frames) and the Sunday Independent (20.83%) present much of their coverage through 
the disaster frame. The Sunday Independent and the Irish Daily Mail record considerably 
lower percentages for the settled science frame (8.33% and 5.56% respectively, compared 
to 16.43% in the Irish Times). The Irish Daily Mail records a high score of 22.22% for 
the morality or ethics frame, far more than the second highest score for this frame, the 
Irish Examiner (13.33%). The political or ideological contest frame is also relatively 
evenly represented in all seven newspaper titles, with the Sunday Independent (29.17%) 
favouring this frame slightly more than the Sunday Business Post (26.06%), the Irish 
Times (24.49%), the Irish Independent (23.68%), and the Sunday Tribune (22.95%). The 
Irish Examiner (19.26%) and the Irish Daily Mail (19.44%) recorded the fewest instances 
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of the political or ideological contest frame in their coverage. The specific approaches to 
coverage of climate change by particular newspaper titles is discussed in a subsequent 
section. 
 
Fig 5.11: percentage of each newspaper’s coverage devoted to particular frames 
 
 
In tracking the number of instances of each frame over time, it is evident that the political 
or ideological struggle frame largely mirrors the rise and fall of media attention in general. 
In other words, it is an ever-present frame through which climate change is presented. 
Other frames, such as the morality and ethics frame, become more prominent during 
international climate change conferences at which issues relating to climate justice may 
be discussed. The settled science frame and the disaster frame remain constant throughout 
the period under consideration and their frequency in the coverage seems unaffected by 
increases and declines in overall coverage (see figure 5.12 below). It is interesting to note 
that the contested science frame, which hit peaks in 2008 and 2013, is now largely absent 
from coverage of the issue. 
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Fig 5.12: frequency of frames by year, 2007 to 2016 
 
 
As mentioned above, the coding methodology allowed for the coding of dominant and 
secondary frames. Although mapping the frequency of frames throughout the coverage 
provides a base measurement of how climate change is framed, the examination of the 
extent to which certain frames dominate the stories in which they appear gives a second 
metric of their influence. For example, the political or ideological contest frame has 
already been established as the most frequently found frame in the corpus of 706 articles; 
by measuring the extent to which it is the dominant frame, its effect is more manifest. 
This frame dominates 28.1% of all climate stories, more than twice the number of the 
second most dominant, the disaster frame. 
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Table 5.1: extent to which frames are dominant in climate change coverage 
Frame	 Instances	of	
frame	
Number	of		
stories	
dominated		
by	this	frame	
Percentage	of		
stories	
dominated		
by	this	frame	
Political	 or	 ideological	
contest	
399	 199	 28.1	
Disaster	 191	 91	 12.8	
Settled	science	 237	 88	 12.4	
Economic	 215	 87	 12.3	
Morality	or	ethics	 148	 48	 6.7	
Contested	science	 94	 47	 6.6	
Policy	or	technical	 184	 45	 6.3	
Opportunity	 111	 30	 4.2	
Agriculture	 51	 20	 2.8	
Domestication	 or	
communitarian	
12	 2	 0.2	
 
 
It is interesting to note that the frequency of frames does not correlate to the extent to 
which they are dominant. For example, the settled science frame is strongly present in 
climate articles, accounting for 14.43% of all frames, yet it is the dominant frame in just 
12.4% of articles. Likewise, the influence of the policy or technical frame recedes, while 
the disaster frame become more powerful, when looked at through the metric of dominant 
frames. The relative salience of individual frames will be examined in more detail in the 
subsequent sections. 
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5.7 Inside the frames: a more detailed analysis 
 
 
In the following sections, the coverage of climate change coded to the 10 frames is 
examined more closely. In each case, further details relating to each frame, such as 
authorship and article type, are provided. The extent to which the frames are present in 
the various publications is also analysed, as is the extent to which each frame dominates 
the coverage in which it is present. 
 
In addition, secondary framing in stories is explored. This allows for a more nuanced 
analysis of media framing of climate change, permitting insights into which other frames 
most often appear alongside dominant frames. Furthermore, the text coded to each frame 
is subjected to a further level of coding to determine the particular sub-topics: the events 
and areas referred to in the coverage. Thus, the specific subject matter of the articles coded 
to a particular frame is uncovered. 
 
Lastly, the text relating to these sub-topics is examined and specific examples of climate 
change coverage are analysed. Having considered the frames at a macro level (their 
prevalence in the coverage and their general characteristics), and at a mezzo level (sub-
topics discussed by in stories dominated by particular frames), it is then proposed to look 
at the content coded to this frame at a more micro level: the level of the texts themselves. 
The most prevalent sub-topics are therefore analysed at the textual level. Trends and 
characteristics in the coverage coded to each frame are then identified. The findings of 
this analysis is then discussed and analysed in later sections. 
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5.8 The Political or Ideological Contest Frame 
 
The political or ideological contest frame dominates Irish print media coverage of climate 
change. It is found in 265 (37.5%) climate change stories. There are 399 instances of this 
frame within the corpus of 706 articles, accounting for 24.28% of all frames. It is the 
dominant frame in 199 articles (28.1%) and appears as a secondary frame in 200 other 
stories (28.3%).  
 
Given that the timeframe of this study encompasses an eventful period in Irish politics, 
the prevalence of this frame is not surprising. The issue of climate change was an 
important part of discussions between the Green Party and Fianna Fail following the May 
2007 general election, formed a central part of the programme for government agreed 
between the Greens, Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats in June 2007 (Ahern, 
Harney and Sargent, 2007) and was central to the policies promoted by the two Green 
Party ministers in the 27th and 28th governments of Ireland (Minihan, 2015). 
 
To recap, the political or ideological contest frame (see figure 4.3 in chapter 4) contains  
“references to summits, conferences and talks, to climate change as a political issue, to 
the stances on climate change of political parties or politicians, to political posturing in 
advance of climate talks, to political point-scoring and jockeying for position on the issue 
of climate change, to assessments as to who is ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ in the political battle 
to implement climate policies, to the ‘game’ of climate negotiation, to climate change as 
a battle between elites, and explicit references to a ‘left versus right’ conflict regarding 
the implementation of climate policies.”  
 
The political frame appears most frequently (65 instances) in complex news stories, 
reports of major events in which multiple sources are quoted. Indeed, political treatment 
of climate change is more common in journalism requiring news gathering (118 instances 
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in news stories and features) than it is in analytical journalism or commentary (76 
instances in editorials, regular columns and op-ed articles).  
 
Fig 5.13: Types of story in which the political or ideological contest frame was dominant 
	
 
 
Looking more closely at the authorship of climate change stories dominated by the 
political frame, the finding that a large majority of articles was written by professional 
journalists appears to be contradicted by a subsequent finding that columnists and non-
journalist guest experts were the more frequently recorded authors (see Figure 5.14 
below). However, this anomaly can be explained by the failure of the LexisNexis database 
to record story authorship comprehensively. In 68% of instances where political or 
ideological contest was recorded as the dominant frame, the authorship of the article was 
not recorded in the LexisNexis database. In the 32% of cases (64 instances) where 
authorship was recorded, non-journalist guest experts (17 stories), regular columnists (17) 
and specialist correspondents (18) were the dominant sources of content presented 
through this frame. The missing data from the LexisNexis database makes a 
comprehensive analysis based on story authorship impossible. However, it is wise to base 
inferences on the complete data (story type) rather than the incomplete (story authorship), 
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and the finding that climate change stories presented through the political frame are more 
fact-based and less polemical stands. 
 
Fig 5.14: Authorship of politically framed climate change stories 
 
 
The political frame is quite evenly represented in all newspaper titles. The lowest number 
of references coded to this frame occurs in the Irish Examiner, where it accounts for 
19.44% of all frames recorded, while the Sunday Independent records the highest 
frequency, at 29.17% of all frames recorded. (See figure 5.15 below). 
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Fig 5.15: Percentage presence of political frames per newspaper title 
 
 
Frames were recorded in two ways: the dominant frame (which appeared in the article’s 
first paragraph and/or was the main framing device used by the author) was recorded and 
the framing of particular sections of text was also coded. It is thus possible to examine a 
particular frame in two different ways: (i) by considering its overall presence in the data, 
and (ii) by analysing the extent to which it dominated the stories in which it was present.  
 
The Irish Times published far more stories dominated by the political frame (121) than 
any other newspaper (see Fig 5.16), while the Irish Examiner (9), the Irish Daily Mail (3), 
and the Sunday Tribune (5) published very few.  
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Fig 5.16: Newspapers publishing stories dominated by the political frame 
 
 
It is more instructive to note the relationship between occurrences of the political frame 
in each publication and the extent to which that frame dominates the coverage. When 
looked at in this way, it is apparent that, in the Irish Times and the Irish Independent, the 
political frame is dominant in just over half of the stories in which it appears, while the 
Sunday Independent the percentage is slightly higher, at 58.62%. In the Sunday Tribune, 
the Irish Examiner and the Sunday Business Post, approximately a third of stories 
featuring the political frame are dominated by it. The Irish Daily Mail records a figure of 
42.86%. It is apparent then that certain newspaper titles such as the Sunday Independent, 
the Irish Times, and the Sunday Business Post privilege the political framing of climate 
change, and that of these three, the Irish Times and Sunday Independent allow this frame 
to dominate more frequently than the other titles. 
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Table 5.1: Extent to which political framing dominates coverage 
Newspaper	
title	
Political	frame		
instances	
Political	frame		
dominant	
%	dominated		
by	political	frame	
Irish	Independent	 54	 29	 53.70	
Irish	Times	 228	 121	 53.07	
Sunday	Tribune	 14	 5	 35.71	
Irish	Examiner	 26	 9	 34.62	
Sunday	Business	Post	 37	 13	 35.14	
Irish	Daily	Mail	 7	 3	 42.86	
Sunday	Independent	 29	 17	 58.62	
 
With a view to looking more closely at representations of this frame in the Irish print 
media, secondary frames in articles dominated by the political frame were also examined. 
Thus, other frames present in primarily political stories were coded (see Fig 5.17). The 
economic frame is the most common secondary frame, occurring in 34% of political 
climate stories, followed by the morality and ethics (19%), policy or technical (13%) and 
contested science (12%) frames. The settled science frame (4%), the agriculture frame 
(3%) and the domestication frame (1%) are sparsely represented. 
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Fig 5.17: Secondary frames in articles dominated by the political frame
 
 
The strong presence of a secondary economic frame is the result of references to the 
economic impacts of climate policy formulated in the political arena; likewise, the policy 
or technical frame is the result of reporting on policy options for mitigation or adaptation 
measures. The finding that almost one fifth of stories primarily concerned with politics 
also contain a secondary moral framing is noteworthy. An example of this political-moral 
framing combination occurs in a report in the Irish Times on November 4, 2009, in 
advance of the UN COP15 in Copenhagen. The story concerns a boycott by the African 
countries of a stand of preparatory talks organised by the UN. Thus, the primary framing 
concerns the politics of climate governance at UN level. The journalist also seeks reaction 
to the boycott from NGOs. A spokesperson for the World Wildlife Fund puts forward the 
view that African countries are likely to suffer the most severe impacts of climate change 
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while having done least to cause it. This is essentially a “climate justice” argument, and 
therefore constitutes a moral or ethical framing. 
 
The relatively strong presence of a secondary framing of contested science (12%) in 
political coverage is also noteworthy. Examples of this combination occur in reports of 
US electoral politics and reports of Dáil debates on the climate issue. For example, a report 
on the views of prospective Republican presidential candidate Fred Thompson in the Irish 
Times on July 28, 2007 is primarily a political story, but contains a reference to the actor’s 
views on climate change, which he equated with a belief that the Earth is flat. A 
parliamentary report in the Sunday Business Post on July 6, 2008 noted that TDs 
(members of the Irish parliament) failed to distinguish between weather and climate, and 
that one TD remarked that his mother blamed the launch of the Sputnik spacecraft in 1957 
for changes in the climate. 
 
In looking more closely at the 399 instances of political framing in the corpus of 706 
climate change articles, it is possible to identify several sub-topics: the particular political 
arena or subject matter to which the coded text refers. The sub-topics identified are 
outlined below, while Table 5.2 shows the number of instances for each found in 
politically framed articles: 
 
(i) Climate change as political proxy: reference to a belief in the anthropogenic 
element of climate change, or to the existence of climate change at all, as an 
indicator of more general political orientation.  
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(ii) EU regulations: references to the political claims-making in relation to the 
setting of EU regulatory targets, such as CO2 emissions targets and exhaust 
emissions levels for motor vehicles. 
(iii) EU-level politics: references to the politics of EU climate and other policy, to 
Ireland’s stance in relation to EU policy, to EU policy in relation to diplomatic 
and economic orientation towards the US and the UN, and to the Nice and 
Lisbon Treaty referendum campaigns. 
(iv) G7, G8 and G20 summits: references to political statements and positioning 
in advance of and during international policy and economic summits of 
developed nations. 
(v) Ireland Greens: references to policies proposed by the Green Party of Ireland, 
to statements made by its members, to negotiations in relation to the formation 
of a coalition government between the Fianna Fáil, Progressive Democrat and 
Green parties following the 2007 general election in Ireland. 
(vi) Ireland party politics: references to domestic political debate and claims-
making in relation to climate policy, to assessment of party performance and 
critiques of ministers and party leaders. 
(vii) Ireland regulation: text concerning announcements of and reaction to 
regulatory policies proposed in Ireland, presented in a political frame without 
references to party politics. 
(viii) Politics of other territories: references to climate politics in foreign news 
coverage. The single instance of this sub-topic is found in an article concerning 
electoral politics in Australia published in the Sunday Tribune on December 
2, 2007. 
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(ix) UK politics: references to climate policy and politics in the United Kingdom. 
The two instances of this sub-topic concern UK security in the face of threats 
posed by climate change (Irish Times, March 14, 2007) and a meeting between 
the UK prime minister and prospective US presidential candidates at which 
climate change was discussed (Irish Times, April 18, 2008). 
(x) UN climate summits: references to political manoeuvring in advance of and 
during UN Conferences of the Parties (COPs). 
(xi) UN-level politics: references to statements made to the UN General Assembly 
referring to climate change or statements relating to climate change made by 
the UN Secretary General. 
(xii) US domestic politics: references to debates internal to the US on climate 
change, to the issue as a polarising one for evangelicals in the US and to 
proposed domestic mitigation measures. 
(xiii) US international politics: references to the US policy position in advance of 
and during international climate summits, to US-EU relations as they relate to 
climate change, and to US influence on global affairs. 
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Table 5.2: Sub-topics in politically framed coverage 
Topic	 References	
Climate	change	as	political	proxy	 2	
EU	regulations	 4	
EU-level	politics	 21	
G7,	G8,	G20	summits	 5	
Ireland	Greens	 18	
Ireland	party	politics	 35	
Ireland	regulation	 4	
Politics	other	territories	 1	
UK	politics	 2	
UN	climate	summits	 8	
UN-level	politics	 3	
US	domestic	politics	 7	
US	international	politics	 14	
 
Sub-topics relating to domestic politics (57 instances) and international politics (60) are 
evenly represented. The international politics total comprises 25 references to EU-related 
topics, and 35 references to broader global politics. The strong representation of outward 
facing coverage aligns with the earlier finding of this research that domestication and 
communitarian perspectives on climate change are largely absent from Ireland’s coverage 
of the issue. 
 
An example of the framing of climate change as a contest for advantage among domestic 
political actors occurs in a report of public forum on the topic organised by the Labour 
Party and Friends of the Earth in the EU Parliament offices in Dublin on June 24, 2009. 
The forum was addressed by then Labour Party leader Eamon Gilmore, who argued that 
the Taoiseach should take personal responsibility for climate change. Mr Gilmore on the 
one hand appears to acknowledge the gravity of the climate change situation, suggesting 
that a national response is required, but he appears to be seeking to score advantage over 
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a political rival by making him personally answerable on Ireland’s lack of climate action, 
rather than advancing any climate policy himself: 
Mr Gilmore said yesterday the gravity of the situation demanded a major national 
response and it was the responsibility of Taoiseach Brian Cowen to provide the leadership 
behind that response.  There is historical precedence. When there are major national issues 
that need to be addressed like the Northern Ireland peace process, the European Union, 
social partnership during the economic crisis in the 1980s, the political responsibility is 
transferred to the Taoiseach. Climate change targets need now to be seen in the same way 
as the peace process in Northern Ireland. The Taoiseach must take responsibility for it, he 
said. (Irish Times, June 25, 2009). 
 
Issues relating to climate change, such as energy independence, CO2 emissions targets 
and proposals to tax carbon coded to this frame are presented in the context of their impact 
on political popularity rather than their likely climate impact. In this example, nuclear 
power is presented in exclusively party political terms, while wider environmental and 
societal contexts are not presented: 
Eamon Ryan wants a public debate on nuclear power. The Communications and Energy 
Minister was responding to the British government's backing for a new generation of 
nuclear power stations to secure the UK's energy supplies. "The debate on nuclear is part 
of a wider debate on where we are going to get our energy from in the future," Ryan said. 
He suggested that the issue be taken up by the Oireachtas committee on climate change 
and energy security. But before asking people to consider the merits of a debate on nuclear 
power, Ryan should check the views of the larger party in the coalition government. Bertie 
Ahern has already rejected the nuclear power option. He aligned himself emphatically to 
the anti-nuclear camp last February at a Fianna Fail conference. At the same meeting in 
Galway, the then energy minister Noel Dempsey said there was "no proposal before 
government or contemplated by government to change" the statutory ban on generating 
electricity by nuclear means which had been in place for almost 30 years. (Sunday 
Tribune, January 13, 2008). 
 
Concern over climate change and other environmental issues are represented as political 
postures adopted to gain a perceived advantage in an analysis article concerning tensions 
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between the then Taoiseach (prime minister) Bertie Ahern and the Tánaiste (deputy prime 
minister) Brian Cowen, both member of the Fianna Fáil party: 
Ahern abhors confrontation while Cowen is ready to go toe-to-toe with an 
opponent.  Sources close to the Taoiseach say that while he was publicly praising the 
decisive role played by Cowen in the election campaign, in private Ahern was jealous of 
the credit given to him.  Still, two days after the election Bertie Ahern acknowledged his 
role and Cowen is now Tanaiste and Fianna Fail's leader-in-waiting. However, Cowen 
didn't see the Taoiseach's anointing of him as his successor as a favour.  The Tanaiste 
hated it.  Stories began to emerge in the media last weekend questioning Cowen's 
competence as Minister for Finance. Other sources said the Taoiseach had been 
highlighting his green credentials while questioning Cowen's commitment to the 
environment and climate change. (Irish Independent, April 11, 2007) 
 
Thus, climate change is portrayed as a policy area in which political advantage may be 
gained, or in which an opponent can be put at a disadvantage. Concern for the climate 
itself, or the benefits or otherwise of particular policies, appear secondary to concerns of 
political point-scoring. 
 
There are several instances of journalists seeking to delegitimise attendance at climate 
change conferences and other events abroad on the basis of cost and CO2 emissions 
incurred in travel. One such report concerns a trip by the then Minister for the 
Environment Phil Hogan to the Earth Summit (the UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development in Rio de Janeiro). The report describes the trip as “controversial” and 
foregrounds the costs involved:  
Mr Hogan and his department have spent almost €92,000 travelling to Europe and the rest 
of the world since he took office in March last year. The most expensive jaunt so far was 
a €28,847 trip to Durban, South Africa, to attend the COP 17 Climate Change Conference 
in Durban in December last year. Mr Hogan's delegation stayed six nights in the beach 
front Blue Water Hotel. Flights for the department's controversial three-day trip to the UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio earlier this summer cost €7,347 for four 
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of the members of the mission who attended. Accommodation costs for the group were 
the subject of much discussion between department officials and Ireland's Brazilian 
embassy and the final hotel bill for the trip has not yet been finalised. However, it was 
revealed that six members of the group dined out on the taxpayers' expense clocking up a 
€842.66 in one of the city's famous steak houses. (Sunday Independent, July 19, 2012). 
 
Other similar reports concerned trips by councillors to a range of events, including climate 
change events, in 2014 (Irish Daily Mail, April 29, 2014) and trips by government 
ministers to promote environmental messages on St Patrick’s Day (Irish Times, March 
10, 2007). 
 
In coverage of climate change dealing with EU politics, the issue is frequently presented 
as a purely regulatory challenge, with countries arguing for the establishment of emissions 
reduction targets that favour their own national interests. The wider context of global 
climate impacts is rarely considered. An example of this narrow portrayal of climate 
change as a challenge that can be met by agreeing emissions targets is provided by a report 
on negotiations concerning proposals from the EU Commission to reduce EU GHG 
emissions by 20% compared to 2005 levels by 2020. The Commission proposal also 
contained legally binding requirements for the EU to produce 20% of its energy from 
renewable sources by 2020, and to improve energy efficiency by 20% by the same date: 
The article depicts the negotiations as difficult, with Italy, Poland and Germany seeking 
concessions on these targets: 
Italy and Poland have both threatened vetoes unless their concerns over the cost to their 
industry is addressed, although there have been signs of compromise in the lead-up to the 
summit. Berlin and Rome want to exempt large portions of their heavy industries from 
having to pay for allowances to emit CO2 in return for their support for the package. They 
fear "carbon leakage" if they do not win concessions, whereby heavy industries simply 
move out of the EU to avoid the extra cost. Poland, which relies heavily on coal-fired 
power stations, says that forcing power stations to pay for all their emissions could lead 
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to a huge jump in electricity prices. Most diplomats expect a deal because failure would 
represent a huge setback for the EU. (Irish Times, December 11, 2008) 
 
The timeframe of this study encompasses the political campaigns in Ireland and elsewhere 
concerning the Lisbon Treaty, which consolidated the treaties of Maastricht (1993) and 
Rome (1957) to become the new constitutional basis for the EU (Dinan, 2010). Several 
instances of op-ed articles and news reports concerning the treaty’s implications for the 
EU’s role in global affairs occur in this coverage sub-topic. For example, Labour Party 
politician Ruairi Quinn and Sinn Féin politician Mary Lou McDonald argued “for” 
(Quinn) and “against” (McDonald) adopting the treaty in side-by-side articles in the Irish 
Times on December 13, 2007. Quinn wrote:  
I belong to that first generation of European citizens who grew up, fortunate in the 
prospect that I would never have to face a European war in which I could become a 
combatant. For my children, and their children, the global dimension is different. The 
prospect, now, of a European war is inconceivable. But the reality of global challenges 
confronts us all every day. Climate change, globalisation, migration and social justice are 
the new agenda with which we have to grapple. The combined strength and authority of 
the European Union acting together is the new instrument which my parents or I never 
had as citizens growing up in the Republic of Ireland. 
 
In her reply, McDonald did not refer to climate change, but rather based her opposition to 
the treaty on the grounds that, as she perceived it, it eroded democracy in the EU and 
failed to safeguard Ireland’s neutrality. Other instances also portray climate change as a 
supra-national challenge which can be dealt with only by a strong and united EU. A 
further example is given by an article by Micheál Martin, then a minister in the Fianna 
Fáil government, writing in support of the treaty:  
I support the Lisbon Reform Treaty because of two vital overall principles and because 
of many specific positive elements. First of all, the purpose of the treaty is to ensure that 
the EU is reformed so that it is more efficient and effective in meeting modern challenges, 
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such as energy, security, climate change, globalisation and cross-border crime. The world 
isn't standing still, so the EU must not or it will fall behind. Secondly, it is true to the core 
model of an EU which has worked so well in promoting Ireland's interests. (Sunday 
Business Post, May 25, 2008). 
 
Thus, coverage of the sub-topic of EU-level politics falls into two broad categories: the 
first, in which climate change is seen as a matter for regulations and targets rather than 
larger societal change, and a second, in which climate change is portrayed as a supra-
national threat against which the EU must unite. 
 
Despite the finding that media coverage of climate change peaks around international 
climate conferences, there are relatively few references to such conferences in texts coded 
to the political or ideological contest frame. Articles dominated by this frame refer to UN 
COPs (8 references), G7, G8 and G20 summits (5 references) or UN politics (3 references) 
are sparsely represented in politically framed coverage in the Irish print media.  
 
The coverage devoted to these international summits presents the issue of climate change 
as a metric by which the performance of political leaders may be measured. This trend of 
personification has been identified as a journalistic norm (Galtung and Ruge, 1965) and 
as a feature of climate change imagery used by the mass media (Smith and Joffe, 2009; 
O’Neill and Smith, 2014). In a report concerning the G7 summit in Krün, Bavaria, the 
relative potency of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French president François 
Hollande are assessed:  
True to the Merkel method, the final G7 communiqué was an incremental agreement that 
made modest steps forward on pressing global issues, in particular UN agreements 
looming this year on climate change and development goals. First, Merkel set aside time 
for a public breakfast with Barack Obama, a clear effort to restore transatlantic ties 
burdened by the Snowden revelations. But in doing so Merkel only emphasised how she 
	 191	
has become Obama's go-to leader in Europe. French leader François Hollande has some 
climate-change momentum for end-of-year talks in Paris. (Irish Times, June 9, 2015).  
 
In addition to representing climate change as a measure of the efficacy of particular 
political leaders, the issue is also “personified” as a measure of national standing in 
relation to the climate issue. An example of the framing of climate change as a global 
contest among political and economic forces occurs in a report from Davos in which 
global climate policy is presented as a competition for dominance between the US and 
China:  
A good example of this happened yesterday in the General Congress Hall during a debate 
on climate change where Bi Jingquan, vice-chairman of China's National Development 
Reform Commission, had this to say about US energy policy: "The United States contains 
4.7 per cent of the world's population and consumes 22 per cent of the world's energy. 
When China develops its energy consumption model in the future, we will never copy the 
US mode." Highlighting consumers' fondness for SUVs in the US, Mr Jingquan went on 
to say that far from dictating the world's climate agenda, it might look at what the East 
was doing. "We must develop the public transportation sector in urban areas. In China, 
we have the largest public transportation system in the world" he said, a hint of triumph 
on his face. (Irish Times, January 26, 2007). 
 
A more explicit use of this strategy or game frame occurs in a report about COP17 in 
Durban: 
China has raised the stakes in the game of climate poker being played here by yesterday 
affirming publicly and for the first time that it would be willing to sign up for a legally-
binding international agreement to combat global warming. On a blustery day in the South 
African city of Durban, China’s chief negotiator, Xie Zhenhua, told a packed press 
briefing his country, the world’s number one carbon emitter, would be prepared to 
negotiate such a deal if the EU and others renewed the Kyoto protocol. Mr Xie, who is 
vice-chairman of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, spelled out a 
number of other conditions, including the delivery of promised aid to poorer developing 
countries to help them cope with the impacts of climate change. (Irish Times, December 
6, 2011).  
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In considering the sub-topics dealt with in articles coded to the political or ideological 
contest frame, it is clear that coverage of domestic and international politics represents 
climate change as a policy issue offering opportunities for gaining political advantage or 
inflicting political damage. The coverage at EU level portrays climate change as an issue 
in which narrow sectoral interests must be defended against onerous regulation, while also 
suggesting it is a bloc-wide challenge in the face of which Europe must unite. The strategy 
framing is also prevalent, with a winners-and-losers narrative strongly present, and the 
issue is personified both by individual leaders and countries. 
 
5.9 The Agriculture frame 
 
 
The agriculture frame was relatively sparsely represented in the corpus of 706 climate 
change articles. It was present in just 34 stories (4.83% of total), and was the dominant 
frame in 19 of these (2.69%). It was most prevalent in the Irish Independent (11 instances, 
4.82% of frames present in that publication) and the Irish Examiner (8 instances, 5.93%), 
while the Irish Times (11 instances, 1.93%) and the Irish Daily Mail (1 instance, 2.78%) 
recorded low percentage representation of this frame. 
 
Fig 5.18: Frequency of agriculture frame in Irish newspaper titles 
	
	 193	
	
	
Opinion articles were the most common story type dominated by the agriculture frame (7 
instances, 35%), followed by feature articles (5 instances, 25%), complex news stories (4 
instances, 20%), simple news stories (2 instances, 10%) and regular columns (2 instances, 
10%). Journalism requiring news gathering, such as simplex and complex news stories 
and feature articles, and opinion journalism, such as op-ed articles and personal columns, 
are evenly represented in stories dominated by the agriculture frame. 
 
Fig 5.19: Types of story dominated by the agriculture frame 
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(3 instances) by regular columnists, 20% (2 instances) by specialist correspondents and 
10% (1 instance) by a general reporter. 
 
Fig 5.20: Authorship of stories dominated by the agriculture frame 
 
 
Looking at the secondary frames present in the 19 stories dominated by the agriculture 
frame, it is noteworthy that frames emphasising policy or technical responses to climate 
change are strongly present (29%), as are frames emphasising opportunity (21%) and 
economic aspects (17%). Articles dominated by the agriculture frame are not overly 
concerned with politics or ideology (8%), morality or ethics (4%) or disaster (4%). An 
acknowledgment that climate change is anthropogenic in origin and requires urgent action 
is well represented in agriculture stories (13% of secondary frames), while frames 
undermining the scientific consensus on climate are relatively rare (4%). 
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as being involved in the stewardship of the environment, or of having responsibilities to 
future generations, is largely absent from media coverage of the topic. 
 
It is also noteworthy that the domestication or communitarian frame, which seeks to 
present Ireland’s emissions-reduction efforts as futile in the context of global emissions, 
is entirely absent from articles dominated by the agriculture frame. The secondary framing 
emphasises dry, technical or policy aspects of climate change, but does not seek to 
undermine climate science or to foreground Ireland’s self-interest as an argument against 
mitigation or adaptation measures. 
 
Fig	5.21:	Secondary	frames	in	articles	dominated	by	the	agriculture	frame	
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followed by references to politics, both at EU and national level (13 instances). It is 
interesting to note that there are several references to how climate change impacts on 
agricultural production, but only one direct reference to agriculture’s impact on the 
climate. The references to emissions from agriculture occur in the context of EU targets 
and national emissions profiles rather than in the context of climate impacts (See figure 
5.22 below). 
 
Fig 5.22: Sub-topics in articles coded to agriculture frame 
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October 14, 2014, which quotes the then Minister for Agriculture Simon Coveny (Fine 
Gael party):  
“We are not talking about taking agriculture off the hook in terms of its responsibilities, 
but to simply force Ireland to reduce its emissions from agriculture by reducing its herd 
size misses the point in terms of what we're trying to achieve," he said." This is a global 
problem. If we produce less, someone else somewhere else in the world will fill that gap, 
and in all likelihood that someone else will be producing food with a higher carbon 
footprint than Ireland." Mr Coveney added that Ireland had the lowest carbon footprint 
per litre of milk in the EU. 
 
A tangential concern expressed by farmers and farming organisations is that, were Ireland 
to reduce its beef production, meat imported from Brazil would take its place. Again, the 
argument is made that weaker environmental standards elsewhere would lead to an overall 
increase in global emissions were Ireland to attempt to cut its own emissions from 
agriculture. This argument is made in an article appearing in the Irish Times on November 
26, 2007: 
“The social and environmental damage associated with Brazilian beef production is 
totally ignored by those promoting this trade, including retailers, but it is clearly 
documented. The UN Commission on Human Rights has reported on the worker 
exploitation and slave labour problem on Brazilian ranches. Environmentalists have 
linked the five-fold increase in beef exports from Brazil in recent years with the rapid 
destruction of the rainforests in the Pantanal and Amazon regions, which is a major cause 
of global climate change. Brazilian beef fails to meet EU standards. It fails to meet the 
standards demanded and expected by European consumers. It exposes Europe to the 
unnecessary risk of foot and mouth disease. The evidence requires that it be banned.” 
 
These arguments constitute a subtle form of communitarianism by arguing against 
emissions reduction measures in Ireland on the basis that producers elsewhere will “fill 
the gap”. Communitarian arguments usually support the advancement of national interests 
by placing them at a higher level of importance than global, or cosmopolitan ones. By 
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suggesting that global interests will be harmed by Ireland taking mitigation measures in 
the agricultural sector, this argument appears to wrap a communitarian argument in 
cosmopolitan clothing. 
 
An article which was published over two pages in the Irish Daily Mail on Saturday, 
November 2, 2013, also refers to the proportion of Ireland’s emissions contributed by 
agriculture, but suggests that reducing them may be counter-productive because climate 
change is in fact beneficial to Irish agriculture. The article bears the headline: “Why are 
we so afraid of global warming? Whatever is causing it, the planet is getting hotter. But 
the Irish have no need to panic: a brave new thesis shows how it could bring wine, warmth 
and prosperity to our rain-sodden shores”. The article contains an interview with Professor 
Richard Tol, a Dutch academic specialising in the economic impacts of climate change. 
Professor Tol worked for the Irish research body the Economic and Social Research 
Institute (ESRI) and has contributed to the IPCC assessment reports (Working Group II) 
on the economic impacts and opportunities of climate change (DeSmog, 2016). Professor 
Tol has links to various climate denial organisations and has been involved in a lengthy 
attempt to dispute the finding by Cook et al. (2013) that 97% of climate scientists support 
the hypothesis of anthropogenic global warming (Nuccitelli, 2014; Tol, 2014). Professor 
Tol is seen by many as engaging in a kind of climate change denial identified by 
Rahmstorf (2004) as “impact sceptics” (Harman, 2014). The headline immediately 
suggests there is some dispute about the cause of climate change by including the 
introductory phrase “whatever is causing it…”. The headline also characterises Professor 
Tol’s research as “brave”, already casting his views in a positive light for the reader. The 
article itself is written by Paul Drury, now deceased and a former editor of the Evening 
Herald and Irish Daily Mail who also worked as a motoring correspondent for the Irish 
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Independent. Drury also wrote op-ed articles for the Irish Daily Mail. In this article, he 
puts forward the view that, because CO2 is necessary for plant growth, more CO2 in the 
atmosphere will lead to more plant growth. Warmer temperatures will lead to lower 
heating bills and fewer deaths caused by low temperatures. Humans will adapt to the 
extreme weather caused by climate change, and concerns about “peak oil” have been 
dispelled by the oil and shale gas extractive technology of fracking. The author concludes 
that: “In other words, there are, it would appear, infinitely more positives to global 
warming - at least in the short term - than there are negatives.” 
 
Insofar as it deals with aspects of climate change relating to agriculture, the article states 
that rising global temperatures will enable the production of crops which were heretofore 
unsuited to the Irish climate. Other articles suggest that climate change will have negative 
impacts on Irish agriculture, such as an article published in the Sunday Tribune on October 
21, 2007 outlining a variety of crop and animal diseases that had already been detected in 
Ireland. The article quotes a soft fruit farmer concerned about the milder winters caused 
by climate change and the effect of higher winter temperatures on his crop, and includes 
an analysis by Professor John Sweeney of Maynooth University that lower summer 
rainfall will affect potato production. 
 
In news coverage of climate change dominated by the agriculture frame, agricultural 
politics was the second most frequent sub-topic, with 13 instances in the 34 stories 
containing the agriculture frame. Topics mentioned included the appointment of Phil 
Hogan, the former Minister for the Environment, as EU Agriculture Commissioner (Irish 
Times, November 4, 2011), reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (Irish 
Independent, August 23, 2013; Irish Examiner, March 16, 2011) and the political dangers 
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of conflict with the agricultural lobby (Irish Times, March 17, 2009; Irish Examiner, 
March 16, 2011).  
 
An article in the Irish Examiner on December 18, 2010 encapsulates the inherent 
contradiction in Ireland’s climate policy: the impossibility of reducing emissions while 
increasing agricultural output. The article concerns a climate change bill the Green Party 
was bringing to government: 
The Green Party leader said the bill is aimed at delivering on the Government's 
international commitments to reduce carbon emissions. The short-term target is to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by an average of 2.5% annually by 2020 compared to 2008. 
The medium-term target is to reduce carbon emissions by 40% by 2030. The long-term 
target is an 80% reduction by 2050, compared to 1990 emissions. Mr Gormley said: "The 
structure of the bill provides a strong legislative framework for a core objective on 
transition to a low-carbon, climate-resilient and environmentally sustainable society. I am 
acutely aware of particular concerns in the agricultural sector, but I believe the bill poses 
absolutely no threat to the sustainable future of agriculture in Ireland." 
 
Responses to the proposed legislation are then sought from farming and environmental 
groups. The then Irish Farmers’ Association president John Bryan points out that the aims 
of the bill run counter to the growth strategy for the agricultural sector contained in the 
Harvest 2020 policy document, and states that any emissions reduction measures initiated 
in the agricultural sector would damage the economy and lead to job losses:  
“This proposed legislation flies in the face of the Government's own expansion plans for 
the agriculture sector as set out in the Food Harvest 2020 Report and will have a hugely 
damaging effect on the recovery of the economy." The proposals fail to recognise the 
many positives around agriculture, especially our sustainable model of farming and the 
carbon sink in both our permanent pasture and our forestry." Mr Bryan said that the 
climate change legislation fails to include a proper calculation of greenhouse gas 
emissions, as it fails to include the positive impact of Ireland's grassland base and forestry 
in its environmental impact calculations. John Bryan said: "It is ludicrous that Ireland 
could introduce emission reduction targets way in excess of those proposed by other 
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countries, while at the same time countries such as Brazil destroy Amazonian rainforests 
and allow their greenhouse gas emissions spiral out of control." 
 
In conclusion, it is evident that agricultural framings of climate change are dominated by 
technical measurements of emissions and by national political considerations. Climate 
impacts on agricultural production feature strongly in the coverage, while the impacts on 
the climate from agricultural emissions are not explicitly described. There is an implicit 
acceptance that such emissions are harmful, but the discourse quickly moves on to 
questions about the legitimacy of the emissions targets themselves or the wisdom of 
attempting to implement them. The rhetorical strategy of the IFA in suggesting that low 
carbon intensity agriculture in Ireland would be replaced by higher carbon intensity 
production in Brazil is also strongly present in the coverage. It is also apparent that 
potential beneficial impacts of climate change are presented, yet the potential benefits of 
a low-carbon or decarbonised agricultural sector are not.  
 
 
5.10 The Contested Science frame 
 
 
The contested science frame has a significant presence in the Irish media’s coverage of 
climate change. There are 94 instances of this frame in the corpus of 706 articles 
mentioning climate change, accounting for 5.72% of all frames. A total of 78 articles 
(11.04% of the corpus) contain this frame. It is the dominant frame in 47 articles, 
accounting for 6.65% of dominant frames. So, although this frame is not strongly present 
in Irish coverage, it is nonetheless significant and dominates a larger number of stories 
that other, more prevalent frames, such as the policy or technical frame (184 instances, 
	 202	
but dominant in 45 articles) or the opportunity frame (111 instances, dominant in 30 
articles). 
 
It has been argued that the presence in the media of sceptic perspectives on the existence 
of climate change, its anthropogenic element, or the wisdom of mitigation or adaptation 
measures contributes to public uncertainty about the issue, leading to a lack of individual 
engagement and political action (Moser and Dilling, 2004; Painter, 2015). Therefore, 
media attention to contestations of climate science, or to the wisdom of climate action, 
may have wider societal impacts.  
	
 
The contested science frame appears most often in the journalism of opinion. Of the 47 
articles dominated by this frame, 34 (72.3%) are either newspaper editorials, op-ed 
opinion articles or opinion columns, while only 9 (19.1%) feature news-gathering 
journalism (news stories and feature articles). Although, as has been noted above, the 
LexisNexis database does not provide a comprehensive dataset of article authorship, it is 
often possible to discover authors’ names by searching a particular news outlet’s website. 
Several of the regular columns expressing sceptic views were written by two columnists 
who return to the topic of climate change from time to time: Kevin Myers, a career 
journalist and opinion writer, writing in the Irish Independent, and Maurice Nelligan, a 
retired heart surgeon, writing in the Irish Times. The content of their media texts is 
discussed in more detail below. 
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Fig 5.23: Types of story dominated by the contested science frame
 
 
Figures 5.24 and 5.25 present the prevalence of the contested science frame in each 
publication. In terms of frequency, this frame is found most often in the Irish Times (44 
instances) and the Irish Independent (22 instances). However, it is more instructive to 
consider the percentage of each newspapers frames devoted to the contested science 
frame. Looked at in this way, the Irish Times, although it has published the most instances 
of this frame, devotes just 4.73% of its total frames to contested science. The frame is 
more strongly present in the Irish Independent, with 9.65% of that newspapers total 
frames featuring contested science. The frame is most strongly present in the Irish Daily 
Mail, where it accounts for 16.67% of all frames. 
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Fig 5.24: Instances of contested science frame by publication 
 
Fig 5.25: Contested science as a percentage of all frames per publication 
 
 
As has been the case with the analysis of other frames, the data relating to article 
authorship is incomplete. In roughly half of the 47 articles dominated by the contested 
science frame (51%) details as to authorship is not recorded in the LexisNexis database. 
Of the remaining 23 stories for which a “byline” was recorded, it is apparent that op-ed 
writers and opinion columnists feature strongly (see fig 5.26 below), with non-journalist 
guest experts and columnists accounting for 73% of articles, and journalists 
(correspondents and reporters) contributing 13%. 
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Fig 5.26: Authorship of articles dominated by the contested science frame 
 
 
In the secondary framing of climate change in articles dominated by the contested science 
frame, the economic frame is strongly represented. In one quarter of stories dominated by 
contested science, the economic frame appears as a secondary frame. Settled science is 
the next most prevalent secondary frame, present in 15% of cases. It is helpful to note in 
this context that the contested science frame contains reference to sceptic views, including 
occasions on which the author mentioned such views in order to dismiss or counter them. 
As Nisbet remarks: “…frames as general organising devices should not be confused with 
specific policy positions; any frame can include pro, anti, and neutral arguments, though 
one position might be more commonly used than others” (2009, p. 18). 
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Fig 5.27: Secondary frames in stories dominated by the contested science frame
 
 
The 94 instances of this frame were also analysed to discover the sub-topics referred to in 
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(v) Distraction from more pressing concerns: suggestions that climate change is 
merely one of many global issues demanding attention, such as population 
growth, energy or food; 
(vi) Honest broker: this sub-topic refers to a journalistic persona in which the 
writer assumes the mantle of an “Everyman” to ask seemingly innocent and 
well-meaning questions about the validity of climate science; 
(vii) Hubris: references to the impotence of mankind in the face of the grandeur of 
nature, implying that our species is incapable of agency regarding the climate; 
(viii) Mitigation unwise or counterproductive: references to various mitigation 
measures, such as the adoption of renewable energy sources, as ineffective or 
possibly dangerous; 
(ix) Positive impacts: references to climate change as a benefit to people or 
territories; 
(x) Religion or orthodoxy: references to a belief in the reality of anthropogenic 
global warming and the necessity for urgent action as a dogma whose 
adherents are intolerant of diverse views; 
(xi) Reportage on sceptic views or organisations: reports on the statements or 
actions of sceptics which do not express support for such views, or which 
mention these views in order to refute them. 
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Fig 5.28 Sub-topics in articles dominated by the contested science frame 
 
 
Media texts contained in the contested science frame, and which communicate direct or 
indirect contestations of climate science, present a broad range of established sceptic 
arguments. In Rahmstorf’s (2004) typology of climate denial, they are mostly trend 
sceptics (who deny climate change is occurring) or attribution sceptics (who accept it’s 
happening, but dispute the anthropogenic element). Often, the edifice of climate science 
is dismissed in its entirety, as an impenetrable “ism” or “ology”. 
 
Two particular sub-topics dominate contested representations of climate change: 
disputing climate science (30 instances) and reports concerning the activities or 
statements of sceptics (26 instances). Sub-topics which dismiss concern over climate 
change as being either a fringe concern or part of a quasi-religious orthodoxy – without, 
it should be noted, dealing with the substantive findings of climate science – are also 
strongly present in the coverage, accounting for a total of 28 instances. 
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Several articles coded to the contested science frame suggest that climate change is not 
occurring, or that it is a result of solar activity. For instance, an article by columnist Kevin 
Myers in the Irish Independent on May 6, 2008, states that weather data confirms the non-
occurrence of global warming: “…what we hear of weather around the world does suggest 
that the simple slide to disaster so beloved of Warmism's doom-merchants is simply not 
occurring.” This sentence contains two separate aspects of sceptic discourse: that climate 
change is not happening, and that climate science is an ideology (an “ism”). 
 
Myers returns to the topic of climate change several times during the period under study, 
often to dismiss concerns over climate impacts as unwarranted. Myers does not deal with 
specific findings of climate scientists, but rather offers broad characterisations of these 
fields of scientific inquiry as contradictory and alarmist. For instance, he ridicules the 
number of scientific disciplines involved in climate science by adding “kitchensinkology” 
to oceanography and others, and states that calls for adaptation or mitigation measures 
amount to “worldwide hysteria” (Irish Independent, January 4, 2011). 
 
A more explicit reference to the theory that solar activity is causing increased 
temperatures on Earth occurs in a discursive comment article on the agreement between 
the Fianna Fáil party and the Green Party to enter government together following the 2007 
general election in Ireland. The author (political reporter Jody Corcoran) makes sarcastic 
reference to Fianna Fáil’s environmental record in government before concluding that 
emissions-reduction measures sought by the Green Party may be unnecessary:  
The harder truth is that we are now powerless, even if we accept the argument that the 
emission of greenhouse gasses is mainly responsible for global warming.  In fact, the 
Earth is getting hotter because the sun is burning more brightly than at any time during 
the past 1,000 years. A study by Swiss and German scientists suggests that increasing 
radiation from the sun is responsible for recent climate changes.  Most scientists agree 
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that greenhouse gases from fossil fuels have contributed to the warming of the planet in 
the past few decades but have questioned whether a brighter sun is also responsible for 
rising temperatures.  It is doubtful that even Bertie Ahern can convince the sun to shine 
less forcefully. And for all their great idealism, it is doubtful that the Greens will make a 
significant impact on the other, man-made, causes of climate warming. (Sunday 
Independent, June 17, 2007) 
 
Other examples of media texts directly disputing the findings of climate science occur in 
the Letters to the Editor section. Certain sceptic arguments are put forth, which are often 
rebutted in responses published in the same section subsequently. In this example, a range 
of several sceptic arguments is concisely presented (for a refutation of each of them, see 
www.skepticalscience.com):  
Firstly, a clear majority of scientists say that our understanding of global climate change 
is so inexact as to render making policy decisions based on it foolish in the extreme. 
Secondly, many solar scientists are predicting that, by 2020, the sun will be starting into 
its weakest Schwabe solar cycle of the past two centuries. This will probably lead to 
unusually cool conditions on Earth. Thirdly, some scientists say that the current warming 
blip is also visible on Mars; that is almost certainly not caused by my car. Fourthly, the 
current cooling blip might be entirely because of the unusually high temperatures caused 
by El Nino in 1998 making it seem as though we are cooling down when measured since 
then. (Letter to the editor, Irish Independent, December 31, 2007) 
 
The argument that climate change is due, not to human influences, but to natural climate 
variability, is also present in the data. For instance, John Fingleton, a meteorologist with 
Met Éireann, Ireland’s national weather service, puts forward this natural variability 
argument, while his colleague Gerald Fleming, states that recent weather extremes are 
due to climate change: 	
For Fingleton, however, talk of global warming was an annoyance. “Wet summers are 
part of the Irish climate,” he said. “I remember '85 and '86 and I remember my father 
telling me about '58 being desperate as well. It happens about every 20 years. It's a natural 
part of the Irish cycle.” … If we are in a period of irresistible climate change, as suggested 
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by Gerald Fleming, then we need to make detailed plans to cope with its consequences. 
If, as argued by Fingleton, these last two summers amount to little more than an 
aberration, then the planning can be more specific, targeting areas that we know are 
vulnerable to flooding in times of heavy rain. (Sunday Tribune, August 17, 2008). 
 
There are several instances of coverage which accepts the climate is changing, but treats 
the suggestion that human activity has anything to do with it as an open question. Such 
references are often parenthetical, as in the following example from the “An Irishman’s 
Diary” column in the letters page of the Irish Times: 
The latest suggestion is that it also has 400 years of fossil fuel resources, at a time when 
the world is wondering what part – if any – man plays in global warming and what part is 
down to the natural and recurring phenomenon of climate change, and the spinning of the 
Earth on its axis. (December 21, 2009) 
 
 
An article in the Irish Times Saturday magazine presents a forceful dismissal of climate 
science. The article contains an interview with Ken Ring, an amateur meteorologist from 
New Zealand known as the “Moon Man” due to his belief that lunar cycles are a primary 
influence on the Earth’s weather. The article is presented in a question-and-answer format, 
rather than journalistic prose, and his replies go unchallenged. In the article, Ring is asked 
whether he believes humans are capable of influencing the weather:  
“Not at all - not one iota. Global warming was an idea funded by Maggie Thatcher in the 
late 1970s because she needed an excuse to close down coal mines in order to ease the 
entry of British Oil nuclear generators in return for funding her election campaign. When 
you have half of the world in freezing winter at the same time as the other half is suffering 
heat waves, and when half of the world is in night time and the other half in daylight: 
what is the global temperature at that moment? There isn't one. It's like talking about 
global happiness. You can't say it's either decreasing or increasing because there's nothing 
to compare it to. They've only been taking valid measurements since the 1950s or so 
because of the standardisation of weather systems and the verification of them. And even 
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now they're not truly standardised: they're sometimes on rooftops or at airports next to jet 
engines.” (Irish Times, March 23, 2013) 
 
 
Several articles coded to the contested science frame could be described as presenting an 
“honest broker” approach, in which the author presents themselves as an “Everyman” 
willing to be convinced by “either side” in a hypothetical argument about the existence of 
anthropogenic global warming, or as an honest guide to the reader trying to understand 
scientific complexities. These arguments often begin with an exposition of the scientific 
case for climate change, before entering several sceptic caveats. Such an approach 
characterised an article on climate change in which the author begins by presenting 
themselves as a disinterested citizen attempting to arrive at a sensible conclusion: 
I still can't decide whether the environmentalist lobby is a type of pseudo-religious 
complex or a genuine scientific inquiry. End-of-the world-itis has manifested itself with 
regularity down the ages. The current global obsession with it - especially in the 
developed world - may be some sort of spiritual manifestation in the face of the 
overwhelming reality of global secular materialism. Like most religious believers, 
environmentalists seem riddled with guilt. One can't argue with thermometers: the globe 
is warming as it has done before in the past, but the question now is: why? The CO2 
argument has become almost unstoppable. Despite many significant scientific sceptics, it 
has already generated a significant global industry. (Sunday Business Post, December 20, 
2009. 
 
A similar representation of the author as a typical “Everyman” occurs in an article 
concerning the efficacy of individual efforts to reduce GHG emissions. In this case, the 
author – a feature writer and music critic – adopts a passive persona of one awaiting 
persuasion, rather than that of an active citizen prepared to seek information: 
I'm one of what I suspect to be a growing number of people who are uneasy with the 
subject. I'm under no illusions that the human race has done huge damage to the 
environment but nobody is able to offer me empirical evidence as to the effectiveness of 
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trying to reduce one's carbon footprint. And what about carbon offsetting, another of those 
bandied about terms? How effective is that. Is it all a load of codswallop, a PR initiative 
that promises much but delivers little? (John Meagher, Irish Independent, May 10, 2008) 
 
Yet another example of the “honest broker” approach to presenting sceptic representations 
of climate change occurs in an article written by William Reville, an associate professor 
of biochemistry and science awareness officer at University College Cork and author of a 
long-running column on science in the Irish Times. Reville concedes his lack of expertise 
in climate science, yet states the importance of entertaining the views of sceptic scientists. 
The consensus among climate scientists that human activity is the main cause of observed 
climate change since the 1950s is 97% (Cook et al., 2013), and many of the remaining 
3% have been shown to have ties to the fossil fuel industry (McCright & Dunlap, 2014; 
Oreskes & Conway, 2010).  
There is a scientific consensus that the world is gradually warming and the majority of 
scientists believe that this warming is caused by man-made emissions of greenhouse 
gases, principally carbon dioxide. However, a not-insignificant minority of scientists 
disagree and believe that the current warming phase is caused largely by other factors, for 
example changes in solar activity. I am not expert enough in meteorology and climatology 
to critically adjudicate on this matter and, so, I accept the conclusions of the majority of 
experts in this area. However, I strongly believe that we must listen thoughtfully to the 
minority of independent experts who advance contrary evidence. (Irish Times, January 
15, 2009). 
 
There are 13 instances of text presenting weather and climate as interchangeable. There 
has been some debate over the use of the terms “climate change” and “global warming” 
in communicating about changes to Earth’s climate. For instance, Frank Luntz, a political 
strategist, suggested to the Republican Party in the US that “global warming” sounded 
more threatening, and that Republican politicians should use “climate change” instead. A 
member of a focus group run by Luntz remarked that “climate change ‘sounds like you’re 
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going from Pittsburgh to Fort Lauderdale.’ While global warming has catastrophic 
connotations attached to it, climate change suggests a more controllable and less 
emotional challenge” (Luntz, 2002, p. 142). Of course, the terms are not interchangeable: 
“global warming” refers to the rise in the average mean temperatures on the Earth’s 
surface, while “climate change” refers to a range of climactic and environmental changes 
caused by the trapping of GHGs in the Earth’s atmosphere. One of these changes is the 
rise on global temperatures. Thus, global warming is a consequence of climate change: 
“Global warming refers to surface temperature increases, while climate change includes 
global warming and everything else that increasing greenhouse gas amounts will affect” 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration; see also Wayne, 2015). However, using 
the terms has different effects on audiences (Ding et al., 2011; Villar and Krosnick, 2011), 
and presents the possibility to rhetorically undermine the existence of climate change 
during spells of cold weather. 
 
Several examples of the rhetorical use of unseasonable weather to delegitimise climate 
science occurs in several columns by Kevin Myers: “It was the coldest April for more 
than 20 years: so what is the meaning of this thing, "global warming"? (Irish Independent, 
May 6, 2008); “We have become the Falklands of the North Atlantic, yet we apparently 
are still experiencing "global warming".  (Irish Independent, March 26, 2013). Myers is a 
controversial figure, having left the Irish Times, where he had written the “Irishman’s 
Diary” column for many years, to join the Irish Independent. Most of the Myers articles 
in this corpus date from his time at the Independent, but more recently he moved again, 
this time to the Irish edition of the Sunday Times. On July 30, 2017, he was sacked 
following the publication of a column offensive to Jewish people (Logue and Gallagher, 
2017). In general, Myers employs a two-fold approach when writing about climate 
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change: in contrasting cold conditions in the present with long-term warming trends, he 
confuses weather and climate and makes scornful references to environmental policies, 
such as energy efficient light bulbs or renewable energy (Irish Independent, January 8, 
2009). 
 
Often, the references to cold weather as a refutation of climate science are made as fleeting 
asides. An example of such parenthetical dismissal of climate change is found in a fashion 
article from the Irish Daily Mail on April 8, 2013: “In a climate such as ours – and I think 
we can all agree, as we shiver into April, that we can forget global warming – tweed is 
the most most natural, and attractive, defence against the elements.” Another such 
example occurs in a column by Maurice Neligan. Neligan, since deceased, was a retired 
cardiac surgeon with a prominent media profile. He was the author of a weekly column 
in the Irish Times on medical matters and the concerns of bourgeois life, such as wine and 
travel. He wrote in the Irish Times on February 17, 2009: “It snowed in Dublin last night. 
I wondered if anybody had told God about global warming. If so, I wish He would get 
His act together because we’re freezing down here.” 
 
There is also a strain of commentary in journalistic content coded to the uncertain science 
frame which seeks to dismiss those concerned about climate change as unworthy of 
serious consideration. These references often refer to “lunatic” environmentalists or 
“nutters”. They comprise a blanket delegitimisation, a characterisation of the writer as 
being among a sane majority and those with whom they disagree as being “other”. For 
instance, an article weighing the advantages of reducing one’s carbon footprint by taking 
fewer flights, quoted Ryanair chief executive Michael O’Leary as “denouncing 
‘environmental nutters’ who were ‘persecuting’ the aviation industry (Irish Independent, 
January 13, 2007). An article on COP15 in Copenhagen contains a characterisation of 
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climate activists as “unspeakably superior moral-high-ground environmentalists who 
dwell on their ‘infallible’ climatic knowledge” of whom the author is “weary” (Sunday 
Business Post, December 20, 2009). 
 
A typical example of this representation occurs in a business-page article about an attempt 
by the Ryanair airline to distance itself from its image as aggressive towards its customers. 
The article contains a quote from the company’s chief executive Michael O’Leary on the 
subject of citizens concerned about the environment:  
“We want to annoy the fuckers whenever we can. The best thing you can do with 
environmentalists is shoot them. These headbangers want to make air travel the preserve 
of the rich. They are luddites marching us back to the 18th century. If preserving the 
environment means stopping poor people flying so the rich can fly, then screw it.” (Irish 
Independent, April 2, 2014). 
 
In a sarcastic aside, Maurice Neligan remarks that “Mother Ireland is rearing them yet” in 
relation to objections by environmentalists to involvement by a leading biologist in a 
project in the Burren (Irish Times, December 23, 2008). He also makes sarcastic reference 
to “Minister Gormley…cycling to Poland to get global warming back on track”, a project 
he described as “Bloody nonsense” (Irish Times, December 16, 2008). The same author 
considers climate mitigation measures in a subsequent article in which he looks forward 
to a holiday:  
To make it worse some humourless bore will start prating to us about global warming and 
saving the planet and explaining to us how some penal carbon tax will make us all feel 
better. Such lectures had better avoid our holiday centres as anybody coming out with that 
doleful rubbish would run a high risk of being run out of town on a rail. As it is we’ll have 
to wait for the next election for that satisfaction. (Irish Times, August 4, 2009). 
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There is considerable media attention given to reportage on the claims, statements and 
actions of climate sceptics. Much of this content contains expositions of sceptic positions, 
but only as a starting point from which they can be countered or rebutted. An example 
occurs in the unsigned ‘Present Tense’ column in the Irish Times which considers the 
difficulties of communication the complexities of climate change: 
There's a serious point to all this. The languages of science and economics are difficult 
ones for the layman to stick with, so making it easier for sceptics to speak more directly. 
Increasingly, such sceptics are getting their place on the airwaves and in the papers, partly 
because they offer something a little more novel than the environmentalists, but also 
because their message doesn't need to be put across using percentages and per-capita 
figures. Those who warn of climate change must also explain that it's a complex issue, 
based on a variety of global, demographic and industrial factors. They must present 
apparently contradictory information. For instance, the sight of a polar bear drifting on a 
melted block of ice like a forlorn version of the Fox's Glacier Mints icon will always pluck 
the heart strings. But it is confusing to then learn that polar bear numbers are actually on 
the rise. Sceptics, on the other hand, can prey on the complex language of science. They 
can offer clarity and simplicity by blaming global warming on such easily-grasped notions 
as "natural cycles", and only need to do this repeatedly until enough people begin to doubt. 
(December 15, 2007). 
 
Other articles falling into this “reportage” category are news stories concerning the tactics 
of climate sceptic organisations, such as this report concerning the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC:  
The American Enterprise Institute - a neo-conservative think-tank based in Washington, 
which has received funding from Exxon-Mobil - was reported yesterday to have sent 
letters to scientists and economists, offering them $10,000, plus expenses, if they were 
prepared to write articles debunking the IPCC's latest findings. (Frank McDonald, Irish 
Times, February 3, 2007). 
 
The reporting on, and critique of, climate sceptics prominently features the work of John 
Gibbons, a former columnist on environmental matters with the Irish Times, a member of 
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the Climate Change Committee of An Taisce, and a prominent blogger on climate related 
issues. For instance, Gibbons draws parallels between industry efforts to oppose the ban 
on CFCs in 1978 and more recent efforts by the fossil fuel industry to stop or delay 
emissions reduction measures:  
The US Environmental Protection Agency instituted a ban on CFCs in aerosols in 1978. 
The US emerged as the clear world leader in tackling the ozone threat, and its influence 
meant many other countries quickly fell into line. The CFC manufacturers weren't going 
to give up without a fight. In July 1975, for instance the chairman of DuPont described 
ozone depletion as "a science fiction tale, a load of rubbish . . . utter nonsense". This line 
may sound familiar if you've been listening to climate change sceptics recently. (Irish 
Times, June 19, 2008). 
 
In another column, Gibbons considers the role of RTÉ (now Newstalk) broadcaster Pat 
Kenny in voicing, and giving a platform to, sceptic views. Gibbons opens the article with 
a reference to the Irish Academy of Engineering’s report Ireland at Risk: Critical 
Infrastructure – Adaptation for Climate Change (2009). The report warns of “social and 
economic disaster” (Ibid, p. 4) unless adaptation action is taken. Gibbons contrasts the 
urgency of the report with the suggestion made by Kenny on his radio show (featuring an 
interview with climate scientist Wolfgang Knorr, postdoctoral fellow in the Department 
of Physical Geography and Ecosystem Science at Lund University) that the Earth is 
coping well with the increase in GHGs, accusing the presenter of embarking on a “bizarre 
tangent” about the CO2 content of human exhalations. The article continues:  
 
Kenny then informed his guest that 98% of the heat generated on this planet comes from 
the outside, it’s actually solar energy; are we being a bit panicky about what’s going on 
down here on Earth? Knorr may have been too polite to point out that a similar portion of 
the energy on Venus is also of solar origin. However, high levels of heat-trapping CO2 
there have created a cauldron with surface temperatures of 480C. (Irish Times, November 
19, 2009). 
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Other related content features reporting on the polarisation of opinion on climate change 
in the US, such as an interview with a US government official:  
IF US president Barack Obama doesn’t get re-elected in November, Gina McCarthy 
knows where she would like to spend the next four years: Vancouver. As assistant 
administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), she s had enough of all 
the climate change denial in Washington and muses openly about going into exile. 
McCarthy had never been to Vancouver but was so bowled over by how civilised it is that 
she half-joked about the idea of sitting out a Republican presidency – along with James 
Goldstene, executive director of California’s powerful Air Resources Board – until the 
right-wing, anti-environmental agenda ran its course. Clearly frustrated by political 
sentiment in the US Congress, which led to the defeat of cap and trade legislation aimed 
at cutting carbon emissions, she told the Globe conference in Vancouver last week that 
the visceral opposition to it was driven by a refusal to deal with – or even recognise – the 
reality of climate change. (Frank McDonald, Irish Times, March 30, 2012). 
 
 
There are several instances of attempted rebuttal of sceptic views contained in letters to 
the editor. One such concerns Ryanair’s Michael O’Leary, who addressed the Oireachtas 
Committee on Transport in July 2008. The letter is written by Ciaran Cuffe, a leading 
Green Party politician:  
Like a latter-day Willy Loman in Arthur Miller's play, Death of a Salesman, he [O’Leary] 
has failed to realise that the world has changed, and he must learn the new rules of the 
game. He was at it again on Wednesday, addressing an Oireachtas Committee on 
Transport. Ironically next door the Climate Change Committee listened to submissions 
on the European Union's proposals for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Surely by now 
O'Leary must realise that times have moved on, and it is only fair that the aviation sector 
picks up the tab for its fair share of the costs of climate change…O'Leary feels a switch 
to nuclear power might save the day, but even a doubling of nuclear power worldwide 
would only lead to a 5 per cent reduction in global CO2 emissions, and his arguments 
distract from the need to conserve energy and use it wisely. He also confuses weather with 
climate, perhaps an understandable mistake to make when you spend time listening to 
climate change sceptics such as Nigel Lawson. (Irish Times July 18, 2008). 
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The ‘Climategate’ controversy also appears in the coverage of contested climate science. 
In this example, the theft of emails from the University of East Anglia is put in wider 
contest by the Science Editor of the Irish Times: 
Similar public naysaying has begun to percolate around the issue of climate change. 
People are told things will get warmer but then we get a major cold snap and people are 
ready to dismiss all the scientific facts piled up about climate change. Their scepticism 
was fuelled by the embarrassing e-mails either leaked or hacked from the University of 
East Anglia s Climate Research Unit. They pointed to manipulation of facts and tailoring 
of data in support of a human cause for global climate change. Put ‘climategate’ into your 
web browser to see how a powerful counter-culture view has sprung up on the issue. Yet 
if East Anglia disappeared under the waves of the rising sea level tomorrow, the research 
findings of another 2,400 scientists will still indicate anthropomorphic climate change is 
a reality. (Dick Ahlstrom, Irish Times, February 5, 2010). 
 
An article syndicated from the Financial Times engages with several sceptic arguments 
directly. The article, which appeared in the business section, appeared under the heading 
‘Eight ways to tackle climate change’: 
An analysis of abstracts of 11,944 peer-reviewed scientific papers, published between 
1991 and 2011 and written by 29,083 authors, concludes that 98.4 per cent of authors who 
took a position endorsed man-made (anthropogenic) global warming, 1.2 per cent rejected 
it and 0.4 per cent were uncertain. Similar ratios emerged from alternative analyses of the 
data. A possible response is to insist that all these scientists are wrong. That is, of course, 
conceivable. Scientists have been wrong in the past. Yet to single out this branch of 
science for rejection, merely because its conclusions are so uncomfortable, is irrational, 
albeit comprehensible. This leads to a second line of attack, which is to insist that these 
scientists are corrupted by the money and fame. To this my response is: really? Is it 
plausible that a whole generation of scientists has invented and defended an obvious hoax 
for (modest) material gains, knowing that they will be found out? It is more plausible that 
scientists who reject the typical view do so for just such reasons, since powerful interests 
oppose the climate consensus, and the academics on their side of the debate are far fewer. 
(Irish Times, May 22, 2013). 
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It can be seen that the sceptic dismissals of climate science (30 instances) have been met 
with a robust response in the 25 instances of articles refuting or debunking sceptic 
arguments. It would appear that frank and open statement of sceptic arguments – such as 
suggesting that climate change is caused by solar activity, lunar cycles, or that climate 
change is not happening at all – are met with straightforward counter-arguments. The 
parenthetical dismissals, or the sarcastic references to people concerned about climate 
change, such as those written by Kevin Myers and Maurice Neligan, are less open to 
challenge insofar as they do not engage directly with the findings of climate science, but 
rather seek to ridicule those proposing climate action or the adaptation or mitigation 
measures they propose. 
 
A related strand of contested science content presents climate science as an orthodoxy or 
a religion whose adherents are not amenable to argument. Sometimes climate science is 
compared to Marxism or communism, such as this reference to noted climate sceptic 
Bjorn Lomborg in the Irish Independent on January 13, 2007: “Bjorn Lomborg claimed 
in his seminal book The Sceptical Environmentalist that environmentalism is an ideology 
just like Marxism, which also pretended to be a 'scientific' theory of economic relations.” 
Kevin Myers also compares climate science to Marxism, and also to Catholicism, 
suggesting supporters of climate action are immune to sceptic arguments (Irish 
Independent, May 6, 2008). Maurice Neligan also compares supporters of climate action 
to religious extremists in his Irish Times column of December 23, 2008: “Easy on the 
Yule logs Sir Walter, in this year of grace such behaviour would bring some jihadist out 
of the woodwork screaming about global warming.” Columnist Mary Ellen Synon, 
writing in the Irish Daily Mail on March 11, 2013, repeats a frequently used sceptic tactic 
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of pointing to the so-called Little Ice Age (roughly 1350-1850) as an example of dramatic 
climate change occurring without human interference: 
Innocent VIII is, however, mocked today for his 1484 Bull against witchcraft. But 
consider his position. Climate change was leading to crop failure and mass starvation. The 
conventional wisdom of the time blamed the temperature changes on witches. In fact, we 
now know that this period between about 1300 and the late 1400s, known as the Little Ice 
Age, was likely to have been caused by low sun-spot activity. But at the time, witches and 
their incantations destroying crops was sold as the explanation. Just as now industrialists 
and their fossil fuel are sold as the explanation. It is likely Innocent was no more 
misguided in 1484 than the anti-capitalist witch-hunters of the Green movement are now. 
 
Other texts coded to the contested science frame contain characterisations of climate 
change suggesting that climate change will in fact bring beneficial effects to Ireland, that 
the media, political and civil society focus on climate change is a deliberate tactic to 
distract attention from other issues, that climate scientists are dishonest or corrupt and that 
mankind is guilty of hubris in thinking that the human species is powerful enough to affect 
nature. In the following section, examples of these characterisations are briefly set forth: 
 
(i) Positive impacts: there are three examples of this characterisation of 
climate change. One (Irish Independent, July 31, 2010) states that the 
Blasket Islands were created by a post-glacial rise in sea levels and that “if 
rising sea levels can produce such a captivating scene, the effects of global 
warming can’t be all bad.” The two others concern the Irish Daily Mail’s 
interview with Prof Richard Tol (November 2, 2013), analysed above. Prof 
Tol suggests that increased levels of CO2 will be beneficial for agricultural 
output. 
(ii) Distraction from more pressing concerns: this characterisation of climate 
change occurs three times in the corpus of 47 articles containing a 
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contested science frame. An article in the Irish Times on May 25, 2008, is 
typical of this approach, suggesting that many in the developing world are 
too concerned with day-to-day survival “to spend precious time worrying 
about ecological niceties”. Kevin Myers argues (Irish Independent, June 
24, 2009) that climate change is such a pre-occupation of the UN because 
the greater problem of over-population is too contentious to be discussed. 
(iii) Discrediting climate scientists: there are six instances of texts suggesting 
that climate scientists are corrupt or conspiratorial. Three of these (Sunday 
Business Post, December 6, 2009; Irish Times, February 4, 2010; Irish 
Independent, July 31, 2010) refer to the ‘Climategate’ controversy as 
evidence of climate scientists’ dishonesty. A letter to the editor of the Irish 
Independent (December 31, 2007) states that “the only people as 
irretrievably corrupt as politicians are scientists” and therefore the writer 
has been sceptical about “the current global warming PR blitz”.  
(iv) Hubris: There is a single instance of a hubristic representation of climate 
change. In his column in the Irish Independent on January 4, 2011, Myers 
contrasts a heavy snowfall with “the worldwide hysteria over global 
warming” before concluding that “We are nothing before the great forces 
of the world” and musing on “the humiliating insignificance of man”. 
 
It is evident that, in the text coded to the contested science frame, the work of Kevin 
Myers, and to a lesser extent that of Maurice Neligan, are prominent in putting forward 
sceptic views about the reality and impacts of climate change. The work of John Gibbons 
is also prominent in attempting to expose and refute sceptic arguments. The tendency to 
dismiss climate science completely by means of sarcastic asides or ad hominem 
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characterisations of those concerned about the environment, is also evident. The range of 
sceptic positions identified by Rahmstorf – trend, attribution and impact – are present in 
Irish media coverage of climate change, but so too is a considerable body of journalistic 
work challenging these positions. 
 
5.11 The disaster frame 
 
There are 191 instances of the disaster frame across 135 stories in the corpus of 704 
climate change articles, and it accounts for 11.62% of all frames. In 92 individual stories, 
disaster is the dominant framing of climate change. Regarding the type of article in which 
this frame is dominant, it is evident that journalism involving reporting and news 
gathering presents the disaster frame most frequently (56 stories; 64.13%), while more 
opinion-based journalism (35 articles; 38.04%) is less strongly represented. 
 
In just over 40% of the 92 stories dominated by the disaster frame was it possible to 
identify the author of the article. In the cases where an author was identified, columnists 
and op-ed writers were most common (63%), and reporters, staff writers and news 
agencies less so (37%).  
 
The Irish Examiner presented climate change through this frame more often than any 
other title analysed, while the Irish Daily Mail relied on a disaster frame less often than 
the other titles. In the Irish Examiner, the disaster frame accounted for 19.26% of all 
frames used by the newspaper. The percentage for the other titles is as follows: Sunday 
Tribune 16.39%; Sunday Independent 13.10%; Irish Times 12.24%; Sunday Business Post 
7.04%; Irish Independent 7.04%; Irish Daily Mail 5.56%. 
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Stories containing the disaster frame often contain secondary frames, although these 
stories are not as densely framed as stories coded to other frames. Articles presenting 
climate change through the disaster frame tend, therefore, to concentrate on a single 
framing. The frequency of secondary frames is given in Figure 5.29 below. 
 
Fig 5.29: Secondary framing in stories containing the disaster frame 
 
 
The prevalence of a secondary frame of settled science is noteworthy, suggesting that 
stories presenting climate change as having potentially disastrous consequences for the 
environment and for human populations is accompanied by representations of climate 
change as a reality requiring urgent action. 
 
The subject matter of stories presenting climate change through a disaster frame is not as 
varied as was the case for the three frames examined in more detail above. Five sub-topics 
were identified: global climate impacts, global security, climate impacts on Ireland, elite 
actors and reportage from crisis-hit regions. Of these, global climate impacts was by far 
the most prevalent sub-topic, with 82 instances, accounting for 55.78% of all sub-topics. 
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The other sub-topics were represented as follows: climate impacts on Ireland 29 instances, 
19.72%; global security 16 instances, 10.88%; reportage from crisis-hit regions 15 
instances, 10.2%; elite actors 5 instances, 3.4%. 
 
Text in the climate impacts sub-topic refers to the publication of IPCC Assessment 
Reports, the setting of new temperature records, the impact of climate change on animal 
migration patterns and species extinction, increased flooding due to climate change, the 
likelihood of coastal cities being affected by sea-level rise, climate feedback loops, the 
decline in the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon, the potential for new diseases to 
infect human populations in a warming world, the loss of sea ice in both the Arctic and 
Antarctic, the effect of climate change on crops, predictions of increased desertification, 
the bleaching of coral reefs, water and food shortages, deaths due to extreme temperatures, 
increased storm intensity due to climate change, increased prevalence of wildfires and 
human migration. 
 
Several articles deal with specific climate impacts, while others offer broad summaries. 
An example of the latter occurs in the Irish Times on April 1, and concerns the release of 
the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5):  
[The report] warns that some risks of climate change are "considerable", even if warming 
is capped at 2 degrees - currently the international goal. For example, it would have an 
impact on human health, mainly by exacerbating health problems that already exist. 
“Throughout the 21st century, climate change is expected to lead to increases in ill health 
in many regions and especially in developing countries with low income, [with a] greater 
likelihood of injury, disease, and death due to more intense heatwaves and fires.” Climate-
change impacts would "slow down economic growth, make poverty reduction more 
difficult, further erode food security and prolong existing and create new poverty traps, 
the latter particularly in urban areas and emerging hotspots of hunger." There was also an 
increased likelihood of under-nutrition resulting from lower food production in poor 
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regions and increased risks from water- borne diseases. The magnitude and severity of 
such negative impacts would "increasingly outweigh" any positives. "It is true that we 
can't find many benefits of climate change, and I believe it's because there aren't many 
benefits, even though we tried really hard to find them," working group co-chairman Dr 
Chris Field said.   In many places, there would be "widespread negative impacts", he 
added. "We live in an era of man- made climate change," working group co-chairman 
Vicente Barros told the Yokohama briefing. "In many cases, we are not prepared for the 
climate-related risks that we already face. Investments in better preparation can pay 
dividends." 
 
Other texts concentrate on more specific impacts of climate change, such as alterations to 
the habitats of chinstrap and Gentoo penguins (Irish Times, February 16, 2007) and the 
threat caused by climate change to production of the Arabica coffee bean (Irish 
Independent, November 21, 2012). 
 
References to the impacts of climate change on Ireland concern changes to temperature, 
plants, growing seasons, crop diseases and the necessity of moving the date of the Irish 
Conker Championship as changes to the climate are affecting the growth cycle of 
chestnuts (Sunday Tribune, October 28, 2007). There are multiple references to flooding, 
and several articles link the floods of November 2009 and December 2015 directly to 
climate change. An article in the Sunday Tribune on August 10, 2008 states that flooding 
in Dublin’s coastal suburbs will become more frequent due to climate change, while more 
recent floods in the south, west and midlands were also linked to climate change: 
Minister of state Ann Phelan made her comments after serious flooding affected her home 
town of Graiguenamanagh in the early hours of Wednesday, while many towns and roads 
in the region were hit by high river levels and heavy rainfall. A number of homes in 
Graiguenamanagh were evacuated overnight after the River Duiske in the Co Kilkenny 
town burst its banks, while two boats were also lost to the floods. Thomastown and 
Inistioge were among other areas in the county seriously hit by flood waters, with many 
local roads closed to traffic. “It’s devastating,” Ms Phelan said in relation to 
Graiguenamanagh.  “I’ve never actually seen it as bad as what has happened this morning. 
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The levels of water were quite frightening.” She said that, as the water in the both the 
Barrow and the Duiske rivers remained high on Wednesday afternoon, that she hoped 
they were over the worst but that long-term strategies are needed. “I think we really have 
to plan now for how we deal with this. Climate change is becoming a real issue in our 
daily lives. We have to face up to that in a serious way to stop situations like this 
happening year in and year out.”  (Irish Examiner, December 31, 2015) 
 
The elite actors sub-topic refers to articles concerning the statements of environmental 
“celebrities” such as Al Gore, David Attenborough and James Lovelock. An example 
occurs in the science section of the Irish Times:  
James Lovelock, who developed the Gaia theory of the earth, has issued an apocalyptic 
prediction. He claims that global warming is now irreversible and, as a result, more than 
six billion people will die before the end of the century. (May 28, 2009) 
 
There are several examples of text characterising climate change as a threat to global 
security. For instance, climate change is a “threat multiplier” which will create millions 
of environmental migrants by 2020, according to a report submitted to the European 
Council. “Linking security to climate change shifts the issue from environment ministers 
to prime ministers, who have more power to deal with it.” (Irish Times, March 15, 2008). 
This report was also the topic of a talk at the Irish Institute for European Affairs given by 
Dr Elina Bardram, policy coordinator at the European Commission’s Directorate of 
External Relations. She predicted that conflict over scarce resources – water, food and 
land – will lead to instability, while demand for biofuels in the developed world is leading 
to hunger in the developing world. Irish Times, April 25, 2008). In another example of 
such coverage, the Irish Examiner reported on the launch of Global Trends 2025, a report 
by the National Intelligence Council, a body of analysts from across the US intelligence 
community, which stated that: “The world of the near future will be subject to an increased 
likelihood of conflict over scarce resources, including food and water, and will be haunted 
by the persistence of rogue states and terrorist groups with greater access to nuclear 
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weapons…Widening gaps in birth rates and wealth-to-poverty ratios, and the uneven 
impact of climate change, could further exacerbate tensions.”  (November 22, 2008). 
 
Reportage from crisis-hit regions is also strongly present in articles presenting climate 
change through a disaster framing. Climate impacts at the Bentayan Wildlife Reserve in 
Indonesia (deforestation), Darfur (drought), Manilla (extreme weather), the Maldives 
(sea-level rise), Louisiana (oil spill from fossil fuel extraction), Somalia (drought), 
Berkshire (flooding), Kenya (drought), China (glacier melt). In two cases, coverage was 
as a result of Irish-based NGOs bringing Irish journalists to the affected regions. 
 
The impacts of climate change, both in global terms and at local level, are strongly, often 
vividly, presented in the coverage examined. The links between extreme weather events, 
such as torrential rain leading to flooding, and climate change are often explicitly stated. 
The possibility that climate change may bring about a collapse of international order, 
leading to forced migration, conflict over resources and a breakdown of economic systems 
is also evident in the data. 
 
5.12 The economic frame 
 
 
The economic frame is strongly represented in the Irish media’s coverage of climate 
change. It is the third most prevalent frame, with 215 instances (coming behind the 
political or ideological contest and settled science frames). It is present in 157 individual 
articles, and is the dominant frame in 87 of these. 
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Feature articles contain the most instances of this frame (32), while opinion articles (24) 
and complex news stories (18) are also strongly present. Simple news stories (8), personal 
columns (4) and newspaper editorials (1) are relatively sparsely represented. For 52 out 
of the 87 stories dominated by the economic frame, the LexisNexis database did not record 
a byline. In the 35 cases where a byline was recorded, it is evident that non-journalist 
guest experts (12) and specialist correspondents (10) were the most prominent.  
 
The economic frame was most prevalent in the Sunday Tribune, accounting for 19.67% 
of all frames in that publication, and the Sunday Business Post (19.01%). The Irish Times 
(11.49%) and the Irish Daily Mail (11.11%) recorded relative low frequencies for this 
frame. 
 
The secondary frames in the articles presenting climate change through an economic 
frame were also examined. The political or ideological contest frame was the most 
common secondary frame (24 instances), suggesting that media coverage of climate 
change strongly links political choices with economic consequences, and economic 
policies with political consequences. Examples of coverage which is primarily presented 
through an economic frame, but which contains a secondary political framing include a 
report of coal industry objections to EU emissions targets (Irish Times, December 11, 
2008) and a preview of a 2009 EU summit: 
Europe’s economic troubles continue to vex EU leaders. With more than half of all 
member states now in breach of the union’s budget deficit guidelines, the nascent recovery 
of the wider EU economy will provide only limited cheer around the summit table. While 
economic freefall is at an end and talk has turned to the development of strategies to 
withdraw extraordinary fiscal stimuli around the union, the turnaround is far from secure 
and EU economies remain prone to shock. Still, Cowen can at least take some succour 
from support at the highest levels of the EU hierarchy for his government’s swingeing 
Budget measures. When chiding Greece last Monday for the perilous position of its public 
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finances, European Central Bank chief Jean-Claude Trichet noted very, very tough 
decisions taken in Dublin and urged Athens to follow that path with courageous fiscal 
manoeuvres. (Irish Times, December 10, 2009). 
 
It is also significant that the opportunity frame is a frequent secondary frame in economic 
stories (18 instances), while morality or ethics (16), policy or technical (16) and settled 
science (16) are also well represented. The contested science (3) and agriculture (3) 
frames did not often appear in articles dominated by the economic frame. 
 
In considering the subject matter of the articles containing an economic frame, it is found 
that the concerns of specific industries, such as the aviation, automobile, food, energy and 
fashion industries dominate the coverage. The impact of environmental regulation on jobs 
is also a frequently mentioned topic, and there is considerable coverage devoted to the 
economic aspects of climate change on the global economy. Coverage which refers to the 
impact of mitigation or adaptation measures on the finances of ordinary citizens is present 
in the coverage, but at relatively low levels. The wisdom of pricing, trading or taxing 
carbon, and, in a specifically Irish context, the imposition of a 5% increase in electricity 
prices in 2010 to support renewable energy schemes, is also a prominent sub-topic.  
 
Overall, the economic frame presents climate change as a narrow financial proposition, 
foregrounding a cost-benefit approach. The costs of environmental regulation on the 
aviation and automobile industries are emphasised, as are the costs to citizens of carbon 
or fuel taxes. The representation of climate change as a global problem requiring urgent 
action is almost entirely absent from this coverage. The financial and environmental costs 
of a “business as usual” approach are not addressed. For example, the Stern Review 
Report on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern, 2006), which emphasised the cost of 
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inaction, is mentioned only once in the 157 articles containing the economic frame. 
However, the opportunity frame, which represented climate action as offering possibilities 
for innovation and sustainable economic growth, is strongly present in the coverage. 
 
5.13 The settled science frame 
 
The settled science frame is very strongly represented in climate change coverage. It is 
the second most prevalent frame, present in 193 articles (27.33% of all climate coverage), 
with 238 instances (14.48% of all frame instances). It is the dominant frame in 88 stories, 
(12.46% of the corpus of 706 articles).  
 
This frame occurs most frequently in feature articles (37 instances), and less frequently in 
opinion columns (15), op-ed articles (12), complex (13) and simple news stories (10). The 
Irish Times publishes 16.43% of its climate change coverage through the settled science 
frame, the highest figure of any of the titles under analysis, and the Sunday Independent 
(9.52%) and the Irish Daily Mail (5.56%) record the lowest figures. In 55 of the 88 articles 
dominated by this frame, no byline was recorded in the dataset. Of the 33 articles where 
authorship was recorded, columnists (13), guest writers (8) and specialist correspondents 
(8) were the most common author types. 
 
The secondary framing in articles presenting climate change through a settled science 
frame is noteworthy in that secondary framing in these stories is sparse, with only 41 
instances of secondary framing spread quite evenly among the other nine frames. This 
suggests that stories containing this frame focus quite narrowly on representations of 
climate change emphasising climate science and the need for mitigation and adaptation 
measures without reference to other aspects of the issue. For instance, there are only three 
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instances of the political frame as a secondary frame in settled science articles, while the 
economic frame appears only twice as a secondary frame. There are eight instances of the 
morality or ethics frame, suggesting that, in the rare cases where settled science coverage 
departs from putting forward the impacts of climate change, it emphasises the moral case 
for action. 
 
The topics and subject matter of stories coded to the settled science frame falls into five 
main categories: articles based on the findings of climate science, such as reports, 
scientific papers or discoveries (26 instances); articles dealing with mitigation and/or 
adaptation or measures aimed at increasing climate resilience (26 instances); articles 
outlining the impacts of climate change on Ireland (22 instances); articles containing 
calls for urgent action on climate change (14 instances) and articles based on the personal 
testimony of individuals involved in various forms of climate action (8 instances). 
 
An example of coverage emphasising the findings of climate science occurs in an article 
based on the release of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4):  
So now we know. The warming of the world's climate system is "unequivocal", and that's 
now what scientists are saying. It has also been accepted as a fact in Paris this week by 
the representatives of more than 100 countries on the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC)."Unequivocal" is the most powerful word in its latest assessment 
of global warming, based on hard evidence of increases in air and ocean temperatures, 
widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising sea levels. And this trend is set to continue, 
even if we manage to cut greenhouse gas emissions. IPCC scientists are now 90 per cent 
certain that these emissions - mainly carbon dioxide (CO2) - are to blame for causing 
climate change. (Frank McDonald, Irish Times, February 3, 2007). 
 
A further example is based on a report on Ireland’s changing climate issued by the 
Environmental Protection Agency in 2009: 
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Average temperatures in Ireland will rise by between 1.4 degrees and 1.8 degrees by 2050, 
according to a new report on climate change impact published by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). The research also indicates that summer and autumn will warm 
faster than winter or spring, with the midlands and east warming more than coastal areas. 
Winter rainfall is also expected to increase by 10 per cent within 40 years with converse 
reductions of summer rainfall. The decrease in summer precipitation could be between 12 
and 17 per cent. The report, Climate Change in Ireland: Refining the Impacts for Ireland, 
suggests that we need to plan for these changes, which are already occurring, but which 
will be clearly evident within four decades. (Irish Times, April 28, 2009). 
Representations of mitigation or adaptation measures, or steps to increase resilience, also 
feature strongly in coverage coded to the settled science frame. Subjects mentioned 
include geothermal heating, eating less meat, taking fewer airline flights, and the 
adaptation of electric vehicle technology. An example of this coverage, focusing on the 
contribution to global emissions from the aviation industry, occurs in the Irish Times of 
April 14, 2008:  
The unpalatable truth is that if we want to avoid the worst effects of global climate change 
we will have to fly less in future. This is not environmental Puritanism, it is simple 
arithmetic. Last year's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report 
concluded that we need to cut global greenhouse gas emissions in half, at least, by 2050. 
Meanwhile, emissions from international aviation have doubled since 1990.These 
contradictory trends are projected to get worse. While the Irish and British governments 
predict a doubling of airline passenger numbers between now and 2030 and plan to 
provide for it, both governments have also pledged to cut climate pollution by 3 per cent 
a year on average. A collision is on the cards. To avoid dangerous climate change, we 
must limit global warming to less than two degrees above pre-industrial levels. If aviation 
continues to grow unchecked it would account for all our permitted emissions well before 
2050.All other polluting activity including much that is essential for human survival - 
would have to stop, just to allow the aircraft to continue flying. Personally, I would rather 
have food, shelter, heat, light, jobs and leisure activity with family and friends, even if 
that means curtailing flying. 
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The move from fossil fuel-powered vehicles to electric powered ones featured in a report 
from the Detroit Motor Show:  
At the recent Detroit Motor Show, huge emphasis was placed on tackling carbon dioxide 
emissions and global warming. There were plenty of fuel cell-powered concept vehicles 
on display, all kinds of petrol or diesel-electric hybrids, cars with plug-in electric range 
extenders and so on. It was noticeable, though, that carmakers have learnt to be a lot more 
circumspect with their predictions about when the world might start seeing fuel-celled 
cars in meaningful numbers at more affordable prices. Although GM and Honda are 
believed to have ambitions to get fuel cell vehicles into the market soon after 2010, most 
carmakers at the Detroit show were more likely to mumble about 2015 to 2020. (Irish 
Times, February 6, 2008). 
 
Coverage referring to climate impacts on Ireland foreground reports from government 
bodies, such as Met Éireann and the EPA. Policies relating to the environment put forward 
by political parties is also mentioned in this coverage, as is the role of climate change in 
the increased frequency and severity of flooding. An example of this coverage focusing 
on Ireland relates to a Met Éireann report on the changing climate:  
Ireland's climate continues to warm up in line with the global picture, according to the 
latest data from Met Éireann. Last year was the warmest on record for a number of the 
country's recording stations. Nor is there any reasonable doubt about what is causing it, 
according to Séamus Walsh of Met Éireann's climatology and observation division. “The 
figures don't really lie. It is 95 per cent certain it is the man-made contribution to levels 
of greenhouse gases that is the cause. The weight of evidence points to the fact it is 
anthropogenic.” (Irish Times, February 2, 2007). 
 
Personal testimony from individuals undertaking environmental initiatives is also 
prominent in climate change coverage. People involved in Dublin’s Cultivate Centre, the 
“grow it yourself” (GIY) movement, eco-housing projects and carbon-tracking systems 
feature in this coverage.  
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Calls for urgent action also feature in coverage of climate change. Often, this coverage 
consists of reporting the statements of elite actors such as former UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki Moon, or former US vice-president Al Gore. In other examples, the calls for action 
are delivered by NGOs, as in this example from the events section of a newspaper 
magazine supplement: 
Environmentalists say we only have 10 years left to take action to save the planet from 
runaway climate change, and the next Government will probably last half that time. We 
can be sure they won't make climate change their priority unless we tell them it's ours. 
Ireland is pretty much Europe's most enthusiastic emitter of greenhouse gases, which 
takes some of the good out of our proud stance on international aid. Stop Climate Chaos, 
an alliance of 20 Irish aid and environment agencies, is inviting the public to send a 
message to the new Government that they must reduce carbon emissions, by joining 
Umbrella Action Day at the Martello Tower in Sandymount Strand tomorrow at 
3pm.They're asking people to bring an umbrella, the kids, a picnic and have fun. 
Choreographer Muirne Bloomer will be coaching the crowd on how to wave its collective 
brolly at the politicians and demand "a future for our children, a decent life for the world's 
poor, and hope for the planet." (Irish Times, June 9, 2007). 
 
Often, such calls are made by the writer directly:  
The challenge - should you choose to accept it - is to develop a sustainable global 
economy that the planet is capable of supporting indefinitely. The consequence, if you 
don't is to set the world on a collision course with the future and accelerate the path to 
potential major economic and social disruptions on a scale similar to those associated with 
the great wars and the economic depression in the first half of the 20th century. (Irish 
Times, January 14, 2008). 
 
The prevalence of the settled science frame in the Irish media coverage of climate change 
confirms that such coverage has explicitly spelled out the state of scientific knowledge on 
climate change over the time frame under study, and has presented the issue as a global 
challenge requiring action. Settled science coverage is narrowly framed, rarely presenting 
the issue in secondary frames that may offer the possibility of deeper engagement. 
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5.14 The policy or technical frame 
 
 
The policy or technical frame, which contains references to the measurement of climate 
impacts, records and assessments and policy initiatives which are value-neutral as to any 
possible course of action, is strongly present in the corpus of 706 climate change articles. 
There are 184 instances of this frame; it is present in 122 individual articles and it is the 
dominant frame in 45 of these. In percentage terms, it accounts of 11.19% of all frames; 
it appears in 17.28% of climate change articles, and it is the dominant frame in 6.37% of 
these. 
 
The authorship of articles coded to this frame is evenly spread across all author types. It 
appears equally frequently in opinion-based journalism and in feature and news 
journalism. It is also relatively evenly represented in all newspaper titles. The Sunday 
Tribune (14.75%) frames climate change through the policy frame most often, and the 
Sunday Independent (7.14%) least often. 
 
The settled science frame occurs as a secondary frame to the policy frame most often (13 
instances, while the contested science frame (0 instances) and the agriculture frame (1 
instance) are the least popular secondary frames. Economic (10) and political (9) frames 
also appear alongside this frame quite frequently. 
 
The subject matter, and topics covered by the media texts coded to the frame prominently 
feature measures proposed to reduce GHGs, such as weighing luggage and owner together 
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to decrease aviation emissions, the role of microscopic marine animals in absorbing 
carbon, using eco-friendly concrete in public buildings, energy efficiency measures in 
domestic buildings, reducing CO2 emissions from cars, pollution reduction initiatives and 
the White Paper produced by the government of Ireland on energy in 2015. 
 
An interesting text concerns EU energy policy and the management of emissions from 
member states. As the text concerns measurement and regulatory matters, it is coded as 
belonging to the policy and technical frame. However, the article also refers to efforts by 
Ireland’s minister for the environment to lobby to have these measurements amended to 
favour the Irish construction industry, and is therefore also political. Thus, it is coded as 
having a secondary frame of political or ideological contest:  
The European Commission recently ordered a 6.4 per cent cut in the CO2 allowances that 
the state allocated to industry for 2008-2012. Minister for the Environment Dick Roche 
has been lobbying the commission to get it to amend its decision in favour of Irish 
industry. But Mr Dimas yesterday appeared to rule out any concessions. "It [ the ruling] 
is not a matter of opinion, it is a matter of methodology. We have a methodology that we 
apply for each country and we end up with a number, so it is not a matter of negotiation. 
So the numbers are there - we don't change them." (Irish Times, March 8, 2007). 
 
 
In general, policy or technically framed text deals with data collection, regulatory regimes 
and the measurement of various environmental pollutants. The existence of climate 
change is not contested in these texts, nor is any ideological view expressed as to the 
means of achieving the various emissions reduction targets described. There is some 
coverage of political exchanges regarding the efficacy of one policy over another, but 
these are written in a hard-news, non-discursive style. The texts in this frame are 
overwhelmingly descriptive rather than analytical. They take place inside the policy 
environment and are concerned with the ability of certain governments or organisations 
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to meet emissions reduction targets; there is no discussion as to whether the targets 
themselves are sufficient to prevent climate change. 
 
5.15 The opportunity frame 
 
Climate change is framed as an opportunity in 83 articles, and there are 111 instances of 
this frame in the corpus. This frame dominates 30 stories. Therefore, it accounts for 6.75% 
of all frames, is the dominant frame in 4.2% of climate change articles, and is present in 
11.75%. Articles presenting climate change through this frame are most often written by 
specialist correspondents, and feature articles are the most common article type to contain 
this frame. 
 
The Irish Times has published by far the most instances of this frame (67) and it represents 
7.2% of all frames in that newspaper. The Irish Independent has published 17 instances, 
or 7.46% of all frames. The Sunday Tribune has published least coverage presented in this 
frame, both in absolute (1) and percentage (1.64%) terms. The economic frame is the most 
common secondary frame in this coverage (10 instances). Settled science and policy 
frames also occur (8 and 6 instances respectively), but the other frames are sparely 
represented.  
 
 Articles coded to this frame present climate change as an economic and social 
opportunity. An example occurring early in the timeframe under examination presents the 
move to a low-carbon society as an exciting challenge rather than a sacrifice: 
Last year I met and interviewed EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, again in 
advance of the annual Energy Ireland conference, and he endorsed a similar 
approach.  The rationale behind this current thinking among energy policy makers is that 
energy use and climate change are inextricably linked.  As Claude Mandil says, one of 
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the most important links between them is the 'efficient use' of energy.  He points out that 
this does not mean we have to return to a modern version of the Stone Age.  Far from it, 
he says we have to be able to travel the world, heat and cool ourselves, live in well-lit 
houses, and enjoy all our modern conveniences and comforts but we have to learn to do 
all these things by using less energy.  He also argues that while using less energy and 
thereby creating fewer carbon emissions happens to be good for global warming, it also 
has a pragmatic side too. (Irish Examiner, August 20, 2007). 
 
 
A further example concerns a policy initiative by the Green Party minister for energy, 
Eamon Ryan, to establish Ireland as a leader in renewable energy: 
It's still early days, but so far one of the most surprising things about Ryan's tenure in 
office has been his overtures to industry. Early on he announced that he wanted Ireland 
to become a world leader in green energy technologies - something almost as fanciful as 
the notion, in 1987, that Dublin could become a top global financial centre. "Twenty-odd 
years ago we set about developing an expertise in financial services - we had no expertise 
in that type of finance at the time," Ryan says. "It was a political decision that this is where 
we want to go, create the environment for it. Lo and behold, 20 years later 20,000 people 
work in the IFSC." "Similarly, in the energy area, this government will do everything it 
can to promote renewable heating and electricity. It's growing. Look at the construction 
industry - and I think it is an energy industry. Companies like Kingspan, CRH, a whole 
range of companies are really delivering energy products." The next priority, he argues, 
is to marry some of Ireland's newly-acquired financial expertise with the goal of 
encouraging new thinking in energy production and efficiency: "Let's look at international 
best practice in green funds to invest in technology in this area. And also, what innovative 
systems can we put in place for lending to householders to invest in renewables." (Sunday 
Tribune, September 30, 2007). 
 
 
A significant thread in this coverage concerns the possibilities offered by so-called “clean 
tech” (technology that relies on energy efficiency and sustainable use of resources) 
industries. For example, Ireland’s minister for the environment claimed that Ireland could 
become “a global leader” in this area (Irish Times, September 10, 2008), while in the US, 
president Obama spoke of a “clean energy economy” (Sunday Business Post, February 
	 241	
22, 2009). Climate change is presented as an opportunity for German wine growers, as 
warmer temperatures allow for riper fruit and more alcohol in their wines (‘Riesling Uber 
Alles’, Irish Times, July 18, 2009). 
 
Text coded to this frame also presents climate change as an opportunity to improve social 
conditions and solve long-standing social problems, suggesting that the solutions to 
climate change will also bring about improvements in other areas of society. An example 
of this representation occurs in an interview with Prof Venkatesh Narayanamurti, an 
advisor to President Obama:  
Barack Obama gets it and that gives Prof Venktesh (Venky) Narayanamurti cause for 
great optimism. He believes that science and engineering have the capacity to solve the 
great challenges that threaten our future, but only if leaders with vision can be found. 
Harvard University’s Prof Venky was in Dublin two days ago to deliver a lecture at the 
Science Gallery at Trinity College, organised by the TCD/UCD Innovation Alliance. He 
discussed the role of science and technology in overcoming the global problems that face 
us today, from climate change to world hunger. He touched on much wider issues, 
however, when speaking before his talk, encompassing his theories on education and 
social responsibility, the power of science and technology to deliver both good and evil, 
and how innovation and discovery can come from any quarter and from any country. 
(Irish Times, March 26, 2010). 
 
An article by Jim Clarken of ENGO Oxfam in the run-up to the Warsaw climate 
conference (COP 19) typifies much of the content coded to this frame. It emphasises 
positive aspects of the challenges posed by climate change, and the opportunities available 
to those who respond:  
Apathy to climate change is not an option. But instead of focusing on an Armageddon-
like vision of a future we are helpless to prevent, we need a new narrative on climate 
changes that focuses on opportunities offered by the green economy. Action on climate 
change will mean fewer natural disasters, less economic migration, fewer conflicts over 
resources and less hunger and poverty. From an economic point of view, action on climate 
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change also makes sense. There are innovations and breakthroughs there for the taking 
through developing independent energy sources and a marketplace for renewable power, 
which could place Ireland and our economy on a more secure footing. Developing the 
sustainable energy sources of the future and running our economy on greener, cleaner 
energy will grow jobs. Let's focus on what we can do, not on what we can't do. (Irish 
Times, November 20, 2013). 
 
 
5.16 The morality or ethics frame 
 
 
The morality or ethics frame includes references to the moral imperative of dealing with 
climate change, to the impact of inaction on future generations, to climate change 
generally as a religious issue, to climate change as related to humanity’s stewardship of 
the planet, to the impact of climate change on those who have done least to cause it 
(climate justice), or to explicit references to fairness, justice or equity. It is present in Irish 
coverage to a moderate extent, with 148 instances, accounting for 9% of all frames. It 
occurs in 110 stories, 15.5% of the corpus. It is the dominant frame in 48 articles, or 6.7% 
of the total.  
 
In absolute terms, the morality or ethics frame occurs most frequently in the Irish Times 
newspaper, which records 89 instances of this frame. However, the Irish Daily Mail 
(22.22%) and the Irish Examiner (13.33%) devote the highest percentage of their 
coverage to this frame. Regarding the type of article containing this frame, feature articles 
(14) and complex news stories (12) are the most common, but opinion based journalism, 
such as opinion articles (11) and personal columns (5) are also well represented. Of the 
48 articles dominated by this frame, byline information is recorded for only 19 (39.58%). 
Of these 19, guest op-ed writers (8) and columnists (5) are most strongly represented. The 
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political or ideological contest frame is the most common secondary frame in this category 
(13 instances), with the settled science (7) and the disaster (9) also strongly represented. 
 
A wide range of topics is addressed in the texts coded to the morality or ethics frame, 
reflecting a range of moral choices facing politicians, businesses and individuals when 
deciding to do something, or to do nothing, about climate change. Among the topics 
referred to is this coverage were the moral case for the European ideal, the moral 
responsibility on the US to take the lead on climate change, the responsibility the present 
generation has to future generations, ethical choices concerning fashion, flying and eating 
meat, the ethics of large corporations and the lack of morality among climate deniers. 
 
The notion that acting to prevent climate change is a moral imperative because citizens 
have a responsibility to pass on a healthy planet to future generations is strongly present 
in this coverage. It is present, for instance, in a report of a speech made by US president 
Barack Obama when he was a candidate for the office:  
If we act with boldness and foresight, we will be able to tell our grandchildren that this 
was the time when we helped forge peace in the Middle East. This was the time we 
confronted climate change and secured the weapons that could destroy the human race. 
This was the time we defeated global terrorists and brought opportunity to forgotten 
corners of the world. And this was the time when we renewed the America that has led 
generations of weary travellers from all over the world to find opportunity and liberty and 
hope on our doorstep. (Irish Times, July 6, 2007). 
 
The image of future generations asking questions of the present one was also present in a 
report of a speech by former US vice president Al Gore at the climate change conference 
in Bali (COP13):  
At the Bali conference, he said: ''They'll look back, and either they will ask: 'What were 
you thinking? ... Didn't you see the glaciers melting? Didn't you see the deserts growing 
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and the droughts deepening and the crops drying up? Didn't you pay attention to what was 
going on? Didn't you care? ...'''Or they'll ask a second question, one that I'd much prefer 
them to ask. I want them to look back on this time and ask: 'How did you find the moral 
courage to successfully address a crisis that so many said was impossible?' "Either way, 
Gore can take some credit that the questions are being asked. (Sunday Business Post, 
December 30, 2007). 
 
The idea that those who caused climate change should be the ones to bear the burden of 
solving it is also present in this coverage. It ranges from representations of a so-called 
“just transition” (whereby wealthy nations pay their share or mitigation and adaptation 
costs and alternative employment is found for those who work in industries made 
redundant by a transition to a low-carbon society) to representations of greed, both 
individual and corporate, among wealthy nations. The ethical aspects of unnecessary air 
travel, for instance, are considered:  
In a way, aviation encapsulates the dilemma facing the first world. So much pollution that 
we cause is not the unfortunate by-product of necessity, but rather the monstrous 
consequence of mankind's self-indulgence. And we're great at inventing new indulgences 
that we think we can't do without. Aviation is a prime example. Flying, we're told, has 
become our inalienable right. We like it, so we should do it, as often as possible…In 
Ireland and Britain, emissions from aviation have doubled since 1990, negating many of 
the savings made in other sectors. The number of flights in and out of Britain is set to 
double by 2020 and triple by 2030. Although the aviation industry clings to a 3.5 per cent 
global emissions figure, this ignores the fact that jet fuel causes 2.7 times more damage 
because it is dispersed at altitude - a realistically adjusted figure would be closer to 9 per 
cent of the total, and growing. (Sunday Business Post, April 6, 2008). 
 
Dubious corporate practices are also represented in this coverage, ranging from the 
Volkswagen emissions rigging scandal (Irish Times, September 29, 2015) to the 
suppression of climate data and the funding of sceptics by Exxon Mobile (Sunday 
Business Post report of a call by NASA scientist Jim Hansen that the company’s 
executives to be tried for crimes against humanity, June 29, 2008), to the potential for 
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deceit in corporate eco labelling and the trend for large corporations to co-opt 
environmental credibility by buying smaller, more eco-friendly companies (Irish Times, 
March 8, 2008). 
 
Climate change is also portrayed as a moral issue of concern to those of religious faith. 
For instance, the Irish bishops of the Catholic church issued a pastoral letter which “drew 
attention to important moral dimensions involved in allocating emissions targets, 
internationally.  Care must be taken to ensure that the most economically, politically or 
militarily powerful nations of the world are not in a position to take advantage of those 
countries which have fewer resources, they said” (Irish Times, November 9, 2009). 
Members of the Methodist, Anglican, Quaker, Catholic and other Christian religions held 
a day of prayer for a positive outcome to COP15 in Copenhagen (Irish Times, October 
10, 2009). The publication of an encyclical on climate change by Pope Francis is widely 
referred to in this coverage also: 
Mrs [Mary] Robinson, the UN special envoy on climate change, found it "significant that 
Pope Francis uses one of the highest forms of doctrinal teaching to communicate that 
preserving a safe climate system 'represents one of the principal challenges facing 
humanity in our day'. His encyclical was "a call for climate justice from one of the most 
influential moral voices on our planet today. In it the pope shows his profound 
understanding of the connection between nature, justice for people living in poverty, 
human dignity and the need to act in solidarity in the face of climate change. Above all 
else, Pope Francis establishes climate change and safeguarding the Earth for humanity as 
the moral issue of our time." (Irish Times, June 9, 2015). 
  
In summary, the moral complexity of climate change as a social issue is strongly 
emphasised in texts coded to this frame. These texts foreground concepts of fairness and 
equity, of justice and integrity, at global, national and individual level. Unlike in other 
frames, coverage coded to this frame represents climate change as a broad, global 
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challenge which humanity as a whole must face. Notions of stewardship of the planet and 
obligations of future generations are also emphasised. 
 
5.17 The domestication or communitarian frame 
 
This frame, which contains representations of climate change as a problem for others to 
solve, or references to the inefficacy of the efforts of any single territory’s emissions 
reduction efforts, is very sparsely represented in coverage of climate change. There are 
15 instances of the frame in the corpus of 706 articles, representing less than 1% (0.91%) 
of all frames present. This frame is present in 9 individual articles, and it is the dominant 
frame in two of these. This frame occurs most often in opinion-based articles. Where this 
frame occurs, it is usually the only frame present in the article. There is only one instance 
of a secondary frame being present, that of the political or ideological contest frame. 
 
The topics referred to in texts coded to this frame concern issues related to Ireland’s GHG 
emissions. In most cases, these articles articulate an argument that emissions reduction 
policies in Ireland are misguided, as they will have little impact on global emissions. 
There are several examples of this kind of coverage: 
Gormley has argued that he is in government principally to help deal with climate change, 
which he believes is the single biggest challenge facing the world today. The problem for 
the minister is that the vast majority of people are not as sure as he is of that being the 
case. In any event, Ireland's carbon emissions are so minuscule - relative to the rest of the 
world - that any achievements Gormley claims in this area won't amount to very much. 
(Sunday Tribune, September 16, 2007). 
 
The argument for altering the current treaties is that we in Europe have challenges which 
a continental institution is best equipped to address. Four million people in Ireland can 
turn off all the lights, but we won't make a blind bit of difference to the global threat of 
climate change. (Irish Times, March 19, 2008). 
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There is no point in Ireland, or any other small country, pursuing go-it-alone renewables 
policies. For every tonne of carbon emissions produced in Ireland, 500 tonnes are 
produced somewhere else in the world. Even if the EU as a whole makes emissions costly, 
high-emitting industries can relocate to other parts of the global economy, and an 
apparently successful go-it-alone policy can end up merely out-sourcing emissions. The 
Earth has just one atmosphere, but unfortunately has around 200 governments which must 
ultimately agree on a global response to this global problem. (Sunday Independent, 
January 26, 2016). 
 
The pursuit of a narrow national interest is also present in this coverage, such as a report 
on diplomatic efforts to have Ireland’s EU targets reduced in the agriculture sector: 
Taoiseach Enda Kenny declared himself pleased with the climate change agreement, 
which accords special recognition for agriculture. This will remove shackles from Irish 
farmers as they build up the dairy sector after the elimination of milk quotas, Kenny's key 
objective going into the talks. (Irish Times, October 25, 2014). 
 
The framing of climate change as something Ireland can do little to influence is present 
in Ireland’s media coverage of the issue, but not to any significant degree. The instances 
which occur, however, state their argument trenchantly. These texts reject the concept of 
climate change as a global problem requiring a global solution which is advanced in the 
texts contained in other frames. 
 
5.18 Discussion and analysis 
 
The levels and framing of Ireland’s media coverage of climate change have been 
described and commented on above; it is intended in the following sections to interpret 
these findings and to discuss them in relation to existing scholarly findings concerning 
media coverage of climate change. In the following chapter, the perspectives of individual 
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journalists, politicians active regarding climate policy, and their media advisors is 
presented and analysed. 
 
Many scholars have taken as a starting point in the examination of media coverage of 
climate change Anthony Downs’s (1972) theory of media attention cycles (see chapter 3, 
section 3.6 for further discussion). Downs theorised that environmental issues go through 
a predictable pattern of media attention, with coverage rising steeply, before falling away 
once the cost of remedial action is ascertained. The issue does not completely disappear, 
but returns to a “pre-problem” stage from which is may emerge to go through the cycle 
again. This notion that an issue can exist in the background, ready to “spring to life” once 
again, with the public retaining some faint memory of its previous incarnation, is similar 
to the notion of “issue cultures” (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989) and “social scares” 
(Ungar, 2014), whereby latent public concern about certain issues, or certain categories 
of issue, can be mobilised by events. 
 
This research finds limited evidence of a Downsian cycle in Ireland’s coverage of climate 
change. In the peaks of 2009 and 2015, a cycle is evident. On the other hand, this is 
countered by the existence of a steady increase from 2007 (and indeed from 1997 
[Schmidt et al., 2013]) in which cycles are not evident. It is true that a steep decline occurs 
after late 2009, but this decline is not necessarily due to the public becoming bored with 
the issue, or to discovery that resolving the issue will be costly, as Downs predicted, but 
rather it is the result of issue competition from events perceived as more immediately 
pressing.  
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In relation to the theory of “mediated issue development” proposed by Nisbet and Huge 
(2006), again there is limited support in the data for this hypothesis. Nisbet and Huge 
argued that several factors influenced the lifecycle of scientific issues, such as policy area, 
media lobbying activities of strategic actors and media framing, and their approach is 
attractive because it combines elements of agenda systems theory, framing and agenda-
setting, and allows for media agency and influence denied by other approaches. Those 
wishing to constrain the debate around climate change have been relatively successful in 
Ireland, as the policy and technical frame is very strongly represented. However, it is 
evident from my research that this constraint is countered by the presence of other, more 
dramatic framings in the media, such as the political and ethical frames, which serve to 
widen the scope of participation. The policy arena dimension of Nisbet and Huge’s model 
is difficult to apply to Ireland, due to a lack of policy responses (Torney and Little, 2017).  
 
Other perspectives on media dynamics may explain the relatively high levels of coverage 
up to 2009, which could have been as a result of “attention driving attention” (Djerf-
Pierre, 2012b) whereby the prominence of one environmental issue prompts the media to 
cover others. A related concept, from the scholarship of news values, which suggests that 
items already in the news are more likely to be covered than items as yet undiscovered by 
the media (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Harcup and O’Neill, 2001), may also have helped 
keep levels of coverage elevated in the period up to December 2009. The decline after 
this period is dramatic, and can be explained by the “crowding out” phenomenon whereby 
news of financial or economic crises and armed conflict downgrade environmental issues 
on the media agenda (Hansen, 1993; Boykoff, 2009; Djerf-Pierre, 2012a). This 
explanation is supported by evidence from interviews with journalists, politicians and 
media advisors presented in the following chapter.  
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International trends are also evident in Ireland’s coverage: dramatic peaks at the times of 
the 2009 and 2015 COPs, and smaller peaks coinciding with the release of the Fourth and 
Fifth Assessment Reports of the IPCC. Although the peak in coverage in December 2015 
attains the same level as that of December 2009, coverage levels in the intervening years 
have not recovered to their pre-2009 levels. While there are many factors influencing 
media interest in climate change, not least among them the difficulty the subject presents 
to journalists (again, to be examined in the following chapter), it is possible that a lack of 
political progress regarding climate change in the years 2009-2015 played a role. Media 
coverage tends to surge around reports, policy announcement, parliamentary debates and 
the introduction of climate legislation (Lockwood, 2009); Ireland’s lack of progress in 
taking any meaningful emissions-reduction action (Torney and Little, 2017), and the 
absence of the discourse, consultation and debate which would accompany such climate 
action, may have been a factor in low levels of coverage in this period. However, even in 
the absence of political progress in terms of climate action, it is evident that Irish coverage 
was dominated by political framing of the issue. The reasons for such framing are 
discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
Narrowing the focus to consider article type, it is evident that coverage favours journalism 
involving news-gathering (news stories and feature articles) over the journalism of 
opinion (columns and op-ed articles). Nonetheless, opinion journalism comprises 38% of 
the corpus, a considerable proportion, which has implications for the way in which such 
coverage is perceived. Coverage via op-ed articles tends to ignore the thematic substance 
of an issue and focus instead on political strategising (Nisbet & Fahy, 2015). Furthermore, 
there is a tendency on the part of editors to “outsource” the ethical considerations of 
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complex scientific issues to the op-ed (O’Sullivan, personal interview, June 16, 2015), 
thus insulating themselves from direct criticism (Nisbet & Huge, 2006, p. 13).  
 
5.19 The politicisation of climate change  
 
 
Political framings of climate change dominate Ireland’s coverage of the issue. The sub-
topics contained in this frame include domestic, EU, UN, G8 and G20 politics, and often 
focus on negotiating positions and strategies. There is some debate about the effectiveness 
of such strategic or political framing. On the one hand, it is argued that political framings 
are more involving than dry, technical frames often used in the early media “career” of 
scientific issues (Nisbet and Huge, 2006), yet on the other, political framings represent 
climate change as an issue of concern solely to economic and political elites (Vliegenthart 
and van Zoonen, 2011). Political frames may also be attractive to journalists, because it 
is possible to personalise the issue by identifying certain politicians with it, thus allowing 
assessments of their relative success. Yet such framings distance the discourse from the 
debate about the core issue and what should be done to resolve it. 
 
In the US, the issue of climate change is politically polarised, with Republicans openly 
sceptical about its anthropogenic element (Weingart, Engels and Pansegrau, 2000a; Moser 
and Dilling, 2004; Nisbet, 2009; Hiles and Hinnant, 2014); this is not found to be the case 
in Ireland. There is no instance of a politician or political party questioning the existence 
of anthropogenic global warming, or suggesting the science is not definitive on the issue3. 
																																																						
3 The statement, which received wide media coverage, by Danny Healy-Rae, TD (member of 
parliament) for Kerry that “God above is in charge of the weather and we here can’t do anything 
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However, the findings of this research that media discourse about climate change is 
dominated by political framing required further elaboration and analysis. It is true that 
much media coverage presents climate change as a political issue, and foregrounds party, 
or national policies. Yet the deeper political, or even ideological implications of dealing 
with climate change are not addressed. This more profound debate about whether, as some 
argue, climate change is inherently a left-wing issue because it demands collective and 
government action (see, for instance, Klein, 2014), or whether it is merely a scientific or 
policy issue devoid of ideological meaning (Hoffman, 2011) is not engaged with.  
 
This focus on party political argument rather than deeper, systemic aspects of responses 
to climate change relates to a wider debate in the academy on the politicisation of climate 
change. On one side, scholars argue that climate activists have alienated support from 
centre, centre-right and right-wing publics because they have characterised climate 
change solutions as requiring radical social and economic change – the “this changes 
everything” argument (McKibben, 1989; Klein, 2014). Furthermore, in choosing high-
profile campaigns, such as the Keystone XL pipeline, cap-and-trade legislation, and 
divestment from fossil fuel companies, campaigners alienated moderates and employed 
flawed communications strategies (Nisbet, 2013). Apart from advocating so-called “big 
fix” solutions, the leaders of these grassroots environmental movements are opposed to 
nuclear power, geo-engineering and other technology-based approaches (Ibid.), which 
further diminish support among moderates (Pielke, 2010; Kahan et al., 2012). These 
arguments suggest that conservatives embraced climate scepticism because measures to 
																																																						
about it”, made in the Dáil (parliament) chamber on May 3, 2016, (McGee, 2016) falls outside 
the timeframe of this study.  
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deal with climate change were framed for them as “deeply damaging to the economy, as 
violating strongly held moral beliefs relative to free markets and personal freedom, and 
as favoring President Obama’s political goals (Nisbet, 2013). Some scholars associated 
with this analysis favour building broad coalitions on smaller, constituent elements of 
climate change, and recommend the work of ecomodern journalists who advocate for 
geoengineering and technological responses to climate change that allow for continued 
economic growth (Fahy and Nisbet, 2017). In calling for a broader coalition, scholars cite 
issues related to public health, such as air pollution, water and protection of the 
environment, which are related to climate change, as having bipartisan support. In other 
words, by taking the politics out of climate change and concentrating on those measures 
on which there is broad agreement, climate-friendly measures may be adopted. 
 
On the other side of this debate, scholars argue that it is this very process of 
depoliticisation which prevents greater public engagement and political action regarding 
the issue (Pepermans and Maeseele, 2014; Carvalho, van Wessel and Maeseele, 2016). 
Focusing on communications strategies which ignore the political and focus on individual 
behaviour amounts to “social marketing” which echo ‘several of the assumptions of the 
so-called information deficit model” (Carvalho, van Wessel and Maeseele, 2016, p. 124). 
These scholars, particularly Pieter Maeseele of Antwerp University, suggest that a 
consensual approach is unwise, and “democratic discussion and contestation” is necessary 
(Ibid. p. 125). Through such political debates, power structures are revealed and the 
possibility emerges to “shape a radically different society” (Ibid). This perspective on how 
to promote greater public engagement on climate change is based in large part on the 
criticisms of deliberative democracy put forward by political theorist Chantal Mouffe 
(Mouffe, 2005). 
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In trying to chart a course through these opposing arguments, it is possible to argue that 
the notion that “more politics” will help bring about climate action seems misguided. 
From a media perspective, politicising climate change further risks the media reverting to 
news values of personalisation and strategy framing, thus failing to engage with the issue 
in a substantive manner. However, attempting to deal with climate change by presenting 
it as a matter of environmental management also risks unduly sanitising the issue and 
returning it to techno-managerial arenas, with a consequence lack of public support for 
action or engagement with the issue at all. In any event, it is clear that such debates are 
absent from Ireland’s media coverage of the issue. 
 
Perspectives on media coverage of climate change which engage with the political must 
take account of the extent and nature of sceptic discourses. Such discourses attempt to 
depoliticise the issue by undermining the scientific consensus or, even when accepting 
climate science, seek to downplay the urgency of responding, or emphasising beneficial 
impacts. Again, in Ireland’s coverage, there is a failure to engage at a meaningful level 
with the topic. Many sceptic references take the form of dismissive or sarcastic asides, or 
of would-be humorous juxtapositions of cold weather with global “warming”. Articles 
which contain sceptic framings often seek to deligitimise environmental campaigners or 
politicians as humourless or Puritanical. Most of these characterisations come from 
columns written by familiar media figures with reputations as contrarians (Kevin Myers) 
or curmudgeons (Maurice Neligan) specialising in glib dismissal rather than deep and 
detailed engagement or discussion. 
 
5.20 Economic and political economy perspectives 
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A considerable amount of climate change coverage is presented through the economic 
frame. Articles coded to this frame did not engage with deeper considerations of economic 
systems, but rather concentrated on the impact of regulations and targets on certain 
industries reliant on fossil fuels, such as the automobile and aviation industries. Concepts 
such as “de-growth” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971) or limitations to growth (Meadows et al., 
1972; Meadows, Randers and Meadows, 2004), or perspectives that suggest the current 
economic system is incompatible with environmental sustainability (Alier, 2009) are not 
engaged with. With regard to the Irish media’s coverage of the country’s economic boom 
(the so-called Celtic Tiger) and subsequent economic collapse, it has been argued that the 
media’s reliance on advertising made it difficult for journalists to counter the prevailing 
media narratives (Fahy, O’Brien and Poti, 2010; Mercille, 2014a), while others have 
suggested that this reliance prevents the media in general from challenging the political 
and economic status quo (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).  
 
The limited nature of the economic discourse and the lack of reflexive analysis on the part 
of the media have produced coverage which concentrates on measures of efficiency, 
technological innovation and market-based incentives. Such representations were found 
in both the economic and opportunity frames. Indeed, the opportunity frame contained 
references to climate change as offering possibilities for ecomodern innovation and other 
market-based approaches to dealing with the issue. This finding aligns with that of other 
scholars on Irish media coverage of climate change (Wagner and Payne, 2015), and low-
carbon transition (McNally, 2015) that media narratives which challenge the established 
economic order by foregrounding arguments of degrowth or alternative economic models 
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were absent from mainstream coverage of the issue and were “limited to marginal 
publications” (Fox and Rau, 2016, p. 18). 
 
Coverage of agriculture may be considered here, as its economic aspects are foregrounded 
in Irish coverage. Once again, such coverage concentrates on targets, efficiencies and 
regulation, while larger questions about reorientation away from intensive production 
methods are unaddressed. The rhetorical strategy of the Irish Farmers’ Association in 
suggesting that any reduction in relatively carbon-efficient beef production in Ireland 
would be compensated for by an increase in less carbon-efficient production in Brazil or 
other territories is foregrounded. However, coverage of agriculture is notable for its low 
levels, considering its place of reverence in the Irish national narrative, the importance of 
agriculture in the Irish economy and the presence of a powerful agricultural lobbying 
organisation.  
 
5.21 Conclusion 
 
The empirical findings of this research show that Ireland largely conforms to international 
levels and patterns of media coverage of climate change. Irish coverage peaks at the times 
of international climate change conferences and the release of international climate 
reports. Coverage of climate change accounts for 0.84% of total news coverage over the 
period examined. The Irish Times published by far the highest level of climate change 
coverage, but its dominant role has diminished in recent time, as coverage in the Irish 
Independent and Irish Examiner increases, while that in the Irish Times declined 
somewhat. The performance and approach of individual titles and journalists is considered 
in the following chapter. Data relating to story type and authorship show the Ireland’s 
coverage favours news-gathering journalism (news stories and features), but the 
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journalism of opinion (columns and op-ed articles) is strongly present, suggesting that 
news organisations often “silo” the topic to the op-ed pages as an alternative to news 
coverage. 
 
A frame analysis, using both inductive and deductive frames, identified the presence of 
10 frames, with the political or ideological contest frame the most frequent. The settled 
science, policy and economic frames were well represented, with the opportunity and 
ethics frames also strongly present. The contested science frame was found to be present 
also, but at lower levels, while the agriculture and domestication frames were less 
frequent. An innovative approach allowed for the coding of dominant and secondary 
frames, which allowed for an examination of which frames were presented alongside one 
another. It is apparent from this analysis that, in stories dominated by the political frame, 
the economic frame was the most prevalent secondary frame, and likewise, in stories 
dominated by the economic frame, the political frame was present also.  
 
This finding of “fellow traveller” frames is pertinent, in that it demonstrates that political 
coverage often focused on economic consequences, and economic measures were often 
assessed with regard to their potential political popularity. Thus, broader and deeper 
political and economic questions were unaddressed in the coverage. For instance, 
considerations of limitations to growth, de-growth and alternative economic systems are 
absent from the coverage, as are ideological questions regarding political approaches to 
the issue. Instead, Ireland’s coverage is focused on emissions reduction measures that rely 
on increased efficiency, market incentives and green technology and suggest that climate 
change can be addressed from within the present political and economic systems. 
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In the following chapter, the views of individual journalists, politicians and media 
advisors are presented and analysed. Having considered, from an external perspective, the 
performance of the media in general, the effect of individual media titles and the content 
of media texts, it is important to examine perspectives from within media organisations, 
and from those who seek to influence media, both in terms of coverage levels and media 
framing. The aim of this thesis is to uncover and analyse the framing strategies of key 
actors in the communication of climate change during a remarkably eventful period for 
environmental politics in Ireland. The interviews with journalists, government ministers 
and their media advisors analysed in the next chapter allow for access to privileged 
information and perspectives into such strategies. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Climate change, journalism and politics 
	
6.1 Introduction 
 
	
In the previous chapter, the performance of the Irish media regarding the topic of climate 
change was considered from a perspective situated outside the media themselves. Levels, 
trends and frames in coverage were identified, analysed and discussed. In this chapter, 
these findings are triangulated with interviews with those engaged in covering climate 
change within the media, and those attempting to influence such coverage. Interviews are 
often used to deepen analysis and expose different perspectives (Morse, 1991; Thurmond, 
2001; Olsen, 2004), and interviews with journalists are also a common form of data 
collection, although they are often presented as the main or only data, rather than a means 
of triangulation of other, more quantitative information (see, among others, Fahy, 
O’Brien, & Poti, 2010, Hermida & Domingo, 2011 and Pihl-Thingvad, 2014 for examples 
of interview-based research). Some studies of media coverage of climate change have 
included interviews with journalists covering the issue, but these were concerned with 
scientific literacy and accuracy (Wilson, 2000; Boykoff and Mansfield, 2008), did not 
foreground the views of journalist interviewees (Mormont and Dasnoy, 1995; Aykut, 
Comby and Guillemot, 2012), or concentrated on journalists in the developing world and 
their personal attitudes to climate change (Harbinson, Mugara and Chawla, 2006). It is 
evident from the corpus of research on media coverage of climate change that there has 
been a concentration on the replication of scientific accuracy, and that perspectives from 
science communication and environmental communication have been privileged. There 
have been several calls for research which includes the perspective of journalists covering 
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climate change (for instance, Anderson, 2009, p. 176 and Dahl, 2015, p. 60). It is hoped 
that this research will go some way to answering such calls. 
	
The interview subjects for this thesis were chosen with an eye to scholarship examining 
the role of the media in the development of complex social problems and, in particular, 
those theories which address the notion of issue competition. Several scholars have 
suggested that various actors attempt to dominate the framing of particular issues in ways 
that favour their agenda, and thereby gain “issue ownership” (Gusfield, 1981) and prevail 
in a battle for the scarce resource of public and policy attention (Hilgartner and Bosk, 
1988; Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). The media, politicians, NGOs and policymakers are 
among those engaged in this competition, with the media often the target of the framing 
strategies of the other groups. Thus the media play a central role in these issue 
competitions, and the development of issue coverage in the media from niche specialist 
reporting to broader, more politicised coverage, is a key factor in raising public awareness 
(Nisbet and Huge, 2006). Journalists who covered the environmental “beat” during the 
timeframe under study were considered important interview subjects, as were those 
engaged in the issue competition concerning climate change from outside the media, such 
as politicians active on environmental issues and political advisors dealing with the media. 
The perspective of newspaper editors overseeing coverage of climate change was also 
considered valuable. The list of interview subjects therefore comprised the environment 
correspondents of influential media organisations such as the state broadcasting 
organisation RTÉ (Paul Cunningham), the Irish Times (Frank McDonald), Irish 
Independent (Paul Melia) and Irish Examiner (Claire O’Sullivan), the editors of the Irish 
Times (Kevin O’Sullivan) and Sunday Independent (Cormac Bourke), and a prominent 
columnist and blogger on climate (John Gibbons). O’Sullivan’s views were of interest as 
he was employed as environment correspondent prior to his appointment as editor of the 
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paper, and has returned to the same “beat” since his resignation as editor in April, 2017, 
albeit with the new title of environment editor. Thus, he has experience both as a reporter 
trying to “pitch” stories to an editor, and as an editor on the other side of this process. 
Bourke’s perspective is also valuable, as he worked as news editor on the Irish 
Independent before he was appointed editor of the Sunday Independent. He was 
designated to speak on behalf of the Independent group of newspapers by the editor-in-
chief Stephen Rae. Paul Cunningham, now a news anchor on RTÉ radio’s flagship news 
programme Morning Ireland, and author of a book on the impacts of climate change on 
Ireland (Cunningham, 2008), was also a key interview subject. Non-media actors 
interviewed comprised two former government ministers (John Gormley, former minister 
for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and Eamon Ryan, former minister 
for Energy, Communications and Natural Resources, both serving in office from 2007 to 
2011) who were in office for much of the timeframe examined by this thesis, and their 
departmental media advisors (Liam Reid, John Downing and Bríd McGrath). The 
perspectives of these actors allow for access to privileged information and expert insight 
from those most closely involved in climate change communication during the examined 
timeframe.  
	
The data from these interviews is discussed in relation to several theoretical perspectives. 
The responses of the interview subjects are placed within the scholarship of agenda 
systems. Many of these systems place importance on the role of “information feedback” 
provided by the media (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Liu, 
Lindquist and Vedlitz, 2011), suggesting that the media are an important component of 
such systems. Approaches from the sociology of journalism are also considered. Such 
scholarship approaches issue dynamics from a more media-centric position, examining 
the norms and work practices of journalists and their effects on issue coverage. The 
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influence of news values – attributes a topic must exhibit in order to be attractive to 
journalists – is found to play a key role in media coverage of climate change. 
	
The choice of interview subjects also allows insight into the interaction between 
journalism and public relations. There has been an antagonistic relationship between these 
two areas (McNair, 2004), with many journalists resistant to the growing influence of PR 
practitioners (Franklin, 2003; Lewis, Williams and Franklin, 2008). Two of the 
interviewees worked as journalists in national print titles before their employment as 
ministerial media advisors and therefore have insight into this tension from both 
perspectives. John Downing had previously worked as a political reporter and 
commentator for a number of publications before being selected by the Green Party to be 
their appointee to the Government Information Service. During the period of the Fianna 
Fáil-Green Party coalition, he held the post of Deputy Government Press Secretary, and 
has since returned to political journalism with the Irish Independent. Liam Reid was 
environment correspondent with the Irish Times before accepting the post as media 
advisor to Gormley; he is now head of corporate affairs with Diageo. The third 
interviewee who worked as a media advisor – Bríd McGrath, advisor to Ryan – had no 
previous journalistic experience, having worked in the NGO sector and the civil service.  
	
The perspectives uncovered in the interviews carried out for this research will also be 
discussed in relation to the professional norms of journalists (Schudson, 1989; Deuze, 
2005a; Beam, Weaver and Brownlee, 2009; Pihl-Thingvad, 2015) and their understanding 
of objectivity (M. Schudson, 2001; Hiles and Hinnant, 2014). The choice of interview 
subjects, comprising as it does a sample of specialist correspondents, allows for 
investigations into the extent to which such journalists advocate for the environment, and 
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the extent to which they espouse a “journalism of attachment” (Bell, 1998; Ward, 1998) 
with regard to the environment. 
	
In other sections below, the extent to which the Green Party influenced media coverage 
of climate change during their period in office is considered. Green Parties are considered 
“issue owners” when it comes to environmental issues and their activities to promote 
environmental concerns up the policy and media agenda can have implications for the 
agendas of other parties (Abou-chadi, 2014). The entry into government of the Green 
Party in 2007 was closely followed by a local banking crisis and the global financial crisis. 
The impact of these events on media coverage of climate change is also discussed with 
relation to theories of media attention in times of financial crisis (Djerf-Pierre, 2012a). 
Finally, the extent to which the newspaper titles in the sample examined in this thesis 
were able to offer alternative narratives concerning climate change (Krovel, 2011), and 
the performance of individual newspaper titles is evaluated and discussed, with reference 
to the interview data and concepts relating to journalistic narrative building (Parisi, 1997).  
	
6.2 Situating the interviews in context 
	
	
Some background information is required in order to situate the comments of the 
interviewees in context (Van Den Berg, 2005). In the general election of June 2007, 
Fianna Fáil emerged as the largest party, yet did not achieve an overall parliamentary 
majority. A coalition was formed between Fianna Fáil (77 seats), the Green Party (6), the 
Progressive Democrats (2) and four independent deputies. The negotiations for the 
formation of this coalition government occurred in the early part of the timeframe 
examined by this thesis. The Greens were allocated two ministries, and allowed to 
nominate two members of the Seanad (Senate). In May 2009, the Green Party initiated a 
renegotiation of the programme for government of the coalition in the light of changed 
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financial situation of the country. On May 6, 2008, Bertie Ahern, the leader of Fianna Fáil 
and Taoiseach (prime minister) resigned and was replaced by Brian Cowen. In March 
2010, two Fianna Fáil ministers resigned. Following the collapse of the Irish banking 
system and a severe reduction in government income from property-related taxes, a 
memorandum of understanding, commonly referred to as a “bailout”, was signed by the 
Irish government and the “troika” of the International Monetary Fund, the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank (Fraser, Murphy and Kelly, 2013; Mercille, 
2014a; Preston and Silke, 2014). Six more Fianna Fáil ministers resigned in January 2011. 
In the same month, the Green Party announced their withdrawal from government and 
their intention to support the passing of a finance bill from the opposition benches. The 
bill was passed on January 29, and the Dáil (parliament) was dissolved immediately 
thereafter. In the following election, the Greens lost all their six parliamentary seats, 
failing to achieve 2% of the vote which would entitle them to state funding as a political 
party. Fianna Fáil lost 51 seats (Gallagher and Marsh, 2007, 2011; Breen, 2012). 
	
Some more specific references in the interviews also require a context. For example, the 
Fianna Fáil-Green Party government published a Climate Change Response Bill in 
December, 2010, just weeks before the government’s collapse and during a period in 
which the country’s finances were effectively under the control of the “troika”. This 
legislation was agreed in the programme for government, was agreed at cabinet (Gormley 
interview) but, due to the timing of its introduction as well as its contents, received 
widespread negative reaction (Tol, 2010). Also, at the behest of the Green Party, the 
government introduced a ban on the hunting of live stags in Ireland (Government of 
Ireland, 2010; Parsons, 2010). This legislation came into effect on July 10, 2010; again, 
it was seen as a frivolous endeavor given the situation of the nation’s finances. It is evident 
in hindsight that, in permitting Fianna Fáil to first delay and then control the timing of the 
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introduction of the hunting and climate change legislation to parliament, the Green Party 
allowed this narrative to emerge. Furthermore, Green Party governance required 
consensus among the parliamentary party on any decision, and this arrangement delayed 
a decision to leave government in the interests of seeing two cherished pieces of 
legislation – the climate change bill and legislation providing for a directly elected mayor 
– through the parliamentary process (Minihan, 2015).  
 
6.3 News values and journalistic norms 
 
Some events and issues are more attractive to the media because they display certain 
characteristics that align them with journalists’ notions of what “makes a good story”. 
These “news values” include discreet events (as opposed to long-term trends) that happen 
close by to people who resemble the story’s intended audience (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; 
Harcup and O’Neill, 2001). Drama, and the presence of heroes and/or villains (Jones, 
2014) add to the likelihood of inclusion on the news agenda. These news values have 
approximate equivalents in the scholarship of framing. For instance, the news values of 
immediacy and discretion are echoed in the preference for episodic rather than thematic 
frames; thus, the framing choices of journalists bear out the news values of their 
profession. An example of this preference for coverage to focus on single, discreet events 
rather than placing them in longer-term contexts occurred with the reporting of two 
extreme weather events in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico in autumn 2017 (hurricanes 
Harvey and Irma) whereby coverage focused on the individual hurricanes and largely 
missed the opportunity to place them in the larger content of climate change (Radtke, 
2017).  
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There was widespread agreement among interview subjects that, as a journalistic topic, 
climate change did not align with news values adhered to in newsrooms. For instance, 
climate change is perceived as invisible, distant in time and often geographically, it is 
complex and data-heavy; it is “for nerds, by nerds, to nerds” (Bríd McGrath, personal 
interview, February 8, 2017). The lack of a direct, visible impact of climate change in 
Ireland was also seen a barrier to media coverage, which in turn rendered the issue 
imperceptible and esoteric to an Irish media audience. According to one interviewee: “It 
was niche, people didn't really believe it and they thought it might affect Mauritius, the 
Seychelles, Bangladesh and small island nations somewhere far away but not us” (Ibid.). 
The absence of tangibility means the problem of climate change is difficult to convey:  
Human beings are just not psychologically geared up to deal with the issue of climate 
change. Because you are talking about a gas which is odourless and invisible and which 
is apparently being emitted in vast quantities. You can't see it and it's causing or is going 
to cause massive changes in our climate. That's not something people can immediately 
identify with, it's abstract almost, so therefore, you know, the media do try and make it 
more tangible by showing photographs of polar bears on small bits of ice and things like 
that, but for the vast majority of people it isn't part of their daily lives. They can't actually 
conceive it… So I don’t blame the media. It’s the concept itself which is abstract and hard 
to communicate. (John Gormley, personal interview, April 13, 2015). 
 
The long time-lines involved in climate change also made it difficult for journalists to 
cover: “It's very difficult to write about something, a front-page story about something 
that's going to happen potentially in about 20 years’ time” (Claire O’Sullivan, personal 
interview, June 16, 2015). This view was echoed by a veteran environmental journalist:  
“…you're talking about the future rather than the present as such, even though there're 
elements of the future in the present, in the sense of the typhoons in the Philippines and 
all that kind of stuff, that may or may not be attributable to the climate change, but it's the 
kind of stuff that's likely to happen with more regularity as time goes on. So yes, it is a 
difficult thing to cover because a lot of people are focused on short-term issues and that 
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includes politicians. And politicians do not have a long-term view in general.” (Frank 
McDonald, personal interview, May 15, 2015).  
 
Apart from the imperceptibility of climate change, in Ireland at least, and the long time-
horizons predicted for some impacts, the repetitious nature of climate change as a media 
topic can be a factor in editorial decisions on coverage. John Gormley recalled speaking 
at the first COP (in Berlin in 1995) and saying that “we have 10 years to do something 
about this and then, of course, at Copenhagen we were saying we’ve only 10 years 
left…The messages are so doom-ey and gloomy, so people are saying, ‘well you said that 
10 years ago and we’re still around, so, you know, what's the story here?’” (John Gormley, 
personal interview, April 13, 2015). It can seem, as several interview subjects stated, that 
climate change is the same story over and over again with slight changes to climate data 
or small increments to scientific modelling projections:  
“…if you’re only having confirmation by ways of scientific evidence then there is a sense 
from an editor’s [point of view]: ‘haven’t we seen that before, haven’t we done that 
before?’ To take it in TV terms, in 2005 we went out to Greenland and we went to the 
Jakobshavn glacier, which calves the tallest vertical icebergs in the world, and we were 
out there with the icebergs and we were talking about the melt, but if I was to go back 
now, I'm sure, or if George [Lee, currently RTÉ’s agriculture and environment 
correspondent] tried to do it now, there would be a sense ‘We’ve done that already, the 
Arctic ice, we did that, we spent the money on it’. So, there’s a repetitious nature to some 
of the evidence and that militates against editors who are always looking for something 
new. It doesn't seem to be new. (Paul Cunningham, personal interview, April 24, 2017). 
 
The repetitious nature of the story of climate change as a homogenous entity during the 
early part of the timeframe under consideration led to difficulties, especially for broadcast 
journalists such as Paul Cunningham. He spoke about the dearth of visual “hooks”: once 
you had broadcast footage of polar bears and melting Arctic ice, there were few 
alternatives: “How many times can I use the Polar ice cap? You can’t, so you have to find 
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something new” (Paul Cunningham, personal interview, April 24, 2015). It also posed a 
challenge for columnists writing about environmental matters on a weekly basis: “…over 
that period I was essentially trying to find ways of presenting the same argument week 
after week and trying to find different ways to engage people, and what might work and 
so on” (John Gibbons, personal interview, May 1, 2015). The news values inherent in 
journalistic practice affected the nature of climate change coverage. Although IPCC 
reports and climate data were published at intervals, in essence the “story” of climate 
change remained the same, even though details and particular data might change: that 
GHG emissions were causing the global temperature to rise. Furthermore, a relatively 
small cohort of sources was available to journalists, and visual imagery associated with 
the topic was becoming hackneyed (Paul Cunningham, personal interview, April 24, 
2015). The prospect of pitching a climate change story to an editor given these constraints 
was summed up by one environmental correspondent:  
“… because if you went up to an editor and said, ‘listen, I’ve got a climate change story’ 
you know they’re going, in their mind, ‘this is going to have John Sweeney [IPCC author 
and geographer, Maynooth University], it’s going to have a fucking polar bear, it’s going 
to have some Arctic ice, and it’s going to have Paul saying “we’re all going to die”.’ (Ibid). 
 
This aspect also has implications for public engagement with the issue. Studies on 
consumer behaviour have shown that continued exposure to the same message may 
provoke a negative reaction (Tellis, 1997; Campbell and Keller, 2003), while extended 
media coverage of the same topic can lead to the exhaustion of new sources and 
information (Vasterman, 2005). Specialist environmental journalists may even become 
disenchanted with a news subject over extended periods (Djerf Pierre, 1996). Taken 
together, these factors (public resistance to oft-repeated message; scarcity of “new angles” 
for journalists, and disenchantment among journalists) may combine to create “issue 
fatigue” (Djerf-Pierre, 2012a, p. 501).  
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The news value of proximity – that events taking place close to the site of publication are 
selected above those happening in distant locations – also influenced climate change 
coverage. One environmental reporter mentioned that she would have encountered 
resistance to suggestions for coverage of distant environmental impacts had she suggested 
them. She stated that she “would have been laughed out of it” if she had suggested doing 
a story on the impacts of climate change on the Arctic, for instance. Even more local 
stories, such as flooding risks in Cork’s docklands area, were declined.  
That is it again: if anything is esoteric, if anything is long-term, they [editors] have no 
interest. But once people can feel it, and it's practically proven, then you could [pitch 
stories] …When it was just esoteric, it was more difficult. But once it started being 
translated into: well you might not be able to afford to run two cars, you mightn’t be able 
to afford to work 30 miles away from home, when it was actually impacting on people's 
lives and their aspirations, then I think it was getting more inches in the paper, you know. 
(Claire O’Sullivan, personal interview, June 16, 2015). 
 
There is no evidence from these interviews that the journalists interviewed suffered from 
“issue fatigue”; however, several suggested that their editors became resistant to climate 
change as a story topic because of its repetitive nature, and it remains a possibility that 
the public may have done likewise. It was apparent in the interviews that journalists were 
advocating for the environment in certain situations, especially when pitching stories to 
their superiors. On occasion during the interviews, the issue of climate coverage and 
climate action was conflated by the interview subject, giving the impression that they 
intended coverage as a motivating factor towards action. This throws up concerns of 
journalistic balance and objectivity.  
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Although journalism which is perceived to be biased is the source of much criticism of 
the media (Blumler and Cushion, 2014), it may be more valued by journalists themselves, 
who strive to be impartial in order to remain credible (Deuze, 2005a) than it is by the 
public (Gil de Zúñiga and Hinsley, 2013). There is abundant evidence that newsrooms 
create their own culture, and newspapers and media organisations transmit unspoken 
attitudes to social issues to their reporters (Breed, 1955; Tuchman, 1972; Reese and 
Ballinger, 2001), making objectivity impossible in any case.  
 
Environment correspondents “express a great deal of personal interest in environmental 
issues, but differ in the extent to which they believe they should engage in ‘moral 
partisanship’ or ‘advocacy’ but some see it as their duty to inform publics through taking 
on an advocacy role (Anderson, 2009, p. 172). Indeed, the presence of an experienced 
environment or science correspondent can help to dilute other coverage which contains 
sceptic viewpoints. Even in media organisations which give prominence to sceptic 
arguments in opinion articles, reporting and commentary written by specialist 
correspondents either do not contain such views, or ensure that they do not go uncontested 
(Painter and Gavin, 2015). As journalists become more familiar with their specialised 
subject field, gaining “interactional expertise”: (Hiles and Hinnant, 2014), they gain 
confidence in explaining the complexities of science to a lay public, even if they stop short 
of becoming the kind of “knowledge journalist” who synthesises information and often 
advocates for a particular point of view (Nisbet, 2013b; Nisbet and Fahy, 2015). This 
stance is related to calls for a journalism of attachment, whereby journalists are exhorted 
to take a moral stance when confronted by situations (such as the Bosnian War) which 
throw up stark moral dilemmas (Bell, 1998; Ward, 1998), and to the impossibility of 
remaining impartial at such times (John Pilger, quoted in McLoughlin, 2016, p.39) 
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The journalists interviewed for this research fulfilled an advocacy role in so far as they 
wished to see levels of coverage increased so that the public could be more informed about 
the issue of climate change. In some cases, they commented negatively on the readiness 
of their news editors to accept climate-related news stories. Most were aware of the danger 
of “balance as bias” (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004) in reporting debates about climate 
science as if scientific opinion were divided equally on the issue, instead of 97% versus 
3%. Indeed, most stated that they never sought such “balance” in their reporting by 
contacting sources who denied climate science or advocated inaction on climate change. 
They also exemplified the role of specialist correspondent identified by scholars as those 
who are “treated more as independent experts, free to make judgments” (Schudson, 2001, 
p. 163), or who are seen as star reporters, independent and removed from the “vast 
journalistic sub-proletariat” of ordinary reporters (Bourdieu, 1998), and who have the 
ability to shape coverage “away from asking basic questions about the science to exposing 
the political games and pressures.” (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005, p. 1465).  
 
Journalists are reputed to be poor at mathematics and their professional culture has prized 
language skills over numeracy (Harrison, 2016), even though reporters have the 
knowledge but lack the confidence to deal well with data-heavy topics (Maier, 2003). 
Journalists’ perceived lack of numeracy makes a topic such as climate change inherently 
unattractive. As a ministerial advisor out it: “It's data heavy, it is big, there's hockey sticks, 
hockey curves, you have various people out who are saying there's nothing happening” 
(Liam Reid, personal interview, May 19, 2015). One interviewee, who has high numeracy 
skills, remarked that he is now tasked with reporting on other data-heavy topics, such is 
the dearth of numerate newsroom colleagues (Paul Melia, personal interview, August 6, 
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2017). Thus, the statistical complexity of climate change, added to the other aspects of 
the topic which do not align with journalists’ news values, make it a challenging topic for 
journalists to write about.  
 
Another disadvantage of climate change as a journalistic topic is negative feedback from 
a motivated cohort of individuals advocating for views of climate change outside the 
mainstream. The “neuralgic reaction” from some individuals to climate change coverage 
was cited by two journalists, one of whom mentioned it as a factor which made climate 
change a difficult media topic:  
“You are going to get the abusive text, you are going to get the phone calls, you are going 
to get the ‘you don’t know who you’re talking to’, you’re going to get the ‘didn’t you read 
this document, that document’, they’re going to start tree rings, they’re going to start 
talking about CO2 levels in the Middle Ages. All of that type of stuff comes up.” (Paul 
Cunningham, personal interview, April 24, 2015). 
 
This section has discussed perspectives from the sociology of journalism practice which 
argue that climate change is in many ways a challenging topic for journalists, a position 
supported by the interview data collected for this research. There are other perspectives 
on the media, particularly those that step outside newsroom culture and work practices, 
such as media theories from a political economy perspective, which have valuable 
contributions to make regarding media coverage of climate change; these will be 
discussed in a later section dealing with individual media organisations and their coverage 
of the issue. Of course, it is also evident that, despite the challenges discussed in this 
chapter, the journalists interviewed did manage to cover climate change for their 
publications. How they, and others seeking to influence coverage, framed the issue is 
discussed in the next section. 
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6.4 How journalists frame climate change 
 
 
The theoretical development of framing as an approach to examining media texts was 
discussed earlier (see Chapter 3, section 3.4), and examples of framing as applied to media 
coverage of climate change were also analysed (see Chapter 2, section 2.15). In this 
section, the testimony of journalists, politicians and political operatives is considered with 
regard to their framing strategies. It is useful to bear in mind that theorists differ on 
whether framing is an unconscious activity (Lakoff, 2009), or whether it entails some 
deliberate elements of selection and exclusion (de Blasio and Sorice, 2013). When it 
comes to journalists, there may be elements of both dynamics at play: journalists, through 
frequent repetition as part of their work routines, may utilise certain frames semi-
automatically on some stories, while on other unusual or complex stories, they may have 
to exercise conscious judgment. Some of the journalists interviewed for this thesis tended 
to adopt framing strategies common in their news organisations. For instance, newspapers 
such as the Irish Independent and Sunday Independent had a “house style” when it came 
to framing most issues. Their reporters used the economic frame, with a special emphasis 
on financial impacts on individuals or households (Paul Melia, personal interview, August 
6, 2017; Cormac Bourke, personal interview, August 1, 2017). Others were more 
deliberative in their framing approaches, trying our creative approaches in order to satisfy 
their editors (Paul Cunningham, personal interview, April 24, 2015; Claire O’Sullivan, 
personal interview, June 16, 2015). 
 
A senior editor also confirmed that a so-called “punter-friendly” approach was common 
in his media group, suggesting it was almost a template for coverage of many issues 
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(Cormac Bourke, personal interview, August 1, 2017). An example cited by one 
interviewee, which falls outside the scope of this thesis, was the publication of Ireland’s 
National Mitigation Plan (Government of Ireland, 2017) in July, 2017. The document was 
criticised by the Climate Change Advisory Council for a lack of policy proposals (Climate 
Change Advisory Council, 2017a). In an example of their policy of relating complex, 
abstract issues to the everyday lives of their readers, the Irish Independent covered the 
story by highlighting a proposal to reduce the speed limit on motorways as a means of 
reducing CO2 emissions from the transport sector (Paul Melia, personal interview, August 
6, 2017).  
 
Opportunity and political framings could also attract the attention of editors. Coverage 
which emphasised the potential of responses to climate change to create jobs was also put 
forward by the environment correspondent of the Irish Independent, who suggested that 
stories of entrepreneurial success in the environmental sector were likely to be published. 
Writing about the politics of climate change was also a means by which the topic could 
be presented to readers. On occasion, this coverage could relate to Ireland’s emissions 
targets: “there was also a political side to it, there was the question of European targets 
and Ireland’s inability to match those targets and so were able to bash ministers up, saying 
‘you were going to do X, you were going to do Y’. (Paul Cunningham, personal interview, 
April 24, 2015). The annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs) also provided an 
opportunity to present preview articles looking forward to the event, coverage from the 
event itself and reflective pieces in the event’s aftermath. The conferences also provided 
journalists with access to national politicians. For one journalist, they “were a focus. We 
also had delegates going to them, so ‘who were they?’, ‘what were they saying?’, ‘what 
aspects were they going to be reporting on?’” (Ibid.). For another, however, they failed to 
	 275	
provide an opportunity for coverage: “COPs? No. Just even the word COP, no. Absolutely 
not.” (Claire O’Sullivan, personal interview, June 16, 2015). 
 
 
Journalists still working in the area stated that climate change could be related to other 
topics, such as extreme weather, planning, energy and water policy, waste and resource 
management. One journalist cited the example of proposals to reduce the number of 
diesel-powered vehicles in Ireland, which is put forward primarily as a health concern.  
“…the push on diesel is more about air quality than climate, but obviously, there's both 
in it. And we need to kind of, I think, look at more the climate change debate in terms of 
just an environmental and health debate. Not necessarily that it's climate change, it’s doom 
and gloom for future generations. Climate change includes quality of life for all. Having 
less cars on the streets of Dublin is good for people in Dublin. It's a nicer place to walk 
around, it's easier to get around. If we're talking about farming, you know, being less 
polluting in farming means there's less sewage and the rivers, it's cleaner, there's more 
wildlife, there's more biodiversity. I think we might need to start framing it like that.” 
(Paul Melia, peraonal interview, August 6, 2017) 
 
 
A newspaper editor suggested that dealing with environmental issues was a means of 
bringing climate change to public attention without addressing it directly. The 
management of resources such as energy and water, the introduction of energy-saving 
measures in the built environment, changes to motor tax regimes and similar topics can 
be used to present aspects of climate change: “…you can talk to people about the big, bad 
wolf of climate change and they don't quite know what it means…the best way to tell 
people about the bigger picture is to give them something they can understand from their 
own end. I think that's the general principle, certainly for papers like the Irish Independent 
and the Sunday Independent” (Cormac Bourke, personal interview, 2017). One 
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environment correspondent makes an effort to present stories about planning, energy and 
flooding in the context of climate change (Paul Melia, personal interview, 2017). 
 
There is a disparity between how journalists describe their own framing strategies and the 
findings relating to the presence of frames in media texts. Firstly, reporters stress the 
economic framing of the issue, generally suggesting that successful coverage addresses 
financial impacts on individuals and family finances. However, the data shows that 
political frames dominate the coverage of climate change in the Irish print media. This 
disconnect between the nature of the actual coverage and journalists’ perceptions about 
how they frame it suggest that the political framing may take place at the sub-conscious 
level, or at least be semi-automatic, the “default frame” so to speak, while other frames, 
such as the opportunity or economic frames, require conscious decision-making on the 
part of the reporter. Secondly, it is evident that the primary audience as far as the journalist 
in concerned is not the reading public but the commissioning editor to whom they report. 
Their framing strategies are aimed first and foremost at this managerial level, rather than 
at a wider audience. The requirement to satisfy fellow journalists as a first step in the 
publication of climate change coverage serves to reinforce journalistic norms and news 
values and maintain a journalistic culture of coverage (Schultz, 2007; Gade, 2008). A 
third aspect of journalistic perspectives relates to the de-politicisation and re-politicisation 
debate referred to in the previous chapter (Chapter 5, section 5.19). Several journalists 
suggest that climate change may be covered without making the story “about” climate 
change, i.e. by focusing on constituent issues such as waste, water, public health or 
flooding. This is akin to the “third way” of communicating about climate change, 
threading a path between polarising political debates and outright denial (Nisbet, 2013). 
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6.5 The framing strategies of ministers and their media advisors 
 
 
In considering the data from interviews with government ministers and their media 
advisors, it is apparent that a variety of framing strategies were deployed, ranging from a 
personal responsibility frame to frames more associated with ecomodern discourses. It 
should be noted that research into the role of media advisors, “handlers” and “spin 
doctors” comprises a vibrant sub-category of political communications scholarship. The 
role of media advisors has been declared anathema to “the communicative and discursive 
standards of a healthy democracy” (McNair, 2004, p. 325). The rise of the industry has 
been charted (Michie, 1998; Miller and Dinan, 2000) and the impact of the industry’s 
activities on the political sphere has been criticised (Franklin, 2003). Political 
communications scholar Brian McNair has argued over several books, essays and articles 
that public relations strategies are necessary in a modern media age and have been unfairly 
demonised (McNair, 2004). Indeed, the material supplied by PR companies – so-called 
information subsidies (Gandy, 1982) – is becoming an ever-more important source of 
information for journalists as their numbers decrease and their workload grows (Brumfiel, 
2009; Fahy and Nisbet, 2011). Furthermore, as media organisations rely less on staff 
journalists and more on freelance contributors, the similarities between these freelance or 
contract journalists and PR operatives grow. Both are involved in “selling” something, 
and both rely on their pitching skills to editors (Evans, 2010).  It is difficult to argue with 
McNair when he says that it is impossible to “uninvent” political PR, that it is a fact of 
political discourse (2004) and therefore must be accounted for in the dynamics of frame 
competition. 
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According to one media advisor, there were differing communications strategies on the 
part of the media teams working with the two Green Party ministers, partly because of the 
different policy area covered by the ministers’ respective departments. The Department 
of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources was concerned with energy network 
improvements, renewable energy technology, a new post code system, incentives for 
electric vehicles and related matters. It was the minister’s policy to link many of these 
policy initiatives to climate change. The Department of Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government were involved with planning reform, the introduction of a carbon budget and 
the examination of various policy approaches to carbon trading, and the linking to climate 
change was not so explicit in departmental communications (Bríd McGrath, personal 
interview, 2017). It is apparent from this characterisation that the Department of Energy 
was concerned with positive responses to emissions reduction, while the Department of 
Environment appeared to be more concerned with more punitive approaches. These 
differing approaches correspond broadly with the “carrot and stick” strategy to changing 
public behaviour in relation to climate change (Stiglitz, 2006; Stern, 2007), whereby 
desired behaviour is rewarded in the form of grants and other incentives and undesired 
behaviour is discouraged by way of taxes, levies and other disincentives. It appears that, 
in this case, the Department of Energy was more carrot, while the Department of 
Environment was more stick. 
 
The media advisor at the Department of Energy followed a strategy of story placement, 
selecting the most receptive media outlet for a given topic.  
“If you wanted to talk to middle Ireland about some rural broadband thing? Into the Indo 
[Irish Independent]. If you wanted to talk about the way you're reforming TLAC [Top 
Level Appointments Committee] to get good civil servants? Into the [Irish] Times. You 
have good visuals? Onto RTÉ.” (Bríd McGrath, personal interview, February 8, 2017). 
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The deputy government press secretary developed a shorthand for two different 
approaches to framing climate change-related material: “widgets” (technological, data-
dense policy initiatives) and “the missions” (impact of climate change overseas told via 
“a bit of the missionary-type, Irish development aid approach to life”). (John Downing, 
personal interview, February 23, 2017). 
 
There was debate within the Green Party as to how best to frame climate change 
communication. The deputy government press secretary believed the economic frame, 
emphasising domestic financial impacts and savings from certain measures, and the 
disaster frame, foregrounding Ireland’s vulnerability at the end of long energy supply 
chain, should be employed. Others believed climate change should be more explicitly 
mentioned at the primary reason for introducing such policies.  
“My own view and tendency was: the better way to approach it would've been to talk 
about conserving energy, cutting your heating bill, cutting our lighting and electricity and 
all of that and by extension cutting Ireland’s dependence on gas and oil and imported… 
particularly the parlous position we were in importing, we’re at the end of the chain, most 
of it coming through Britain. And I felt that it would be better to go that way. There was 
a debate periodically within the Greens, Eamon Ryan among them, saying ‘We're Green 
and we'll stay green and we'll talk about climate change’, deal with it directly rather than 
trying to sell it by a roundabout route…” (John Downing, personal interview, February 
23, 2017). 
 
Here, another difference in approach between the two Green Party ministers emerges. 
John Downing, who worked more closely with Minister Gormley, favoured 
communicating about climate change more indirectly – the “roundabout route” – rather 
than linking climate explicitly to policy initiatives. Minister Ryan proposed explicit 
linkage of climate change to Green Party policy. It is worth noting that, despite Ryan’s 
emphasis on climate change as a motivating factor behind many of his departmental 
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initiatives, his media strategy was seen as more successful than Gormley’s (Bríd McGrath, 
personal interview, February 8, 2017). 
 
It was possible to interest some media organisations in coverage of climate change related 
events, such as COPs, but only if there was conflict involved, as the media wished to 
report on these events through the political or ideological contest frame (Liam Reid, 
personal interview, May 19, 2015). Another strategy for interesting media organisations 
in the issue was to “pay them to do it” (Eamon Ryan, personal interview, February 1, 
2017) by sponsoring programme content. However, proactive communications strategies 
could often have unintended consequences and contribute to a media stereotype of the 
Green Party. A Green Party minister stated that a video campaign to promote public 
engagement on the broad issue of climate change was followed up with recommendations 
for personal behavior change; the approach proved counterproductive.  
“We did try to get them [the media] interested [in climate change]. And to an extent they 
were. If I could be slightly self-critical here, at the very start…we launched this massive 
campaign, on which we spent far too much money in my view, in retrospect, on 
awareness-raising, you know. We got this public relations campaign…It was on TV, ads, 
comparing our commitment to climate change to the great Michael Collins…And then we 
kind of matched that with what we can do as individuals, you know what I mean? …We 
were now going to get Europe to change over to these new lightbulbs which use less 
energy, I made a few trips… and we did, we got Europe to agree. They were going to 
have a long time-lag to bring it in, but we wanted to do it unilaterally. But again, this 
could be in the butt of jokes, you know: ‘this is what the Greens are doing’. If you put 
your mind back to that first year, people were saying, well, the Greens are about lightbulbs 
and bikes, you know? That's their agenda. And it kind of trivialised the whole climate 
change thing. You know, that's what it's about. But we were trying to make them see, to 
make the connection between what they were doing in their daily lives and the big, big 
issue of climate change. And when you think about it, what other ways have you got to 
do that?” (John Gormley, personal interview, April 13, 2015). 
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It is notable that, in the statement above, Gormley moves from an inclusive view of “what 
we can do” to deal with climate change to a more top-down approach of trying to “make 
them [the public] see” the necessity for climate action. This strategy facilitates dismissal 
on the grounds that it is patronising and “talks down” to the public. 
 
 
6.6 ‘Realo’ versus ‘fundi’ framings in media coverage of climate change  
 
 
The media advisors working with the Green Party ministers at this time employed various 
strategies to interest the media in climate change and other environmental issues, 
attempting to place stories in particular outlets, to persuade print and broadcast media 
cover certain issues and initiatives, but they also had to respond to inquiries from the 
media themselves, necessitating a switch from a proactive role in generating coverage and 
pursuing their communications agenda to a more passive role in responding to the agendas 
of others. Sometimes, this involved trying to control the narrative of a particular story 
(“jumping on grenades”, as it is known [Bríd McGrath, personal interview, February 8, 
2017]).  
“Apparently, this is quite classic, some of the other guys used to say, some of the other 
people around government used to say ‘We have our proactive plans and we've always 
been doing this’, but in the end, in the end of the end, it always ends up [that you’re] 
reacting, firefighting, trying to manage, trying to dial down, trying to deal.” (John 
Downing, personal interview, February 23, 2017). 
 
One interviewee drew attention to the contrasting approaches of the media advisors of the 
respective Green Party ministers, suggesting these differing approaches may have 
influenced the tone, if not the level, of coverage of the Green Party in particular and of 
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climate change more generally. She characterised Eamon Ryan’s media approach as 
positive, pro-business and focused on potential and economic opportunity, while John 
Gormley’s media team, in her view, were more concerned with negative actions and 
prohibitions and foregrounding what the Greens were doing as individuals.  
“So there were two sets of messages on the environment going out into the world. Even, 
on the one hand, Eamon was all ‘Yes, we can’ and John was all ‘You better not do that’, 
so it was just even tonally, they were different, not to mention let's say internally in a 
political sense…there was different communications strategies being played out in front 
of us. They [Gormley’s media team] were all about carbon credits and all that kind of 
stuff, and not taking the government jet, and making it all about what the Greens were 
physically doing themselves on a day to day basis, and was there a garda driver behind 
them on the bikes with the files, and all that kind of stuff. I never went into that detail” 
(Bríd McGrath, personal interview, February 8, 2017). 
 
 
She also believed that employing two former journalists as media advisors may have 
contributed to an adversarial relationship between Gormely’s media team and the press.  
The Gormley guys as far as I could hear and see in the paper, because the stuff was so 
bilious, we're effing and blinding with their ex-colleagues all day and all night. That's part 
of what you get from getting a journalist into that position. So you're coming straight out 
of the newsroom and all of these guys were your friends and you'd hang around press 
conferences with them and go for dinner parties with them. Suddenly you have the 
information that they want, that you used to be chasing. (Ibid). 
 
It is apparent there were differing approaches to communication about climate change 
from the two Green Party ministers and their media advisors. For instance, John Gormley 
wished to relate the issue of climate change to individual behavior, while Eamon Ryan 
had come to the view that a broader approach, focusing on the economy’s dependency on 
fossil fuels, is more productive. The emphasis on individual actions serves to make the 
public feel guilty about their lifestyle choices and resistant to engagement on climate 
change. 
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“…if you're so feckin’ virtuous and kind of goody two-shoes, it just gets a bit sickening 
after a while, so I think we've moved on slightly from that phase.” (Eamon Ryan, personal 
interview, February 1, 2017). 
 
These differing communications strategies echo wider debates in the Green movement 
between so-called “fundis” and “realos” (Doherty, 1992). In some ways, the approach of 
the Department of the Environment communications effort in concentrating on the 
personal lifestyle choices of the Green Party parliamentary representatives, on individual 
emissions reduction actions, on taxation as a policy instrument, is a watered-down version 
of the ‘fundi’ position that radical transformation of economic and political systems and 
individual lifestyles is required in order to protect the environment, while the approach of 
the Department of Energy in emphasising solutions, often technology based, resonates 
with the ‘realo’ view that change can be effected by working with the existing social, 
political and economic systems. The effectiveness of these strategies is considered in the 
next section by (i) looking at the presence of coverage of the Green Party in the corpus of 
706 climate articles, and (ii) examining the data from the 12 interviews carried out for this 
research regarding the impact the Greens may have had on the levels and content of 
climate change coverage. 
 
6.7 The effect of the Green Party in government on coverage of climate change  
 
The scholarship of political science regards Green parties as niche parties who mostly 
compete on a single issue. They are “issue owners” when it comes to environmental 
matters, and when (or if) they achieve electoral success, there is an incentive for other 
parties to de-emphasise their own environmental policies (Abou-chadi, 2014, p. 422). 
Green parties have had little success in gaining media coverage in national outlets, and, 
despite efforts to diversify their communications strategies to include the full spectrum of 
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policy issues, have largely been unsuccessful in dispelling their image as a single-issue 
party (Hughes, 2016). The Irish Greens were closely identified with environmental 
policies and constantly sought to persuade the public and other politicians of the 
importance of climate change as a social and political issue (Boyle, 2006; Minihan, 2015; 
Bríd McGrath, personal interview, February 8, 2017). It seems axiomatic that having two 
Green Party ministers focused on climate change would increase media interest in the 
issue, and a majority of the journalists interviewed strongly believed it did so; perhaps a 
more interesting question from a media studies and political science point of view is 
whether a single-issue party (or, at least, a party perceived as single-issue) negatively 
affects media coverage of their core issue once they have fallen out of favour with the 
electorate. 
 
6.7.1 The extent of media coverage of the Green Party  
 
Coverage of climate change which featured references to the Green Party was coded for 
the presence of frames, but the party was also coded as a topic in its own right. There are 
118 references to Green Party as a topic, and the party is the main topic in 27 of the 706 
articles in the corpus. These references will be examined in more detail below, but in 
general they comprised reports of announcements or statements by the party’s members 
or analysis of the party’s performance or policy positions. The Irish Times covered the 
Greens more than any other publications, with 55 references and 16 stories devoted 
mainly to the party. This coverage was predominantly written by specialist (political) 
correspondents, and references to the party were found to be evenly represented both in 
news reporting and opinion articles. 
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Table 6.1: Coverage of the Green Party as main and sub topic 
Publication	 Main	topic	 Sub-topic	
The	Irish	Times	 16	 55	
Sunday	Tribune	 4	 12	
Sunday	Independent	 3	 9	
Irish	Independent	 2	 20	
Irish	Examiner	 1	 4	
Irish	Daily	Mail	 0	 2	
Sunday	Business	Post	 0	 4	
 
 
In addition to the coding outlined above, a quantitative content analysis was carried out, 
examining coverage of climate change which mentions the Green Party and all climate 
change coverage. It can be seen that climate coverage mentioning the Greens broadly 
follows the pattern of coverage of the issue more generally, albeit at a much lower level, 
suggests the two topics are linked to some degree. It is notable, however, that the peak in 
coverage of climate change in December 2009 is not reflected in the coverage linking the 
issue to the Greens, so the link is not a straightforward one. It is also apparent that 
coverage of climate change which also contains reference to the Green Party accounts for 
between 7 and 13% of all media coverage of the issue.  
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Fig 6.1: Climate change coverage mentioning the Green Party 2006-2011 
 
Data compiled via a LexisNexis search for “climate change” or “global warming” or 
“greenhouse effect” and “Green Party” from January 2006 to December 2011. 
 
Table 6.2: Percentage of climate change coverage mentioning the Green Party  
	 2006	 2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	 2011	 Totals	
Total	number	of		
climate	change	stories	 638	 2206	 2336	 1983	 1128	 824	 9115	
Number	of	stories	containing		
climate	change	+	Green	Party		 61	 287	 165	 149	 80	 99	 841	
%	of	climate	change	coverage		
mentioning	Green	Party		 9.5	 13	 7	 7.5	 8	 12	 9.2	
 
However, it is possible to identify a “Green Party signal” in the coverage of climate 
change at several points: in June 2007, both general climate change coverage and Green 
coverage increases, coinciding with the Green Party’s entry into government; in 
December 2007, both metrics are elevated, coinciding with the COP in Bali attended by 
Minister Gormley, and again in January 2011, both levels increase, coinciding with the 
collapse of the government of which the Greens were members. The more pronounced 
alignments of coverage of both climate change and the Greens occur in June 2007, when 
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the party were about to enter government, and in January 2011, when they were about to 
leave. This suggests that when there is media interest in the Green Party, climate change 
is also mentioned. Yet, when there is heighted media interest in climate change, such as 
at the Copenhagen COP of 2009, there is no corresponding increase in coverage of the 
Greens.  
 
6.7.2 The nature of Green Party media coverage 
 
In looking more qualitatively at the content of media texts coded as dealing with the Green 
Party as a topic, it is evident that early coverage relates to various statements and policy 
announcements in early 2007, such as a proposal to introduce a €20 per tonne carbon levy 
and to introduce individual carbon quotas. An article in the Sunday Tribune predicted they 
would win 10 or more seats, on the basis that issues such as climate change were near the 
top of the public agenda, adding: “Even if they don't win all those seats, the party seems 
guaranteed to win eight or nine seats, potentially leaving it as king-maker after the 
election.” (Sunday Tribune, March 18, 2007).  Subsequent coverage follows the progress 
of the party as events unfolded: the agreement between the party and Fianna Fáil on a 
programme for government, the appointment of two Green Party ministers to the cabinet, 
the introduction of a carbon budget, various speeches and statements by the two ministers 
on climate change policy, the party’s stance as Fianna Fáil’s leader Bertie Ahern was 
called to give evidence to the Mahon Tribunal into political corruption, the re-negotiation 
of the programme for government following the global banking crisis and the ultimate 
collapse of the coalition government in 2011.  
 
There is also a considerable amount of analysis and opinion on the performance of the 
Greens in government, and on that of the two ministers representing the party at cabinet. 
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In early coverage, this commentary focused on the wisdom of entering government with 
Fianna Fáil. A letter to the Irish Times (June 15, 2007) describes the party as “an abject 
creature, shivering at the heel of Fianna Fáil”, while several articles portray the Greens as 
naïve while lauding the political skill of Fianna Fáil leader Bertie Ahern. In this example 
of a political commentary, Ahern’s achievement in forming a coalition government which 
included the Greens, the Progressive Democrats and four independent deputies, is lauded: 
The Greens' membership accepted a fudge as the price of power. So be it. Welcome to the 
world of real politics.  Now they hold two powerful ministries, and will, finally, get a 
chance to implement a watered-down version of its own policies, otherwise known as the 
Fianna Fail election manifesto.  Bertie Ahern, we will never tire of saying, is truly a 
political genius. (Sunday Independent, June 17, 2007). 
 
The possibility that the Greens allowed themselves to be used to confer, by association, 
some credibility on environmental issues on Fianna Fáil, is also raised: 
Ahern's determination to ensure that his third government has a secure D·il majority was 
clearly one of the motivating factors behind the drive to include both the Greens and the 
PDs, as well as four of the five Independents. It seems, though, that he was also motivated 
by a desire to subtly change the image of Fianna Fáil by colouring it with a new shade of 
green…	 the party will now hope to benefit from the environmentally friendly image 
presented by the Greens and to freshen up its image for a new generation of voters. 
(Stephen Collins, Irish Times, June 15, 2007). 
 
There are also examples of personal criticisms of the two Green Party ministers. An article 
in the Sunday Tribune laments the lack of action on climate change mitigation measures, 
suggesting that there are too many issues “under review” in the Department of the 
Environment presided over by John Gormley, who, the article states: “sometimes gives 
the impression that he’s so obsessed with saving the planet, the problems of a small, damp 
island on the edge of Europe are beneath him” (Sunday Tribune, August 10, 2008). The 
proposal in 2009 to ban high wattage incandescent light bulbs on environmental grounds 
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also drew personal criticism of Minister Gormley. In this example, it is suggested that the 
ban is essentially meaningless and is compared to a 1940s campaign by Sean McBride to 
declare Ireland a republic:  
John Gormley, with his 1.9 litre virtuously-powered government car, (no doubt topped up 
by a squad of lentils inside the engine-block) is the pietistic equivalent today of McBride, 
with his ban on large light bulbs.  Indeed, you could go back a further generation, and 
compare this moralising folderol with the ban on condoms in 1926. Clearly, the 
underlying attitude – an interfering certainty that Nanny knows best – is deep within the 
Irish political psyche. The ban is also a reversion to the dismal and fanciful notion that 
the Irish are a better people than others: and thus, look! No condoms! No light bulbs! Up 
the Republic! How brave and adventurous and ethical we are!  We may sit piously in the 
dark, going blind while trying to read by the non-light of hideously expensive, energy-
saving plug-in electrical glow-worms, thereby saving the planet from global warming; 
meanwhile China builds 650 coal-burning power stations, and Ireland is an icefield. 
(Kevin Myers, Irish Independent, January 8, 2009). 
 
The other Green Party minister, Eamon Ryan, Minister for Energy, Communications and 
Natural Resources, also received personal criticism: 
…	if the Greens really want to make a contribution to easing global warming they might 
consider decommissioning Minister Ryan's mouth (hot air) … Minister Ryan exudes a 
wonderful air, as if he's saying: "Look at me. I'm a Minister. And it's as much a surprise 
to me as it is to the rest of ye."  He's a more poetic soul, too, than the guys who normally 
make Minister. At least I like to think the slightly faraway look in the eyes and the slight, 
bemused smile always playing about his lips is a reflection of a poetic soul. Other, less 
kind people, might say he looks half-mad. I like to think the best of people. I think, at 
worst, it's just earnestness. He'd remind you of one of the Famous Five. (Sunday 
Independent, June 24, 2007). 
 
An assessment of the Green Party’s performance in government praised the performance 
of the party representatives:  
Far from being flaky, the likes of John Gormley, Eamon Ryan and Trevor Sargent have 
been, in the main, rock-solid during extremely perilous times for Ireland Inc.To borrow a 
line from George Lee, in years to come, when their grandchildren ask what they did during 
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the worst recession in decades, they can say they held their nerve and did the right thing 
by the country. (Sunday Tribune, February 28, 2010). 
 
The media coverage of climate change in which the Green Party features shows many of 
the characteristics of climate change coverage generally: it is politically framed, often 
using the game or strategy frame to assess the success or otherwise of the party, and it 
deploys some of the same dismissive and sarcastic tone evident in the contested science 
frame. Climate change is often tangentially mentioned, as one of a list of policies espoused 
by the Greens; in-depth commentary on the content and implications of such policies is 
absent. There is an emphasis on reportage rather than analysis; the calls by the Greens for, 
as an example, an annual reduction of 3% to Ireland’s GHG emissions, is repeated, but 
there is not investigation of the implications of such a policy. Likewise, various 
pronouncements by the Green Party ministers on the need for climate action, for climate 
legislation, for a carbon tax have all been reported in the media; one cannot say such 
matters have not received coverage, but rather that they have not been engaged with. 
 
6.7.3 Journalistic and political perspectives on media coverage of the Green Party  
 
 
The majority of journalists interviewed were of the view that the entry of the Green Party 
into government in 2007 had a positive impact on levels of media attention for climate 
change. One reporter dissented from this view, stating that, in the publication where she 
was employed, the Greens were “seen as cranks” and that they communicated about 
climate change in “a very un-newspaper friendly way” that was too abstract and academic, 
and were therefore viewed as “crazy and just that they were totally out of touch with 
modern living” and had no effect on increasing interest among the editors at her 
newspaper in the topic (Claire O'Sullivan, personal interview, June 16, 2015). Another 
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was undecided (“It did and it didn’t” [Frank McDonald, personal interview, May 15, 
2015]). Others believed that the presence of two Green ministers in the government meant 
that the media were required to give more attention to climate change. 
“Without a shadow of a doubt, it did. The very fact that John Gormley was Minister for 
Environment, that he was sitting around the Cabinet table, that he was therefore able to 
influence things, that he was able to hold information campaigns…in the run-up to the 
election Bertie Ahern went to the University of Galway and described himself as an 
environmentalist, that Fianna Fáil was an environmental party. I mean, you could see that 
things did change…John Gormley…was a leader who could pull the plug on the 
government but it also meant that he was getting on air more and it was one of his top 
priorities and so therefore definitely upped the coverage. And Eamon Ryan once again 
was in [the Department of] Energy so that was a huge focus and he was able to get more 
money for doing up your homes and he was always tying in that question of energy usage 
with the climate change message and John Gormley used to always get tied up in other 
issues like the incineration, in Dublin, like the Ringsend factory and you could see the 
battles that he was having inside with the civil servants. (Paul Cunningham, personal 
interview, April 24, 2015). 
 
As one of the ministerial media advisors put it, some things get coverage simply because 
a government minister is doing them (Bríd McGrath, personal interview, February 8, 
2017). It appears to have been a deliberate policy for Green ministers to be active during 
their early period in government. The party leader stated: “I was determined that we were 
going to hit the ground running” (John Gormley, personal interview, April 13, 2015). One 
of their ministers believes that media coverage of climate change increased in this early 
period because the party were active in the policy area:  
I think it [having the Greens in government] did [increase media attention for climate 
change] in the first year until the crash came, because we were doing stuff that was related 
to the issue, we were producing a carbon tax, we were pushing renewables, we changed 
the building standards. We were doing stuff that relates to people's homes, so all that 
Duncan Stewart, DIY up your home, whatever. I think that did. (Eamon Ryan, personal 
interview, February 1, 2017). 
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The media strategy of the party was also designed to increase media attention for climate 
change. A ministerial media advisor stated that it was a requirement for all media 
communications from the Department of Energy, Communications and Natural Resources 
to contain a reference to climate change. 
 
“Number one, what we did, rightly or wrongly, and this was an instruction from the 
esteemed minister, every single press release, and I mean every single thing, whether it 
had to do with a post office or broadband or whatever, had at the end of it ‘and the ultimate 
point of this is because we're tackling climate change which is the greatest threat to Ireland 
da-da-da’. We put it into every press release…that annoyed the Department, but from the 
minute he walked in the door, basically Eamon Ryan, minister, did not do anything, apart 
from maybe the Broadcasting Bill in 2009 where he didn't say “…and the ultimate aim of 
this is to deal with climate change”. (Bríd McGrath, personal interview, February 8, 
2017). 
 
The presence of the Greens in government also permitted the media to perceive 
institutional resistance to policy initiatives on the part of the civil service, according to 
one well respected environment correspondent.  
“…you got a sense that the permanent government wasn't of the same view as him 
[Gormley] and was merely watching the clock tick down until he was gone and then they 
could carry on as normal…But when it came to climate change, there was resistance and 
it was strong, it was because money mattered more than the government policy, and what 
they would do is that they would sign up to it and say it, but wouldn’t necessarily 
implement it. Blocks would come from places like the Department of Agriculture…so it 
was not only that you got more coverage [with the Greens in government], but you also 
got a sense that what is happening within climate change and where the difficulties where, 
and you were getting a sense of the politics behind, and the real politik that was behind 
the announcement of any policy per se.” (Paul Cunningham, personal interview, April 24, 
2015). 
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Although the data from the interviews undertaken for this research strongly support the 
notion that the Green Party had a positive influence on media attention for climate change, 
data from media texts is not so conclusive.  
 
There was less agreement among interviewees about whether, following the financial 
crisis and their electoral losses in the 2011 general election, the unpopularity of the Green 
Party negatively affected media attention for climate change. One media advisor was 
adamant that the decision by the Greens to stay in government in part to ensure the passage 
of the Climate Change Response Bill into law was misguided and affected media and 
public engagement with climate change. The controversy over the ban on stag hunting 
was also a factor in public disenchantment with the Greens and, by extension, with their 
policy agenda.  
“I think the Greens had to have a climate bill because they had to have a climate bill. And 
they stayed in government as well to a large part because of that climate bill. I personally 
don't agree with that. I think for a party that's all about sustainability, I don't understand 
who told them that the only legislation that ever happens is when you're here in this minute 
right now and that then once it’s on the statute books, that it's on the statute books forever 
and that the next crowd can’t turn up with a Blairite majority and kick out every single 
thing that you ever did anyway. So they had this view, which maybe people do at this 
point in history because it was a big historical moment of just “only we can save the world 
right here right now with only this bill that can only come from us”. There's a terrible 
hubris in that that they will never admit and is part of the disconnect between the Greens 
and real human beings going around their lives. I think it was a wrong estimation, to be 
honest. I think it was we went with, everyone talks about this, but at the height of the 
financial crisis, all you could see the Greens were at in the Dail was was trying to ban one 
stag hunt.” (Bríd McGrath, personal interview, February 8, 2017). 
 
 
The view that the unpopularity of the Greens also affected public support for action on 
climate change is partially accepted by one of party’s ministers. 
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“I think this kind of sense was: ‘Ah, feck it, these guys are just, they're keeping the 
government going’ that they don't want, ‘they’re keeping Fianna Fáil in office, which we 
don't want because Fianna Fáil are bad and they caused the problem, to get a feckin’ 
climate bill over the line’. And I think [there was] some hostility towards us and towards 
the climate agenda because of that. So there are connections. (Eamon Ryan, personal 
interview, February 1, 2017). 
 
 
The second Green Party minister interviewed suggests that all environmental policies 
were seen as irrelevant once the financial crisis struck, and that the antipathy to the Greens 
was not specifically related to climate change per se.  
“You have to put it in context. The government had unravelled at that stage. The IMF was 
in here. Our problem was post-2008 was that every single thing we did after 2008 was 
seen as irrelevant: ‘that's all very well, what about the crisis?’ That we are in there doing 
stuff that makes no… how is that going to help people who are struggling? So the context 
couldn't have been worse, so here are the Greens in cloud cuckoo land again in the middle 
of a crisis and what are they doing? Introducing a climate change bill. Morons! You know 
what I mean? That's the context, and that's how it was seen.” (John Gormley, personal 
interview, April 13, 2015). 
 
 
There were diverse opinions among the journalists interviewed as to the question of 
whether the Greens “took climate change coverage down with them”, so to speak. One 
columnist suggested that the performance of the Green Party in government negatively 
affected media coverage of climate change:  
 “…the backlash [against the Greens] was ferocious, and I think it poisoned the well of 
coverage. It's like as if, for a while, Green had been the colour of success and now it 
became the colour of failure and you know the political failure of Fianna Fáil was vast 
but I think people's kind of visceral dislike of green issues kind of went [makes plane 
taking-off gesture]. I think it [climate change coverage] was going down anyway, but I 
think in Ireland it probably went down a bit further because of the Greens. (John Gibbons, 
personal interview, May 1, 2015). 
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One of the environment correspondents interviewed agreed that climate change was very 
closely linked to the Green Party in the media’s approach to the issue. It should be noted 
that there is a tendency on the part of some interviewees to conflate media attention and 
political attention for climate change, despite attempts to distinguish between the two on 
the part of the interviewer. However, as was pointed out above, political and policy action 
on a particular issue generally prompts media attention, so there is a connection. In the 
answer below, for example, the subject moves from the impact of the disappearance of 
the Greens from government on media coverage of climate change to the impact of their 
disappearance on political support for climate policies. 
“…climate change was associated with the Greens and the Greens were associated with a 
disaster, so it definitely had a pull factor. The message was taken away and it did have a 
negative impact, but probably the biggest thing was that no one was ever going to be more 
committed to the climate change message than Green politicians, no matter who they 
were. Noel Dempsey may have signed up and put in place very good climate policies and 
we should recognise that, and yet, when it came to say something like Kyoto, I don’t think 
he did a particularly good deal from an Irish national point of view in our allocation. But 
once John Gormley and Eamon Ryan were gone, there wasn’t anyone who was going to 
fight for climate change as strongly as they were, and so I think that, it did, it had a big 
impact.” (Paul Cunningham, personal interview, April 24, 2015). 
 
Other journalists took a different view. For example, that the financial crisis and 
subsequent economic recession was largely to blame for the lack of media interest in 
climate change (Paul Melia, personal interview, August 6, 2017) or that the issue has 
remained high on the policy and media agenda (Cormac Bourke, personal interview, 
August 1, 2017; Liam Reid, personal interview, May 19, 2015), thanks in part to a 
requirement for Ireland to meet EU emissions targets by 2020 (Claire O'Sullivan, personal 
interview, June 16, 2015).  
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In summary, there is a broad consensus among journalists, politicians and media advisors 
that the Green Party’s entry into government increased media attention for climate change, 
and there is considerable support for the view that, given the circumstances of their exit 
from government, the performance of the party in 2010 served to taint the media’s view 
of climate change as a journalistic topic. The data relating to levels of coverage is not so 
categoric; there is a link between climate change coverage which mentioned the Green 
Party and climate change coverage more generally. The two follow the same broad 
patterns, but it would appear that when the Greens are in the news (as when they entered 
and left government or attended climate change conferences), coverage for climate change 
increases, but when climate change is in the news (as for the Copenhagen COP of 2009), 
the Greens often are not.  
 
6.8 The economic crash and the “crowding-out” effect 
 
 
Theories of how some issues rise on the media and policy agendas suggest that 
“information shocks” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991) or “focusing events” (Kingdon, 
1995) are required to bring a dormant issue to the fore. These concepts are similar to the 
news values of drama and novelty by which journalists judge the newsworthiness of an 
event or topic (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Harcup and O’Neill, 2001). Once these events 
occur, information feedbacks in the form of media coverage is usually required to promote 
the issue. If these elements diminish, the related topic reverts to its former dormant status, 
and other issues take its place. Other perspectives suggest that some topics, particularly 
environmental ones, have an inherent life cycle in the media, quite removed from the 
dynamics of agenda systems (Downs, 1972). It is a facet of both approaches that an issue 
does not stay at the top of the media, or the policy, agenda indefinitely. Another factor in 
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displacing topics from these agendas was identified by Monica Djerf-Pierre in her study 
of 30 years of television news coverage in Sweden: news of war and financial crisis 
crowds out environmental news (2012a). In considering the dramatic decline in the 
coverage of climate change in Irish media from December 2009, this “crowding-out” 
effect is a more plausible explanation that the attention cycle model. However, the 
evidence is not clear-cut. The financial crisis began to impact on Ireland from late 2008, 
and indeed coverage in the UK and Europe suffered a steep decline in November 2008. 
Levels of coverage in Ireland dropped, but not dramatically so, and reached their highest 
level during the timeframe under study in December 2009. However, from late December 
2009, Irish coverage declined severely.  
 
Many of the interviewees pointed to the economic crash of late 2008-2009 as the key 
factor for the decline in media coverage of climate change at that time. One correspondent 
recalled the impact of the banking collapse and the arrival of the troika in Ireland on the 
area of environmental journalism: 
“…suddenly I couldn't get a story on to save my life. The very idea of being concerned 
with something that could happen in 100 years was just being eclipsed completely by 
thousands of people have been thrown out onto streets today, people losing their homes 
today, it was today’s story, so talk about momentum towards deals, anything like that was 
seen as completely irrelevant in the context of the times. And I was trying…I was 
struck…I remember at about the end of 2008, there was about three months where I was 
nearly considering saying ‘do you want me do business stories?’ because I was offering 
stories which had regularly got on air and I just couldn't get them on. It didn’t matter: TV, 
radio, online. No one gave a monkey’s.” (Paul Cunningham, personal interview, April 24, 
2015). 
 
This view is shared by those actively involved in trying to attract media coverage for the 
issue, such as media advisors.  
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I don't blame the media for not noticing climate change when they thought the world was 
collapsing around us. Everyone at a particular time maybe from, want to say, early 2009 
on were buying the FT, opening the back of it and looking up bond yields. That's what 
was going on, not carbon things, not how hot is the world today, but bond yields…If you 
turned up at a particular time and start going on about climate change, eyes rolled, ‘shut 
up, stop saying the same thing again, look at us, we're about to get cut adrift into the ocean 
or we won't be able to pay the civil servants tomorrow’ or whatever. So there became a 
time when it annoyed people to talk about climate change…We were like a Cormac 
McCarthy novel, like it was holocaust territory, people were sad, we were losing 
everything in sport as well even, we've stopped being good at the rugby for a while, I 
think it was just a sad, insular, depressing time where we thought we lost the sovereignty 
of the nation and yes, that trumped climate change. (Bríd McGrath, personal interview, 
February 8, 2017)  
 
 
From the perspective of news values and journalistic norms, the financial crash in Ireland 
was an all-consuming story. It had many of the attributes required to make it attractive to 
journalists: drama, novelty, meaningfulness, and reference to something negative 
(Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Harcup and O’Neill, 2001). One government minister closely 
involved in efforts to deal with the financial crisis recalled the intense media focus on the 
economic story:  
“At that point, we were in such feckin’ chaos in terms of [laughs] they [the media] didn’t 
give a shit about any climate bill. The only story in town was Troika, IMF, bailout of 
banks, whatever, bondholders being burnt, whatever, for pretty much from 2008 onwards, 
October 2008 onwards, there wasn’t any other story in Ireland.” (Eamon Ryan, personal 
interview, February 1, 2017). 
 
The decline in climate change coverage does not map neatly onto the timeline of the 
financial crash in Ireland. For instance, the first major event in the credit crisis was the 
issuing of a guarantee to cover the liabilities of seven banks operating in the jurisdiction 
in September 2008, yet coverage of climate change remained relatively steady afterwards. 
Yes, there is a decrease from June 2008, but it was incremental. In December 2009, in the 
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run-up to the Copenhagen COP, coverage reached its highest point. It could be argued 
that the decline post December 2009 is as much related to the deflation of politicians and 
journalists at the disappointing outcome in Copenhagen as to the effects of the ongoing 
financial crisis. 
 
Up to this point, media coverage of climate change and of the Green Party in government 
has been confined to mainstream and familiar narratives, shaped by news values and 
journalistic norms and influenced by the communications strategies and, to a certain 
extent, the personal qualities of the two Green Party ministers. In the next section, the 
extent to which narratives outside these confines was present in climate change coverage, 
is examined. 
 
 
6.8 Alternative narratives in Ireland’s climate change coverage 
 
The settled science frame – which contains coverage which presents a scientifically 
accurate depiction of climate change as a pressing issue requiring action – is well 
represented in Irish coverage of the issue. However, in looking at the range of coverage 
from the seven national titles examined in this research, it is evident that differing editorial 
approaches are adopted by different news organisations, each of which foregrounded 
favoured framing devices. For example, newspapers in the Independent group (the Irish 
Independent and Sunday Independent) and the Irish Examiner preferred framings which 
foregrounded the impact of mitigation policies on the finances of individuals. The Irish 
Times accentuated national and global politics. Other researchers have shown that news 
organisations report on climate change in accordance with their own ideological cultures 
(Carvalho, 2007; McKnight, 2010). For instance:  
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When knowledge claims appeared to constitute a threat to ideological principles and 
arrangements in the political, social and economic realms, The Times did not hesitate to 
harm the reputation of an institution like the IPCC. In “critical discourse moments” like 
the release of IPCC reports, The Times picked individuals at the margins of respected 
science and magnified their opinions in order to sustain a certain view of the world and a 
certain social order. This was particularly evident in The Sunday Times, whose circulation 
is twice as large as The Times. (Carvalho, 2007, p. 237-238). 
 
This finding accords with perspectives from political economy which suggest that news 
organisations are commercial entities dependent on advertising, and therefore are 
incapable of critiquing an economic model that promotes continued consumerism and 
economic growth. It is suggested that this is a structural problem for media systems in 
developed economies (Herman & Chomsky, 1988), and also for journalists working in 
such systems (Lewis, Williams and Franklin, 2008). In an Irish context, it has been shown 
that the Irish media were incapable critical analysis during the financial crisis (Mercille, 
2014a) and I have argued in the previous chapter that, in its coverage of climate change, 
the Irish media put forward climate solutions based on market incentives, technological 
innovation and increased efficiency and avoided coverage of more radical or structural 
reforms. In addition, concentration of media ownership by wealthy individuals, it is 
argued, further constrains the Irish media from questioning the established political and 
economic order (McCullagh, 2008).  
 
The perspectives of political economy were represented among the interview subjects, 
with several pointing to media ownership as a constraining influence on coverage. The 
journalists interviewed tended to rate or rank other media organisations in journalistic 
terms, assessing the coverage of various news outlets in Bourdieusian terms of capital 
within the journalistic field. From this viewpoint, the Irish Times and RTÉ (at least when 
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Paul Cunningham was working as environment correspondent) had the most journalistic 
capital, while the Irish Daily Mail, which was seen as a subversive force, had least. 
Columnist and blogger John Gibbons, who combines the roles of journalist and activist, 
was able to place the tone and content of coverage in a wider perspective: 
“The [Daily] Mail and the Express, they're obsessed by weather stories, by health stories. 
Everything gives you cancer or prevents cancer, and I think there seem to be a whole 
string of health and weather stories, and weather extremes, but clearly there's no interest 
in the underlying science whatsoever…And I think they're just blow with the wind, and I 
think their ownership, most of these newspapers we're talking about are owned by expat 
billionaires, and I do think expat billionaires have a particular issue with, how to say, 
global good housekeeping. I think that's reasonable to say, and in many cases, these media 
owners are also owners or heavily involved in a variety of corporate activities that, again, 
feel threatened by regulation, and I think their focus is, ‘Don't pay tax and destroy 
regulation’. And I think when they see climate change, they hear, ‘Regulation’. Like the 
IFA, and therefore they're fighting it, not for what it is, but for what they perceive it to be 
as a threat to their interests.” 
 
The Irish Daily Mail was perceived by many interviewees as pursuing an editorial policy 
with regard to climate change that sought to undermine the legitimacy of proponents of 
climate action by, for example, foregrounding the expense of attending climate change 
conferences, or by submitting freedom of information requests on the number of 
parliamentary questions submitted, and the number of reports commissioned by the Green 
Party and calculating the number of trees required to manufacture the paper used for such 
purposes. The press advisors to John Gormley recounted an attempt by the Irish Daily 
Mail to establish where Minister Gormley was staying for the Copenhagen COP so the 
newspaper could focus on the cost of rooms, suites or meals (Liam Reid, personal 
interview, May 19, 2015), while the press advisor to Eamon Ryan stated that the Irish 
edition of the paper published reports from the UK edition concerning UK climate 
proposals, but simply substituted the names of Green Party politicians for the names of 
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the UK Labour Party ministers (Bríd McGrath, personal interview, February 8, 2017) 
appearing in the original UK edition reports. Other researchers have found that the Mail 
group is seen as untrustworthy and deliberately contrarian on this issue (Lockwood, 2009, 
p. 8), and seeks to portray climate change as a means of introducing “stealth” 
environmental taxes (Hibberd and Nguyen, 2013).  
 
The Irish Daily Mail contained relatively elevated levels of the contested science and 
morality frames (see Chapter 5, section 5.6, figure 5.11), and the texts coded to these 
frames contained a range of sceptic arguments and representations of climate change as a 
religion, suggesting that acceptance of the existence of anthropogenic global warming 
was a matter of faith rather than of science. Other studies have found that the Mail engages 
in a range of sceptic rhetorical repertoires, such as the “settler” (rejecting alarmism on 
grounds of “common sense”) and comic nihilism (unserious, blithe rejection of climate 
science) repertoires (Ereaut and Segnit, 2006). It is clear from the frame analysis detailed 
in Chapter 5, and from the statements of journalists and political media advisors 
interviewed for this thesis, that the Irish Daily Mail engaged in an editorial strategy in its 
climate change coverage that was markedly different from those pursued by other media 
organisations. Much of this coverage was presented as a campaign to expose wasteful use 
of taxpayer’s money, or to question orthodoxy on behalf of the common citizen; both 
these approaches also had the effect of delegitimising climate science and undermining 
public appetite for climate action. A close relationship between the willingness of a news 
organisation to publish sceptic views and its ideological alignment has been established 
(Carvalho, 2005, 2007; Carvalho and Burgess, 2005), although ideological orientation 
does not correspond neatly with levels of sceptic coverage (Painter and Gavin, 2015). The 
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Mail coverage, though presented as common sense consumer advocacy, nonetheless 
served the interests of its political and economic agenda. 
 
Another alternative narrative was evident in media texts dealing with agriculture. For 
instance, the contribution of agriculture to Ireland’s emissions profile is frequently 
mentioned. Agriculture contributes 33.1% of Ireland’s total GHG emissions (Government 
of Ireland, 2017, p. 80), compared to an EU-28 average of 10% (Eurostat, 2017) and a 
global average of 20% (IPCC AR5). Over half of Ireland’s agricultural emissions derive 
from enteric fermentation in ruminant animals. In the content coded to the agriculture 
frame, an alternative narrative about agriculture’s role in Ireland’s emissions emerges, 
with farming organisations suggesting (i) that the measurement of emissions does not 
adequately account for carbon sinks such as grassland and forestry found on Irish farms, 
(ii) proposed emissions reduction measures (such as those in legislation proposed by the 
Green Party in 2010) run counter to other government policy, which encourages increases 
in food and dairy production, and (iii) emissions reduction efforts in Irish agriculture are 
misguided, as any shortfall in beef or milk production in Ireland would be filled by 
increased production elsewhere, perhaps in territories such as Brazil, where regulations 
are of a lower standard and agriculture is less carbon-efficient.  
 
The narrative put forward by the Irish Farmer’s Association (IFA) and the Irish Creamery 
and Milk Suppliers’ Association (ICMSA) that farming and the agri-food business are 
important to the Irish economy and therefore any measures inhibiting the growth, or 
endangering the viability of these sections would run counter to the national interest, is 
similar to other economic arguments against mitigation measures. However, it does 
contain an implied domestication perspective, suggesting that measures adopted by 
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Ireland alone will count for little in a global context, and even that well-intentioned 
policies may be taken advantage of by less scrupulous rivals in the beef or dairy industry. 
The climate change legislation proposed by the Green Party in 2010 was singled out for 
particular criticism from farming organisations, as it committed Ireland to emissions 
reductions targets in excess of those envisaged by the European Union (Irish Examiner, 
December 18, 2010). This narrative also casts Ireland as the victim of unfair emissions 
measurement systems at EU level (Lynch, 2014). 
 
The two examples analysed above – the faux concern for taxpayers’ money of the Mail 
and the special pleading of the agriculture lobby – are variants of familiar media tropes. 
The Mail’s approach is a form of climate scepticism, as is the approach of the farming 
organisations: both are kinds of distraction from more substantive issues. In the first 
instance, the Mail’s emphasis on expenses is an attempt to portray climate change policy 
generation as a wasteful exercise, while ignoring the predicted impacts of climate change 
itself; in the second, the efforts for special concessions for Ireland’s agriculture sector also 
fail to take wider perspectives into account. However, other opportunities for more 
profoundly alternative narratives have not been availed of by the media. In the frame 
analysis presented in Chapter 5, it is clear that the opportunity frame is a salient feature 
of Irish coverage, and offers possibilities for competing narratives about mitigation and 
adaptation to be presented. Yet the text coded to this frame adheres to conventional 
narratives suggesting that new technologies, efficiencies and market mechanisms can be 
mobilised to combat climate change, thereby missing an opportunity to communicate 
alternative narratives to the public. 
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6.9 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the analytic focus moved from outside the media to an inside view of the 
frame competition regarding climate change. The perspective changed from observation 
of coverage trends and frames as manifest in media texts to analysis based on the views 
of working journalists, politicians active in the climate change policy area and media 
advisors tasked with influencing media coverage of climate politics. 
 
It is evident that media coverage of this issue is influenced to a great degree by news 
values. Climate change does not display many of the characteristics journalists look for 
in events or topics that influence their place on the news agenda. All of the journalist 
interviewees testified that climate change was an inherently difficult topic to cover. It is 
not immediate, its effects are not visible yet in Ireland, it is complex and data-heavy, and 
journalists see themselves are possessing poor numeracy skills. Perhaps most importantly, 
it is repetitive, with a repeating narrative which changes only in relation to details of data. 
 
A further influence on the coverage is the necessity for journalists to consider the attitude 
of their editors (rather than their readers) as a primary concern when framing coverage. 
This dynamic contains climate change within a journalistic culture, and newsroom norms 
may take precedence over professional or even societal ones. Furthermore, journalists 
need “hooks” on which to hang their coverage. In other words, they need something to 
report on. Elsewhere, climate change-related legislation or policy announcements provide 
such hooks. Ireland, however, is seen as a “laggard” (Torney and Little, 2017) when it 
comes to policy responses to climate change, and these opportunities for coverage do not 
often arise. Consequently, coverage hooks become restricted to international conferences 
and the release of scientific reports. These news hooks in turn promote certain media 
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frames: conferences invite political framings, while IPCC reports lend themselves readily 
to disaster frames (Painter, 2013, 2014). 
 
Journalists themselves offered a timeline of coverage as they experienced it in their 
workplace: a general lack of interest on the part of editors in the early 2000s followed by 
a surge of interest from 2006 onwards. The Stern Report (2006), the release of the movie 
An Inconvenient Truth (2006) and the release of the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC (2007) provided raw material and pretext for coverage of the issue. This account 
again emphasises the need for “news hooks” on which to hang coverage and also links to 
the news value of “continuity”, whereby a topic already in the news is more likely to 
receive coverage than a completely novel topic. In 2006 (the Stern Report, An 
Inconvenient Truth) and 2007 (AR4, the Green Party entering government and attending 
the Bali COP), climate change was in the news, and news organisations were more 
disposed to cover it. However, according to one environment correspondent, “by 2008, it 
was gone” (Paul Cunningham, personal interview, 2015). 
 
In the absence of news hooks, and seeking to gain approval from their editors for story 
proposals, journalists often framed their articles in ways which they knew would be 
congruent with the general approach of their news organisation. At the Independent group, 
which sees itself as representing “middle Ireland” (Cormac Bourke, personal interview, 
August 1, 2017), economic frames were favoured, while at the Irish Daily Mail, contrarian 
tactics were often employed. This replication of newsroom culture, taking place at the 
level of individual news editor or reporter, in turn served to amplify the ideological stance 
of the wider news organisation and led to media-wide coverage of the issue that 
emphasised approaches and solutions from within the economic and political status quo. 
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Journalists are motivated to provide climate change coverage to their news organisations, 
and showed considerable ingenuity in overcoming institutional apathy towards the 
subject. A frequently used strategy was to connect climate change to coverage of other, 
related topics such as air pollution, water quality, waste management, flooding and 
planning. This disaggregation of climate change had the effect of depoliticising it, of 
reducing it to constituent issues about which there is little or no disagreement. The 
academy is divided on whether this tactic is necessary to build broad coalitions across 
political divides, or whether such political sanitisation of climate change in fact 
discourages deep engagement by the public. 
 
The divergent approaches of the media advisors to the two Green Party ministers in 
government from 2007 to 2011 also influenced the media’s coverage of climate change. 
In the case of the Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources, the media 
message emphasised the necessity of dealing with climate change through a pro-business, 
ecomodern approach, and coverage of this minister’s policy initiatives, public statements 
and appearances was positive (Bríd McGrath, personal interview, February 8, 2017). The 
Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government foregrounded the personal 
lifestyle choices of the Green Party members of parliament, and his policies involved 
more negative measures, such as the introduction of bans and taxes. This invited the media 
to explore possible divergence between his public statements and his private behaviour, 
and resulted in more negative coverage. The employment of two former journalists as 
media advisors to this minister contributed to an adversarial relationship between the 
media and the minister’s press team, fuelling further negative coverage of climate change-
related policy measures (Ibid.). 
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The presence of two Green Party ministers in cabinet had a complex effect on media 
coverage. Journalists interviewed for this research stated that a Green voice in government 
provided them with more “news hooks” on which to hang coverage, and the data supports 
the view that, when coverage of the Green Party increased, so also did coverage of climate 
change. However, the Green Party “signal” in the coverage of climate change is weak, 
and only 9.2% of climate change coverage mentions the Green Party. As mentioned 
above, some of this coverage could be negative, and, given the circumstances in which 
the Green Party left government, it is likely that they had a negative effect on the media’s 
attention for climate change at that time. 
 
The journalists, politicians and media operatives interviewed for this research agree that 
the financial crisis which began in mid-2008 had a significant negative impact on media 
attention for climate change. The news values to which journalists subscribe mean that 
more immediate, dramatic and negative events take precedence in the news agenda over 
events which do not exhibit these characteristics. However, when the views of 
interviewees are considered in the light of the data on media attention for climate change, 
a more complex picture emerges. Although the effects of the financial crisis began to be 
felt in Ireland from the summer of 2008 (RTE News, 2008), media coverage of climate 
change did not decline until December, 2009, in line with international trends. This 
suggests the “crowding-out” effect (Djerf-Pierre, 2012a) may be a more drawn-out 
process that previously suggested. The importance of the December 2009 climate change 
conference in Copenhagen may have been a factor in maintaining coverage levels.  
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There may be a further dimension to the crowding-out effect. The initial research into this 
aspect of media dynamics concluded that news of armed conflict and financial crises 
pushed environmental issues off the media agenda (Ibid.). It may be the case that attempts 
to communicate via the media on environmental issues at such times are 
counterproductive. In November, 2010, the “troika” of the International Monetary Fund, 
the European Central Bank and the European Commission, instituted an “Economic 
Adjustment Programme” for Ireland, known colloquially as “the bailout”. At that time, 
the Green Party was trying to steer a Climate Change Bill through parliament. It is evident 
from the statements of journalists and ministerial media advisors working at that time that, 
not only had media attention for climate change-related matters declined, but that attempts 
to increase media interest for climate change at a time of financial crisis provoked an 
antagonistic response. Not only were the media uninterested in climate change, they 
viewed attempts to promote it up the media agenda as naïve and even unpatriotic (Bríd 
McGrath, personal interview, February 8, 2017). 
 
In the next chapter, it is intended to place these findings regarding the influence of the 
Green Party on coverage, and the perspectives of journalists, politicians and media 
advisors, in the context of this research project as a whole. The conclusions drawn from 
the investigation of Ireland’s media coverage of climate change, and possible avenues for 
further research suggested by these conclusions, will also be discussed.  
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Chapter 7 
 Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This research set out to answer the question: what were the framing strategies used by 
Irish journalists, politicians and political advisors around climate change in the period 
2007 to 2016? It is evident from the scholarship of agenda-setting and agenda systems 
that journalists, policymakers, politicians and other claims makers become engaged in a 
competition to promote certain issues to the top of the media and policy agenda, and to 
impose a framing of that issue favourable to their position (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; 
Baumgartner and Jones, 1991; Kingdon, 1995; McCombs, 2004; Nisbet and Huge, 
2006). Some theorists assign greater agency to certain contestants in this competition 
than to others. For instance, theories of media effects, such as agenda-setting, framing 
and priming (discussed in chapter 3), claim that the media wield considerable power in 
influencing the public and policy arenas. Agenda systems theorists suggest that policy 
sub-systems or sub-governments are the most important agents in the process of 
pressing for responses to social problems. Other perspectives, such as the mediated issue 
development model suggested by Nisbet and Huge, plot something of a middle path, 
giving roughly equal weight to the policy and media aspects of the process. Journalists, 
politicians and other “issue enterpreneurs” (Ashe, 2013) are involved in a complex 
competitive process to increase the salience of an issue and to impose their chosen 
framing on the issue discourse.  
 
In this chapter, it is intended to discuss the findings of this thesis and to set them in a 
wider context. Firstly, the limitations of this research are set out, and subsequently, the 
contribution to knowledge of this work is discussed. The findings of this thesis 
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concerning the extent of climate change coverage in the Irish print media, the 
perspective of journalists and editors, of media advisors and government ministers are 
then analysed and discussed. The influence of the Green Party on media coverage of 
climate change is also discussed. The relevance of Nisbet and Huge’s mediated issue 
development to the Irish context is analysed. Finally, some best-practice 
recommendations for those communicating about climate change are presented. 
 
7.2 Acknowledgement of the limitations of this research 
 
At the outset of this chapter, it is important to acknowledge any limitations in the 
research design, methodology or data in this research (Ioannidis, 2007). The most 
important limitation relates to the data available for analysis. The LexisNexis database is 
not comprehensive, and the record for certain newspaper titles is poor. For instance, the 
content of the Evening Herald newspaper is recorded for just a few months, and was 
therefore excluded from analysis. Other titles, such as the Irish Examiner and the Irish 
Daily Mail are recorded for relatively recent years only. Every effort to compensate for 
these lacunae was taken in calculating average levels of coverage over the period 
concerned. The LexisNexis database is also deficient when it comes to recording article 
authorship; some 30% of articles do not have the relevant metadata to enable author 
identification. Where such articles are quoted, searches of the relevant media 
organisation’s website were undertaken. This process was only partially successful, and 
despite considerable effort, the lack of authorship data remains a limitation of this 
research. 
 
The data reduction methods used in this thesis may also constitute a limitation. In 
selecting articles of 500 words or more, many shorter news stories were excluded. Their 
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inclusion, it could be argued, would contribute to the understanding of the nature of 
Ireland’s media coverage of climate change. However, it is possible to defend the 
decision to analyse longer articles on the grounds that they are likely to be more 
complex texts, containing more frames and therefore more suited to a qualitative content 
analysis. Also, shorter articles were accounted for in the initial quantitative content 
analysis. Despite efforts to mitigate against the factors described here, it must be 
acknowledged that these three elements – imperfect data records, inconsistent recording 
of authorship and analytic focus on longer climate articles – constitute limitations of this 
research. The decision to omit news sources from the data coding instrument may also 
be construed as a limitation; however, as I have argued (in section 4.11), despite the 
power of sources to influence news content, the power to frame the news remains with 
the journalist. Thus, a framing analysis is an appropriate means of examining the 
dynamics of the competition between strategic actors to influence media frames. 
 
7.3 The contribution to knowledge 
 
This thesis, I would argue, makes a contribution to our knowledge of how the media 
operates in relation to climate change, and how the competition to impose dominant 
framing via the media plays out. Firstly, this thesis measures media attention for climate 
change among seven national newspapers over a 10-year period, addressing a key 
knowledge gap. Secondly, the frame analysis presented here sets out how such coverage 
is framed, both in terms of dominant and secondary frames, again adding to our 
understanding of framing of climate change in the Irish context. 
 
The framing strategies of journalists covering climate change are uncovered by this 
frame analysis, and a further level of analysis is added by interviews with key 
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environmental journalists and newspaper editors. This allows for insights into how 
journalists and editors think about climate change and approach the topic professionally. 
These perspectives have been lacking in research into media coverage of climate 
change, and the analysis presented here allows for a greater understanding of the 
influence of news values and newsroom cultures on climate change coverage, as well as 
permitting insights into how individual media organisations approach and frame the 
issue. 
 
The perspectives of media advisors presented here also contributes to our understanding 
of the frame competition around climate change. The data from interviews with three 
media advisors provides valuable insights into the communications strategies of political 
operatives and allows for an assessment of the effectiveness of their differing 
approaches to framing the issue of climate change. 
 
The interviews with two former government ministers provide a rare and privileged 
perspective on the approaches to communicating with the media about climate change 
adopted by key figures in the environmental space during the period under examination. 
The analysis of their differing framing strategies, and of the reaction of the media to 
these approaches, goes some way to addressing a key knowledge gap concerning the 
frame competition around climate change. 
 
Lastly, the investigation into the extent to which having a Green Party in government 
affects media interest in climate change adds to our understanding of influencing factors 
on levels of media attention. The perspectives of journalists, editors, media advisors and 
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ministers on the question of Green Party influence on media coverage are also of value 
in understanding the relationship between the media and environmental politics. 
 
This research deepens our understanding of how the media cover climate change by 
focusing on the competitive framing environment around the topic. Other studies focus 
on media texts to make points about the nature of media discourse or media framings 
(for example, Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004, 2007; Eide & Ytterstad, 2011; McCright & 
Dunlap, 2014; Schmidt, Ivanova, & Schäfer, 2013), but do not examine the contest 
between other actors and the media themselves to impose a dominant frame. Although 
other studies bring interviews with working journalists to bear on their analysis 
(Boykoff, 2008; Boykoff and Mansfield, 2008; Jennings and Hulme, 2010), none that I 
am aware of includes the perspectives of government ministers and their media advisors. 
These privileged insights allow for a more detailed examination of the framing process, 
and allow the reader to see the mechanics of the process, as it were, whereby politicians 
and their “media handlers” attempt to influence the media by conveying information 
about climate change through certain frames, while the media, adhering closely to their 
professional norms and news values, mostly resist such strategies and impose their own, 
more familiar journalistic frames. 
 
7.4 The extent and nature of print media coverage of climate change   
 
It is evident from the data presented in this thesis that print media coverage of climate 
change in Ireland largely conforms to international norms, both in levels of coverage 
and in coverage patterns. However, coverage in Ireland was found to be below the 
European average according to one international monitoring project. Coverage of 
climate change accounted for an average of 0.843% of total news coverage, and 
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coverage of the issue exhibited dramatic peaks and troughs. Coverage peaked at times of 
UN climate change conferences and the release of UN climate reports, but suffered 
severe fall-offs in coverage at other times. The financial crisis of late 2008 had a delayed 
effect, with coverage remaining quite strong until December 2009 (the time of the 
Copenhagen climate conference), after which it experienced a dramatic decline. These 
levels and patterns are largely in accord with trends established in other territories 
(Schmidt, Ivanova and Schäfer, 2013; McAllister et al., 2017). 
 
However, a frame analysis of a representative sample of this coverage reveals that some 
aspects of Ireland’s print media coverage of climate change are unexpected: for 
instance, the relatively sparse representation of the agriculture frame is noteworthy. The 
agriculture frame accounted for just 3.1% of all frames, suggesting that the Irish media 
has not yet fully engaged with examining or questioning the role of agriculture in 
Ireland’s emissions profile. When the agriculture frame is present, the content coded to 
this frame is concerned with targets and emissions measurement; there is little or no 
questioning of the policy of encouraging further growth and intensification in the 
agriculture sector, regardless of the impact on emissions. 
 
The frame analysis also finds that Ireland’s coverage is largely political – the political 
and ideological contest frame comprises 24.28% of all frames. Again, at first glance, 
this seems to be in line with international norms (O’Neill, H. Williams, et al., 2015). 
However, closer analysis reveals that much of this coverage is concerned with party 
political jostling for advantage, while deeper political issues remain unaddressed. 
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Other findings of the frame analysis show a considerable representation of the morality 
frame (9%), suggesting that Irish coverage presents strong arguments concerning 
climate justice and just transition to a low-carbon society. However, most of the 
coverage presented in the morality and ethics frame contains sceptic representations of 
climate change as akin to a religion or an unquestionable dogma. 
 
In general, Ireland’s coverage of climate change in the print media is normative in terms 
of levels and trends. However, once closer attention is paid to the nature of such 
coverage, it is clear that Ireland’s coverage remains at a superficial level, avoiding deep 
engagement with the social, political and moral implications of climate change. The 
surface nature of the coverage is reflected in the focus on targets, measurements, 
dismissive scepticism and party political considerations. 
 
7.5 The perspectives of journalists and editors 
 
Journalists find climate change a difficult story to cover, predominantly because it does 
not align well with the news values of the profession. Several journalists remarked that 
the long time-horizons of climate change made it difficult to convince news editors of 
the immediate need for coverage, while the relative lack of visible impacts in Ireland 
contributed to the difficulty in securing space in the newspaper for the topic.  
 
It is noteworthy that, although the data from newspaper coverage shows that political 
framings were by far the most common, the journalists interviewed suggested that they 
themselves tried to present climate change through the economic frame by means of 
linking the impacts of climate change or of mitigation or adaptation measures to 
individual impacts. In fact, several interviewees downplayed the role of politics in their 
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coverage of the issue. The two newspaper editors interviewed also suggested that 
climate change coverage in their particular titles was focused on impacts, often financial 
impacts, rather than on political considerations. 
 
This points to a disconnect between the nature of the actual coverage of climate change 
and the journalists’ own perception of how they, and their newspaper titles, present it. 
Environmental journalists, when asked to reflexively analyse their framing strategies, 
suggest that the economic frame is most successful. This is how journalists, when 
having to pitch stories to their editors, frame climate change. However, much climate 
change coverage is reactive, covering set-piece events and conferences, and thus 
bypasses the process whereby the reporter researches and pitches a story for inclusion in 
his organisation’s publication. Left to their own devices, journalists favour economic 
framings, but when assigned to cover events, revert to political ones. As discussed 
above, the data makes it clear that significant peaks in coverage occur around UN 
climate conferences; these are essentially political gatherings, and the political or 
ideological contest frame is prominent in the coverage at these times (O’Neill et al., 
2015). These events are the main drivers of climate change coverage, and call forth 
political framings from journalists.  
 
Journalists also frame climate change in ways that appeal to their editors. Thus, the 
newsroom culture of a particular media organisation has a considerable influence on the 
frames that are eventually transmitted to the public. The need to satisfy editors as to the 
newsworthiness of climate change stories also means that the topic remains contained in 
a journalistic culture, at a remove from the scientific reality of climate change and from 
its social and political aspects. The institutional cultures of the Independent Group and 
	 318	
the Irish Examiner, for instance, perceive climate change through the lens of impacts on 
individual and family incomes, while the Irish Times culture emphasises climate politics 
and a global perspective. 
 
It is also apparent that the topic of climate change is in the process of being segmented 
into constituent sub-frames, such as planning, flooding, resource management and waste 
management. These sub-frames are more easily aligned with traditional news values, are 
smaller in scale, more local in relevance, and can be linked to the larger whole of 
climate change by the journalist.  
 
7.6 The perspectives of ministers and media advisors 
 
The framing strategies of politicians and political operatives were investigated by means 
of semi-structured interviews with two Green Party ministers, their respective media 
advisors and the former deputy government press secretary. The two Green Party 
ministers interviewed for this thesis had differing approaches to communicating about 
climate change. The differences were apparent both from their own responses to 
interview questions and from the perspectives of their media advisors. John Gormley, 
the former Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, sought to 
emphasise actions individuals could take to mitigate climate change. Among the 
initiatives his department introduced were a transition to an emission-based motor tax 
regime, changes to energy-efficient light bulbs and a carbon tax on fossil fuels. He also 
initiated a public information campaign linking climate change to individual lifestyle 
choices, and suggested that the Green Party ministers choose hybrid vehicles over 
conventional cars as their ministerial transport. Given this foregrounding of individual 
emissions reduction actions, it was predictable that the media would seek to expose any 
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hypocrisy in Gormley’s personal behaviour or in that of the other Green Party 
representatives. The Irish Daily Mail in particular engaged in a campaign in 
undermining the legitimacy of the Green Party’s position on climate change by seeking 
to highlight any party activity that caused excessive (or indeed any) GHG emissions. 
Furthermore, the employment by Gormley of two former journalists as media advisors 
may have been counterproductive, as it led to an abrasive relationship between the 
media and the minister and his staff. A further complication factor in assessing 
Gormley’s communications strategy is his role as party leader, which required him to 
engage with the media on party issues such as ministerial and Seanad appointments, the 
Greens’ relationship in government with Fianna Fáil, and its reaction to various 
pronouncements by Fianna Fáil Taoisigh (partly leaders) Bertie Ahern and Brian 
Cowen. The media’s coverage of Gormley, therefore, is based on more than his 
performance and qualities as a minister. 
 
Eamon Ryan, the former Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural resources, 
emphasised narratives of ecological modernisation in his communications with the 
media. Each departmental communication contained a mention of climate change, but 
technological solutions, rather than individual actions, were foregrounded. Ryan’s 
activities in office concerned expansion of the energy grid, the introduction of new 
postal codes, the establishment of investment incentives for renewable energy and the 
introduction of electric vehicles. These were presented in a positive, business-friendly 
context. 
 
Similarly, the media advisors to both ministers had different approaches. John Downing, 
the deputy government press secretary, found that he was not called upon to deal with 
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media queries concerning climate change; the bulk of his dealing with the media 
concerned politics. Liam Reid, who worked more closely with Gormley on media 
relations, was required to head off or otherwise deal with negative coverage of the party 
leader. Whatever framing strategies they may have favoured were secondary to 
“reacting, firefighting, trying to manage, trying to dial down, trying to deal.” (John 
Downing, personal interview, February 23, 2017).   
 
Bríd McGrath, who worked with Ryan, had more success with a framing of economic 
opportunity in her communications with the media. She also employed a tactic of 
strategic placement of stories, allocating events, announcements and policy proposals to 
a series of specialist publications and specialist correspondents. She also stated that not 
having worked as a journalist was an advantage, as journalists treated her more 
professionally and her relationship with them was less hostile than those of her 
colleagues. 
 
In summary, Gormley and his team sought to communicate climate change as a real 
danger the solution to which lay partly in changing individual behaviour. The emphasis 
on personal behaviour invited media scrutiny of Gormley’s own behaviour. Ryan and 
his advisor stressed the economic and opportunity frames, which was a more successful 
media strategy as it avoided the stereotype of environmentalists “talking down” to their 
audience, or lecturing them from on high. 
 
7.7 Dynamics of the frame competition 
 
The competitive framing environment around climate change in the timeframe of this 
study was a complex one. The framing strategies of the media, government ministers 
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and their advisors were discussed above in isolation; in this section, how they performed 
when coming into contact with one another is discussed. Gormley attempted to frame 
the issue as one in which individual lifestyle choices were a key means of tackling rising 
emissions. This is similar to the responsibility frame identified in studies of generic 
frames (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). In a significant contribution during our 
interview, Gormley, speaking about a public information campaign, said that “…we 
were trying to make them see, to make the connection between what they were doing in 
their daily lives and the big, big issue of climate change” (John Gormley, personal 
interview, April 13, 2015). Ryan, on the other hand, emphasised the economic and 
opportunity frames. Gormley’s media advisors were forced into reactive strategies by 
the responsibility framing adopted by their minister, while Ryan’s advisor was able to be 
more proactive and strategic in her framing. 
 
The media, meanwhile, reported on climate change largely as a political or ideological 
contest. They engaged in what could be called meta-coverage: they did not, to any great 
degree, adopt the frames put forward by politicians or media advisors, but reported on 
the two competing framing strategies through their own preferred game or strategy 
frame. Thus, the substantive issues of the impact of personal actions, or of the economic 
impacts or opportunities of climate change were not engaged with, but rather a meta-
narrative of how these tactics were succeeding relative to one another in the political 
arena was presented. The media did not undertake journalism which considered the 
problem and investigated the relative merits of proposed solutions; instead they covered 
only the politics of climate policy, essentially writing about the contest between 
Gormley and Ryan interpretations of the issue – meta-coverage that bypassed the topic 
itself. 
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7.8 Mediated issue development and the Irish context 
 
The theories of agenda systems considered earlier (Chapter 3, sections 3.7 to 3.13) seek 
to explain why some issues rise to the top of the public and policy agenda, while others 
do not. In most of these theoretical models, the media are seen as relatively passive and 
stable components, without the power of agency. However, one model, the mediated 
issue development model (Nisbet and Huge, 2006), allows for a more active and 
influential role on the part of the media. To recap briefly, according to this model 
(analysed in detail in section 3.13), four factors contribute to the rise of a particular 
issue: the type of policy venue involved, the media lobbying activities of interested 
parties, the influence of professional norms and news values on the journalists reporting 
on the issue, and the context of the issue relative to other competing issues. 
 
The mediated issue development model has considerable explanatory power when it 
comes to understanding the progress of climate change as a media, public and policy 
issue in Ireland. Many of the elements suggested by the authors as being necessary for 
an issue to rise to the top of the media, public and policy agenda are present in the Irish 
case. For instance, as has been shown in this thesis, there is considerable competition to 
frame the issue of climate change in an advantageous way by strategic actors, such as 
Green Party politicians, agricultural organisations, business organisations and 
environmental NGOs. 
 
Nisbet and Huge also argued that, in order to be “successful”, an issue must transition 
from specialist reporting, such as in the science or environment sections, into general 
and political reporting. In Ireland, such a transition has partially occurred, as climate 
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change is largely reported as a political issue. However, such coverage is confined to 
party political issues rather than more profoundly political or ideological considerations.  
 
Furthermore, the mediated issue model envisages a media environment in which news 
organisations are large enough to have separate science, environment, politics and 
general news sections or departments. In the Irish context, only the Irish Times 
publishes science and environment sections, and these extend only to one or two pages 
on a weekly basis. As the interviews carried out for this thesis show, environment 
correspondents are expected to cover both the scientific and political aspects of climate 
change. 
 
The policy venue in which debates over a particular issue take place is also an important 
factor, the authors argue. When an issue is confined to technical or scientific venues, 
media coverage is low; but when the issue moves to more overtly political arenas, the 
possibility of conflict arises, and media coverage increases. In the case of Ireland, the 
response to climate change during the period considered by this thesis has been 
characterised by a lack of policy debate and an absence of policy proposals (Climate 
Change Advisory Council, 2017b; Torney and Little, 2017).  
 
The mediated issue development model also suggests that journalistic norms and news 
values have a considerable influence on the progress of an issue to the top of the public 
and policy agendas. When an issue is covered by specialist correspondents, it tends to be 
framed in scientific or technical terms. However, once it begins to be covered by 
political correspondents and general news reporters, it is more likely to be presented in 
the strategy frame and media coverage increases. In the case of Ireland, news values and 
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journalistic norms have had a significant influence on both the levels and nature of 
climate change coverage. Journalists interviewed for this thesis have stated that climate 
change does not align well with the news values by which news topics are evaluated. 
However, the strategy frame (or the political frame as it is called in this thesis) 
dominates press coverage. 
 
The authors also suggest that an issue such as climate change will be judged in context 
relative to other competing issues. It is clear that Irish coverage of climate change was 
adversely affected by the collapse of the country’s banking system, the imposition of a 
financial rescue package by the “troika” of the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and by the global financial crisis of 
late 2008-2009. 
 
In conclusion, it is clear that mediated issue development can contribute to an 
understanding of Ireland’s print media coverage of climate change. However, the model 
is not wholly suited to the Irish context because (i) the policy venue debates envisaged 
by the model have been absent in Ireland; (ii) Irish media organisations are not large 
enough to accommodate the reporting transitions put forward by the authors, and (iii) it 
was not possible for climate change to maintain its position on the media agenda in the 
context of the dramatic deterioration of the country’s financial position. 
 
7.9 Recommendations for best practice in covering and communicating about 
climate change  
 
Some conclusions may be drawn from the findings and subsequent discussion and 
analysis presented in this thesis with regard to best practice for those communicating 
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about climate change. These best practice recommendations are based solidly on the 
research presented here, and relate both to journalists covering the issue, and to those 
wishing to increase or influence the nature of media coverage. 
 
Firstly, it is evident that employing a dedicated environmental correspondent serves to 
increase the level of coverage of climate change in a media organisation. The decline in 
the levels of coverage in the Irish Times in the absence of an environment 
correspondent, is apparent from the data presented here, as is the increase in the levels 
of coverage of climate change published by the Irish Independent since the appointment 
of an active and engaged correspondent. The coverage of climate change by the national 
broadcaster, RTÉ, was found to decline following the departure of a dedicated 
environment correspondent (Cullinane and Watson, 2014). 
 
Furthermore, employing a dedicated correspondent may change the nature of a media 
organisation’s coverage. Specialist correspondents have more autonomy in the 
newsroom, are freer to express opinions and are treated as independent experts whose 
judgment can guide coverage (M. Schudson, 2001; Hiles and Hinnant, 2014). The 
correspondents interviewed for this thesis exhibited considerable resourcefulness and 
ingenuity in pitching stories to their editors and in deploying a range of framing 
strategies. They were also more active in generating original news material rather than 
reporting from events. Thus, specialist correspondents may help move news 
organisations away from an over-reliance on the strategy and conflict frames towards 
more positive and engaging framings, such as the opportunity and morality frames. 
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Secondly, a strong argument may be made that a reporting strategy based on coverage of 
the constituent elements of climate change, rather than the issue as a hegemonic whole, 
may be successful. Data from the interviews with journalists and editors suggest that 
topics such as planning, air pollution, water quality, environmental protection, energy 
efficiency measures and technological advances may align more closely with the news 
values of editors. These topics may then be linked with the larger issue of climate 
change in the text of the news article. 
 
Furthermore, it is apparent that journalists assigned to cover set-piece events such as 
international climate change conferences or the release of climate reports revert to 
familiar political or disaster frames in their reports, whereas journalists who propose 
original, “off-diary” coverage have more freedom to deploy a wider range of framing 
strategies. Journalism which reacts to events is characterised by a more limited range of 
frames, while proactive, original journalism is more diverse in its framing. 
 
For those wishing to influence media coverage of climate change, it is clear from the 
evidence presented in this thesis that some framing strategies are more successful than 
others. The responsibility frame, deployed by the former Minister for the Environment, 
John Gormley, proved counterproductive, and produced a hostile reaction, particularly 
from news outlets publishing content sceptical about climate change. The economic and 
opportunity frames proved more successful when employed by the former Minister for 
Communications, Eamon Ryan. However, it proved difficult for those seeking to 
influence media coverage to persuade journalists to abandon their preferred conflict and 
strategy framings, suggesting that, while external actors may increase levels of 
coverage, influencing the nature of coverage may prove more difficult. 
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It is also evident that a flexible approach, tailoring communications material (and how 
such information is framed) to specific news outlets can attract coverage. The media 
advisor to the Minister for Communications employed such a strategy, directing 
differing material to television, newspapers, specialist outlets and websites (Bríd 
McGrath, personal interview, February 8, 2017).  
 
This approach was in contrast to her colleagues (John Downing and Liam Reid) working 
with the Minister for the Environment. These media advisors spent considerable 
amounts of time attempting to discourage or minimise negative coverage. Both had 
worked previously as journalists for print newspapers. While this experience gave them 
valuable insights into news routines and journalism practice, it also meant they had 
existing relationships with the political, environment and news journalists they now 
dealt with as media advisors (John Downing, personal interview, February 23, 2017; 
Bríd McGrath, personal interview, February 8, 2017). This state of affairs in turn meant 
it was difficult to maintain an appropriate professional distance from those journalists 
they engaged with, and calls into question the advisability of employing former 
journalists as press advisors.  
 
Journalists covering climate change offered recommendations for improving both the 
level of coverage, and its content. Improved scientific literacy among journalists would 
help in being able to summarise complex documents (Claire O'Sullivan, personal 
interview, June 16, 2015), and less newsroom pressure would allow reporters to 
investigate the issue more deeply (Kevin O’Sullivan, personal interview, August 14, 
2017). Journalists should ignore sceptic arguments (Frank McDonald, personal 
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interview, May 15, 2015), attend to the local implications of international events and 
concentrate on the disparity between goals and targets and actions deployed to achieve 
them (Paul Cunningham, personal interview, April 24, 2015). All, however, emphasised 
the difficulties in communicating the complexities of the issue. 
 
The perspectives of media advisors in relation to media practice is also valuable. Those 
seeking media coverage must provide effective communication, rather than “blame the 
conduit guys”, who may be uninterested in climate change and are often “cut and paste 
merchants” (Bríd McGrath, personal interview, February 8, 2017). This viewpoint links 
to arguments about a lack of material on which journalists can base their reports. 
Perhaps, instead of attempting wholesale changes in the way the media operates, it may 
be more productive for actors to tailor their communications to appeal to the media as 
they are currently constituted. The media need something to report on. Few newsrooms, 
especially in Ireland, have the resources to carry out investigations ab initio. In his 
comparison between climate change coverage in 1988 and 2012, Sheldon Ungar pointed 
to a key difference between the two periods. In 1988, there were multiple “inputs” 
relating to climate change: events, speeches, hearings, reports and protests (Ungar, 
2014). In short, there were matters the media could report on, pretext under which 
climate change could be covered. In Ireland, given the lack of action on climate change, 
there are relatively few occasions for coverage: sparse legislation, a dearth of policy 
initiatives and few parliamentary debates. If there is little action on climate change by 
way of reports, policy initiatives, parliamentary debates or climate legislation, then the 
news hooks on which journalists can hang stories are missing. Climate change is 
inherently repetitive, and, as a range of social theorists have noted, focusing events are 
required to promote issues up the agenda ladder. Journalists need these focusing events 
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also, as a pretext under which climate change related material can be published. The 
environmental journalists interviewed for this thesis are ready to take advantage of any 
inputs from the policy or politics spheres as a means by which climate change 
information can be put before the public. 
 
7.10 Implications for further research 
 
The competition to establish dominant frames in relation to intractable social and 
political issues is a complex process. This research has analysed the dynamics of this 
contest as it relates to climate change, and as it involved journalists, government 
ministers and their media advisors. The role of other actors in this process, such as 
NGOs, lobbyists, industry figures and civil society, has not been examined in this thesis, 
and could be acknowledged by further research.  
 
Likewise, research into the nature of climate change coverage as presented through 
other media in Ireland – social media, local press, specialist publications, blogs – could 
further uncover the dynamics of the frame competition. The role of the farming press 
and the provincial press, in particular the Farmers’ Journal, might repay examination in 
relation to urban vs rural framings of climate change and in light of the Journal’s role in 
promoting the sceptic Irish Climate Science Forum (Gibbons, 2017).  
 
The diverging communications strategies of the two government ministers interviewed 
for this thesis could also be examined in greater detail. Their alignment with the “realo” 
and “fundi” perspectives of the wider green movement, and a content analysis of their 
official departmental communications, could form the basis of further scholarly 
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investigation, and might also be widened to include investigations of the 
communications strategies of Greens in other countries. 
 
This thesis provides a basis for further research concerning the changing role of sceptics 
in the frame competition around climate change. The identification of new rhetorical 
strategies employed by sceptics – the “honest broker” and the “climate dismissives” – 
could form part of a more modern typology of denial to update previous ones, such as 
Rahmsdorf’s 2004 model.  
 
Lastly, the results and analysis provided here could form the starting point for several 
cross-national studies on media coverage of climate change. For instance, a study of 
media coverage of climate change in other European states affected by the global 
financial crisis of 2008-2009, such as Portugal, Spain and Greece could be examined. 
The influence of Green parties in other countries might also be examined with a view to 
establishing the effect of Greens in power on national media coverage of environmental 
issues. 
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Appendix D: how stories and interviews were coded in Nvivo 
 
Step 1: articles were imported into the Nvivo software and set up as a series of ‘nodes’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 2: articles were coded according to descriptive variables into a ‘classification sheet’. 
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Step 3: each article was coded for the presence of frames. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 387	
Step 4: the text coded to each frame appears then as a separate ‘node’, and text captured 
on each frame appearing in multiple articles can be recalled and analysed. 
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Step 5: Interview transcripts were imported into Nvivo. 
 
	  
	 389	
Step 6: the text of each transcript was coded as it pertained to certain topics. 
 
 
Step 7: each of these topics was created as a ‘node’ and the text coded to them could be 
recalled and analysed. 
 
 
 
